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FOREWORD

In 1999 NATO will formally admit three new members
and adopt a new strategic concept. In so doing, it will take
giant strides towards effecting a revolutionary transformation of European security. On the one hand, it could be
said that NATO enlargement closes the immediate
post-Cold War period that began with the collapse of the
Berlin Wall in 1989. But on the other hand, enlargement
raises a host of serious new issues for the Alliance and for
U.S. policymakers that they must begin to address now.
Bearing this fact in mind, the Strategic Studies Institute
(SSI) organized a conference with the Center for Strategic
and International Studies in January 1998 to explore the
new challenges confronting the NATO Alliance. These
essays are the product of that conference.
Undoubtedly, considerable future debate on all of the
issues addressed here will take place. But that is precisely
why SSI, in fulfilling its responsibility to contribute to and
shape debates over national security, is presenting these
essays. We hope that this collection will stimulate our
audiences to reflect more deeply upon these issues which
affect the vital interests of the United States and its allies.

LARRY M. WORTZEL
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Stephen J. Blank
In April 1999, NATO members will celebrate in
Washington the 50th anniversary of the Washington Treaty
and the founding of NATO. At that time they will enroll
three new members: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic, decide upon NATO’s new strategic concept, and
raise issues connected with the possibility of further
enlargement. In the wake of the Paris and Madrid
conferences of 1997 that consummated agreements with
Russia and Ukraine on their relationships with NATO and
resolved to admit the three aforementioned states as
members, NATO is moving forward to reshape the
European security agenda. But, as in other situations, we
may ask “Quo Vadis NATO?” and even more sharply make
the same inquiry of individual members and of Russia. In
fact, it is quite clear that, despite the American claim that
enlargement is merely projecting stability eastward, it
actually constitutes a radical transformation of the
European agenda and of both U.S. and European history.
And, as such, NATO enlargement raises a host of issues for
future consideration.
But nobody can say for sure where enlargement will
lead, or, more importantly, how it will be enforced, though
hopes for and prognostications of the ultimate point of
arrival abound. Nor can we resolve with any certainty the
myriad issues involved in extending NATO both in terms of
its organizational scope and its future missions. That
extension, particularly in terms of territory or geographical
scope is immense in its implications, but the final outcome
or resolution of all those issues necessarily remains unclear.
That uncertainty is not surprising. It is commonly the case
that major restructurings of international politics are
undertaken by statesmen and politicians who have only a
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partial notion at best of where they hope go. As Napoleon
would have said, “on s’engage et puis on voit,” (One commits
himself and then sees where he is). Precisely because the
process of NATO enlargement is itself such a transformation and raises probably more issues and questions
than it answers, the Strategic Studies Institute undertook a
conference in Washington on January 26, 1998, to begin the
process of seeing where the United States and where NATO
are going. The following chapters are the fruits of that
conference, but obviously they can only deal with some of
the issues. Questions like the Baltic littoral’s future, the
nature of peace operations in the future, or the emerging
situation in Bosnia and, more recently, in Kossovo, are not
specifically included. But many other fundamental issues
have been addressed. Simon Serfaty addresses the larger
issue of where European security institutions in general,
i.e., not just NATO, but the European Union and its
hoped-for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are
going. Robert Dorff assesses trends in both American and
European public opinion regarding issues raised by
enlargement and possible future military contingencies.
Stephen Blank probes the rival visions of America, Russia,
and Europe concerning the future missions and roles of
NATO and of these three sets of governments. Sherman
Garnett and Rachel Lebenson analyze the complicated
situation on Russia’s Western frontier where Moldova,
Belarus, and Ukraine all interact in a complex way with
Russia and the members of NATO. Rachel Bronson and
Glen Howard track the little-discussed but increasingly
important strategic interaction of NATO and the United
States with the Transcaucasian and Central Asia states.
General Edward Atkeson (U.S. Army Retired) discusses
issues of burdensharing among allies and the military
implications of the Partnership for Peace program within
the expanded NATO. And General Frederick Kroesen (U.S.
Army Retired) raises the important question of how NATO
actually should go about building a true military coalition.
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All of these are fundamental issues that will be
addressed, either by conscious design or by default, in the
years to come. But it is essential to realize that their
importance, along with that of other issues not covered here,
represents a transformation but not a repudiation of
NATO’s and the allies’ past histories. As Kosovo shows us,
and other issues would do so as well, conflict, interstate
rivalry, and states’ efforts to maximize their influence in
Europe have not disappeared from the agenda. Far from
ending European political history, enlargement only opens
a new chapter with elements of continuity existing besides
elements of profound innovation. It will certainly be an
interesting and probably exciting adventure to watch or
participate in this new evolution. We organized the
conference in January 1998 and present the following
essays with the intent of contributing to the debate and to
our audience’s ability either to understand or take part in at
least some of the major issues in Europe’s future. We hope
that the analyses and information contained here will be
enlightening to laymen and experts alike, and increase the
informed debate over some of the most critical security
issues the United States will face in the near future.
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CHAPTER 2
PUBLIC OPINION AND NATO ENLARGEMENT
Robert H. Dorff
INTRODUCTION
The process of NATO enlargement has thus far followed
a curious path. For what is clearly a decision of enormous
magnitude with potential implications for global as well as
regional security, the silence is deafening. In the United
States and in Europe, little if any meaningful public debate
has occurred on the many critical dimensions of the issue.1
Why such debates have not occurred is itself an interesting
and important question, and the answer more than likely
varies across the different countries. But it is not the central
question addressed in this essay. Rather, the focus here is
on the nature of public opinion (content, intensity, stability)
on the issue of enlargement and the possible implications of
that opinion for the future of the enlargement process and
the Alliance itself.
The fact that very little, if indeed any meaningful debate
has occurred within the existing NATO member countries is
itself somewhat surprising. Yet one could argue that this
generally reflects the preoccupation of the publics and their
elected officials with domestic issues. Much has been made
in the United States of President Clinton’s near exclusion of
foreign and security policy from his list of priorities. And
certainly among many Western European countries today
basic economic issues such as unemployment and growth,
not to mention the soon-to-be created European Monetary
Union, occupy center stage, making discussions of NATO
Partial support for this research was provided by a grant from the USAF
Institute for National Security Studies (Lieutenant Colonel Peter L. Hays,
Director). The author gratefully acknowledges the input and assistance
provided by Dr. Thomas-Durell Young, Colonel Jeffrey D. McCausland, and Dr.
Stephen J. Blank, as well as the support of the Strategic Studies Institute.
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enlargement at best a second-tier priority for both the mass
and elite publics. But what is perhaps even more striking for
this analysis is the fact that virtually no real debate has
occurred not just in the current NATO member states but
even in the countries that aspire to NATO membership. As
we shall see, public opinion about enlargement in the new
member countries is almost as formless and potentially
unstable as it is in many of the current member countries.
The thesis embedded in this analysis is certainly not
that public opinion will or even should play a determinative
role in the decisions to proceed with enlargement or to seek
membership. Rather, the thesis is that the nearly complete
absence of serious attempts by policymakers and opinion
leaders to inform and thereby shape the public debate will
have potentially deleterious consequences for the Alliance
at some as yet unspecified period down the road. For the
absence of a broader public debate is simply an indicator of
the more important absence of an underlying strategic
consensus on such critical matters as the role and purpose of
the Alliance, the responsibilities of individual members to
it, and the conditions under which the Alliance can and
should be called into action. In terms of grand strategy, this
issue is hardly trivial. If there is very little context within
which the policymakers can explain and justify the core
functions of the Alliance to their respective publics, then the
political will that must underlie such an Alliance to ensure
its timely and effective action will be largely absent. The
approach taken to date seems to presume that we can
address the strategic questions later, if and perhaps only
when the need actually arises. And it is in the critical area of
the context for such a future debate that the current nature
and role of public opinion deserve attention.2
This essay examines the issue of NATO enlargement
from the perspective of public opinion. It begins with some
general observations about the role and nature of public
opinion in democracies. Then it looks at some of the specific
public opinion survey data that address public opinion and
NATO enlargement in current and future NATO members.
6

Finally, it concludes with a discussion of possible
implications that current opinion and the enlargement
process might have on the future of enlargement and the
future of NATO.
SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT PUBLIC
OPINION
Studies of public opinion in democracies have long noted
the contradiction between the democratic ideal of an
informed public shaping public policy and the practical
reality of an ill-informed general public rarely attuned to
their country’s foreign and security policy decisions.3 At the
same time, studies have demonstrated that at critical
moments in history, public opinion (both mass and elite)
plays an important role in determining if, when, and how a
democracy responds to crises.4 So while one body of evidence
suggests that the mass public is largely unaware of and
uninterested in foreign and security policy as a general rule,
another body of evidence nonetheless points to situations in
which public opinion has in fact played an important role in
shaping policy outcomes in this broad issue area. In fact,
these somewhat contradictory findings are not incompatible, as an informed understanding of the nature and
role of public opinion would reveal. Therefore, it is
important to begin this analysis with a brief examination of
public opinion in a democracy.
The study of public opinion has to some extent suffered
from the advent of nearly universal and instantaneous
polling capabilities and techniques. The use of polls to
predict election outcomes has created a false sense of public
opinion as something that is inherently “knowable,”
concrete, and stable. First, sophisticated research has
shown that this is not even true for election analysis.
Second, and most important for the purposes of this essay,
much of that view is based on the rather unique conditions
under which election polling occurs. Consider the following:
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• In the United States, for example, voter choice is often
essentially dichotomous. Potential voters are basically
choosing between two major candidates.
• In highly visible races (such as the presidency),
candidates enjoy relatively high name recognition among
the voters. When asked, the public knows what the choices
are.
• Most individuals have preexisting (some stronger
than others, of course) dispositions to choose one candidate
over the other. These dispositions are anchored in a belief
system generally learned at an early age and reinforced over
time through contacts with events and individuals. It
includes both an individual’s general philosophical
orientation (liberal-conservative) and a more specific
partisan orientation (party identification).

None of these unique qualities obtain when one moves
into the general realm of public opinion and public policy. As
study after study has shown, public opinion on matters of
general public policy is at best quite fluid and at worst
completely unanchored. Only for the perhaps 10-15 percent
of the most informed and most ideologically consistent
individuals does “constraint” across policy issue areas exist
in substantial amounts.5 Why is this? Consider the unique
conditions about voting choice listed above. For one thing,
real public policy is not about simple dichotomous choices.
The issue is not whether “more” or “less” should be spent on
a particular problem (although this is frequently how such
questions are worded), but also how it should be spent (if at
all). Moreover, individuals frequently have very little idea
about the content of existing policy, so questions purporting
to tap their preferences often tap “doorstep” or “induced”
opinions because the individual has no clear sense of what
the choices really are.6 Finally, at any level other than the
most general (whether one is in favor of social security, for
example), most individuals have little or no guidance from
their philosophical orientations (liberal, conservative, etc.)
on which to rely. Consequently, opinions on matters of
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public policy (as opposed to voter preference) are much more
likely to be weak and therefore unstable. Measuring the
content and impact of public opinion on public policy is
inherently more complex and problematic than voting
behavior research implies.
The critical dimension of public opinion is not its content
per se (what opinion one holds) but the intensity with which
it is held. Careful study reveals that almost everyone has
some kind of opinion on an issue when asked. But the
intensity with which one holds an opinion reflects how
clearly the opinion is formed (its substantive content) and
how likely that opinion is to endure (its stability).
Individuals with strongly held, lasting opinions are quite
unlikely to change them, and far more likely to base their
behavior on those opinions (to act on them). That is why we
find that intensely held, enduring opinions are the most
likely to influence the policy process.7 Despite the attention
that short-term, volatile opinions often receive from the
media, there is little evidence to suggest that they have
substantial influence on the policy-making process beyond
some very minor, often symbolic pronouncements by
policymakers. Moreover, evidence is abundant that elected
policymakers in democracies who assume that the people
have “spoken” on a particular issue frequently get punished
by those same people who appear to have “changed their
minds” when a specific bill or action is undertaken. Absent a
stable opinion on the issue, the people respond to specific,
concrete actions when they are put on the table, not to policy
in the abstract.
Returning to the NATO enlargement debate, these
general observations about public opinion help shed light on
the current situation. Many individuals in all of the
countries will have basic opinions on the dichotomous
questions of enlargement (should NATO enlarge, should
our country join), especially when they are asked for them.
At the same time, there will be little context underlying
those opinions. In the absence of a meaningful debate,
shaped and led by an informed policy elite, most public
9

opinion will be shallow, weakly formed and held, and
consequently highly unstable. People will willingly express
an opinion on whether they are for or against NATO
enlargement, or their country joining NATO. How they will
in fact react to a future decision to commit NATO forces, or
to increase spending in order to meet Alliance obligations,
or to defend a new member if attacked, or to some kind of
internal crisis within NATO, and so on is anything but clear.
A critical decision about the use of the Alliance may have to
be made in the nearly complete absence of any underlying
public comprehension of the general strategic necessity and
purpose of the Alliance. This is hardly a model for successful
policymaking in a democracy. And perhaps more important,
it is hardly a model for successful grand strategy formulation and implementation in modern democracies.
PUBLIC OPINION AND NATO ENLARGEMENT:
SOME DATA8
New NATO Members.9
As noted in the introduction, one of the most surprising
features of public opinion and NATO enlargement is the
relative absence of any serious public debate in the new
member countries. In fact, and perhaps reflecting the view
held by policymakers in these countries that the public
might not desire NATO membership, only one of the
countries has held a public referendum on the issue. In that
referendum, held in November 1997 in Hungary,
approximately 85 percent of those voting expressed
approval for joining NATO. However, in that same
referendum barely over 50 percent of the eligible citizenry
voted, the minimum threshold required for the referendum
to be valid. Poland and the Czech Republic have not held,
and do not plan to hold, any popular votes on the issue of
joining NATO. In essence, then, we are left with the publicly
available survey data to consider in assessing the nature of
public opinion on the enlargement issue. Let us now turn to
those data.10
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If (survey country) had the opportunity to become a full
member of NATO, would you strongly favor, somewhat favor,
somewhat oppose or strongly oppose our country doing so?

Favor
Czech Republic
1997
1996
1995
Hungary
1997
1996
1995
Poland
1997
1996
1995

Oppose

Don’t Know

60%
51%
59%

32%
33%
27%

8%
16%
14%

55%
57%
58%

34%
27%
27%

11%
16%
15%

83%
72%
81%

9%
12%
8%

8%
16%
11%

Table 1. Support for NATO Membership.
Table 1 presents the results of the survey that asked
individuals from each of the countries to indicate whether
they strongly favored, somewhat favored, somewhat
opposed, or strongly opposed their country joining NATO if
the opportunity were presented. In the table these
categories were further collapsed into three categories
(favor, oppose, and don’t know). Only in Poland does the
expressed public support for joining NATO achieve
convincingly strong levels; 83 percent of those surveyed
expressed support, while only 9 percent were opposed and
only 8 percent expressed no opinion. In 1996 the level of
support was 72 percent, and in 1995 it had been 81 percent.
Although the data reveal a little “bounce” over the 3-year
period, there does appear to be fairly consistent support
among the Polish public for joining NATO. Data are
available from 1996 that break the results down into the
original four categories and “don’t know," and it is useful to
note that of the 72 percent who expressed support, 28
percent strongly favored and 44 percent somewhat favored
11

Poland joining NATO. Although this represents a
reasonably healthy level of general support, it is hardly a
ringing endorsement for the proposal to join NATO.
The results for Hungary and the Czech Republic are less
encouraging. In Hungary support has remained fairly
steady in the mid- to upper-50 percent range (from 58
percent in 1995 to 55 percent in 1997). But of the 57 percent
that expressed support in 1996, 19 percent strongly favored
while 38 percent somewhat favored. In this case, more than
twice the total supporters fell into the “somewhat favor”
category as into the “strongly favor” category. And perhaps
most significant is the fact that fully 34 percent (just over
one-third) of the respondents in 1997 expressed opposition
to Hungary joining NATO (up from 27 percent in the
previous 2 years). In the Czech Republic support appears to
be somewhere around the 60 percent level (although it also
was lower in 1996 at 51 percent). Of that 51 percent support
in 1996, 17 percent consisted of strongly favor and 34
percent of somewhat favor; here again, twice as many
supporters expressed some as opposed to strong support for
joining NATO. And as in Hungary, expressed opposition in
the Czech Republic to joining NATO constituted about
one-third of all respondents. If, as a number of observers
have argued, the time for NATO enlargement has indeed
come, it is more than a little surprising that significant
percentages of citizens in these new member countries seem
either not to recognize it, or to acknowledge it only in a
lukewarm fashion. And of course, we should note that
respondents were not asked anything about costs, missions,
risks, or any of the potential “burdens” associated with
joining—they are simply asked, in a very general way,
whether they would support their country joining NATO if
the opportunity arose. By most standards of survey
research, such a question is biased toward the “favor” end of
the response spectrum.11
And indeed this shows up when questions are asked
concerning the public’s willingness to support specific
security-related actions. Questions were posed to
12

respondents concerning four such actions: sending their
own troops to defend another NATO country; hosting
regular, routine NATO exercises in their country; allowing
regular, routine overflights of their country by NATO
aircraft; and stationing NATO troops in their country. (See
Tables 2-5.) As with the general question concerning
support for NATO membership, the highest levels of
support are found in Poland, with 70 percent of the public
expressing some support for sending troops and hosting
exercises, and 54 percent and 55 percent for allowing
overflights and stationing troops respectively.12 But even in
Poland nearly one-fourth of those surveyed (23 percent)
expressed opposition to sending troops and hosting
exercises, while more than a third were opposed to
overflights (37 percent) and stationing troops (35 percent).
The next highest levels of support are found in the Czech
Republic, as was also the case for NATO membership
generally. Here we find just over half of the respondents
expressing support for sending troops (52 percent), not even
half supporting exercises (47 percent), just over one-third
supporting overflights (36 percent), and less than one-third
for stationing troops (29 percent). But a matter of genuine
concern emerges here when we look at levels of opposition to
these actions. Fully 44 percent expressed opposition to
sending troops to support another NATO country, 48
percent opposed hosting exercises, a clear majority (60
percent) opposed allowing overflights, and an overwhelming majority of two-thirds (66 percent) opposed the
stationing of NATO troops on Czech soil. In Hungary only
one-third (33 percent) supported sending their own troops to
support another NATO member whereas nearly two-thirds
opposed it (63 percent), around one-third (35 percent)
supported hosting exercises whereas 60 percent opposed the
notion, 46 percent supported and 50 percent opposed
allowing overflights, and a clear majority was opposed to the
stationing of troops in Hungary (58 percent to 38 percent).
With perhaps the exception of Poland, the publics in these
countries seem to be expressing moderate support for
joining NATO, but with a corollary qualification that their
13

country not have to fulfill any real obligations as part of that
membership.

As you may know, if we join NATO there are certain things we
MAY be asked to do. Please tell me if you would strongly
support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly
oppose the following: Sending our troops to defend another
NATO country.

Support

Oppose

Czech Republic
1997
1996
1995

52%
45%
42%

44%
48%
50%

Hungary
1997
1996
1995

33%
32%
26%

63%
60%
69%

Poland
1997
1996
1995

70%
68%
55%

23%
24%
35%

Table 2. Support for Sending Troops.
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Regular, routine exercises by NATO forces in our country.

Czech Republic
1997
1996
1995
Hungary
1997
1996
1995
Poland
1997
1996
1995

Support

Oppose

47%
34%
33%

48%
61%
60%

35%
26%
28%

60%
67%
67%

70%
67%
45%

23%
25%
45%

Table 3. Support for NATO Exercises.

Regular, routine overflights by NATO aircraft over our
country.

Czech Republic
1997
1996
1995
Hungary
1997
1996
1995
Poland
1997
1996
1995

Support

Oppose

36%
30%
26%

60%
63%
67%

46%
36%
35%

50%
57%
58%

54%
53%
41%

37%
37%
47%

Table 4. Support for Overflight by NATO Aircraft.
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Stationing NATO troops in our country.

Czech Republic
1997
1996
1995
Hungary
1997
1996
1995
Poland
1997
1996
1995

Support

Oppose

29%
31%
30%

66%
63%
63%

38%
44%
34%

58%
49%
59%

55%
52%
56%

35%
38%
34%

Table 5. Support for NATO Troops in Country.
The opposition to stationing NATO troops in these
countries is certainly understandable, especially given the
oft-expressed official position that there is no need, no
intention, and no plan to do so (the so-called “three NO’s”).
But the majority opposition in Hungary is perhaps a bit
curious given the fact that NATO troops are in fact currently
based in that country in support of the operations in Bosnia,
and had been for more than 2 years at the time this question
was asked. But putting the issue of stationing NATO troops
aside, there is still ample reason to be concerned when we
consider this pattern of opinion. What if a NATO member
(new or old) were to feel threatened and the Alliance moved
under Article 4 to consult about possible actions to be taken?
And what if an attack on a NATO member actually led to an
attempt to mobilize for an Article 5 collective action?
Leaders in Poland would probably be able to galvanize the
necessary public support to join in. In the Czech Republic a
battle royale could ensue as the public would apparently
split virtually down the middle. While in Hungary, elected
officials could face a monumental uphill fight against a
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public that is nearly 2-1 against providing such
assistance.13 Perhaps most disturbing is the possibility that
such politically volatile debates could occur in the near term
in countries whose democratic institutions and processes
are barely a decade old. To observe that such crises might
severely strain those fledgling democracies is surely to
engage in understatement.
Before looking at public opinion in the existing NATO
member countries, one other related issue requires
attention: spending. As noted previously, the general
question about joining NATO had no “burdens” attached to
it—no mention of requirements, costs, risks, and so on. One
of the frequently mentioned issues, however, is cost, and it is
worth considering how the publics in these countries react
when issues of spending are raised. In the surveys
conducted by USIA this was done in two ways. First,
respondents were asked whether they would support or
oppose increased defense spending. Second, and generally
an even more reliable measure of public support for specific
spending policies, respondents were asked if they would
support or oppose increasing the percentage of their
national budget spent on defense as opposed to education
and health care (the classic “guns versus butter” comparison). On the general question of increased defense
spending, only in Poland was a majority in support of an
increase; 55 percent supported the idea, while one-third (33
percent) opposed it, and 12 percent responded “don’t know.”
In the Czech Republic fully two-thirds of the respondents
opposed the idea (66 percent), whereas only 27 percent
expressed support and 6 percent were undecided. In
Hungary, only one-third (33 percent) supported an increase,
whereas 58 percent opposed it and 8 percent were
undecided. When posed as a potential trade-off between
increasing defense spending and decreasing domestic
spending, public support for increasing defense spending
not surprisingly dropped off precipitously in all three
countries (and expressed opposition rose accordingly). In
Poland only 29 percent expressed support for an increase in
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defense spending while 62 percent were opposed. In the
Czech Republic only 16 percent were in favor while 80
percent were opposed. And in Hungary only 10 percent of
the public expressed support while 88 percent were
opposed. If joining NATO means expending scarce
resources on improving defense capabilities in order to
enhance security, elected policymakers in these three
countries are not in an enviable position. The domestic
politics of such policy decisions could get very testy, indeed.
Once again, this distribution of opinion is wholly
understandable. These countries and their peoples are
faced with some daunting economic challenges. The harsh
realities of economic reform, not to mention the perceptions
of individuals that they are being unfairly and unjustly
treated, are enough to ensure widespread opposition to
anything that would compete with domestic programs,
especially education and health care. Moreover, the legacy
of the Cold War and memories of the military machinery
underlying it are themselves probably sufficient for high
levels of lingering skepticism about increased defense
budgets. And, as many observers have noted, the end of the
Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union have made
it very difficult to justify such increases (and in many cases
to justify the status quo) in defense spending. If the rhetoric
among current NATO members is correct that the majority
of the costs of NATO enlargement will be borne by the new
members themselves, then one must hope that the “cost
optimists” are correct and the “cost pessimists” are wrong.14
If not, then we are in for a nasty political struggle within and
between old and new NATO members over burden-sharing
issues. If one thought some of the old NATO burden-sharing
debates were acrimonious, just wait until the rifts emerge
between the new and the old members (at both the elite and
mass levels). And this observation brings us to the next
question: How do things look in the current NATO member
countries?
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Old NATO Members.15
Among some of the startling aspects of the NATO
enlargement debate, at least when compared to discussions
that were occurring shortly after the end of the Cold War, is
the virtual resurrection of NATO itself. Not that long ago
serious doubts existed as to the future utility and viability of
the Alliance. According to some analysts, the Alliance was
doomed to disappear completely or at least fade into
irrelevance.16 Today, and especially in the aftermath of the
Dayton Accords and the ongoing NATO operations in
Bosnia, the future existence of NATO seems assured well
into the next century. And public support for the Alliance in
the NATO member countries certainly indicates no
near-term problems for that existence. In Germany
approximately 6 of 10 respondents expressed confidence in
NATO to “deal effectively with European problems,” while
in France and Great Britain at least 7 of 10 respondents
expressed such confidence. Moreover, in 1997, 74 percent of
German, 69 percent of British, and 58 percent of French
respondents considered NATO “essential to their countries’
security.”17
But the picture for NATO enlargement is significantly
murkier, characterized by greater fluidity and uncertainty
in publicly held opinions. For example, public skepticism is
increasing, with less than half of the respondents in these
three European countries believing that enlargement
generally will benefit the overall security of Europe. In
France, 39 percent think enlargement will benefit overall
European security while 41 percent think enlargement will
harm it. In Germany, 38 percent think enlargement will be
a benefit while 37 percent think it will be harmful. And in
Great Britain, 42 percent think it will benefit and 36 percent
think it will harm overall European security. In all three
countries, at least 20 percent of the respondents “don’t
know” whether enlargement will benefit or harm overall
European security, indicating that there is a significant
amount of uncertainty among the public.
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As with our discussion of enlargement in the new
member countries, though, we must also look at more
specific aspects of enlargement in our assessment of public
opinion in the existing NATO members. In Germany, for
which we have more detailed survey data, the tension
between enlargement in the abstract and enlargement in
the concrete has been evident for a number of years. In
1994-95, 33 percent of German respondents favored NATO
enlargement, 25 percent opposed it, and 42 percent were
undecided when asked only about the general prospect of
enlargement. When the question was reframed to focus
specifically on Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary,
support rose to 47 percent and opposition declined to 20
percent. But when asked if they supported the admission of
these three countries knowing that Germany would be
bound to come to their defense if they were attacked, 41
percent now opposed enlargement and only 27 percent
supported it.18 In other words, evidence suggests that a
substantial subgroup of the German public supports NATO
enlargement as long as NATO is never called upon to do
anything.
And in 1997, when Germans were asked whether they
supported the admission of specific countries “keeping in
mind that our country must defend any NATO country that
comes under attack,” 35 percent supported and 51 percent
opposed the admission of Poland, 36 percent supported and
44 percent opposed Hungary, and 39 percent supported and
48 percent opposed the Czech Republic.19 The results in
Great Britain were: Poland (49 percent supported-26
percent opposed), Hungary (37 percent supported-37
percent opposed), and Czech Republic (44 percent
supported-30 percent opposed). In France the results were:
Poland (43 percent supported-44 percent opposed),
Hungary (37 percent supported-46 percent opposed), and
Czech Republic (34 percent supported-52 percent opposed).
In no country did any of the new members receive a majority
of expressed support for joining NATO (although Poland
came very close in Great Britain at 49 percent, which is
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probably not a statistically significant difference from 50
percent). In two cases (Poland in Germany and the Czech
Republic in France) majority opposition to admission
obtained, while significant levels of opposition (over 40
percent) were found in three other cases (Czech Republic
and Hungary in Germany, and Hungary in France). What is
especially noteworthy in this is that Germany, where public
enthusiasm for specific action in support of new NATO
members appears to be consistently the lowest among the
three current members, is widely viewed as the country that
has pushed the hardest for the enlargement process.20 If
ever there appeared to be a divergence of opinion between
elected officials and the mass public, the current situation in
Germany is one. Given the national elections to be held in
that country in the fall of 1998, one has to wonder just what
this divergence will mean for the future of NATO (even if it
appears to have had no influence on the formal enlargement
decision).
A similar situation is found when we examine public
opinion and possible new roles and missions for NATO. Of
the Germans surveyed on this issue in 1993-94, 74 percent
expressed support for “NATO involvement in new crises on
Europe’s periphery.” However, there was no specific
indication of just what that “periphery” was; it could be seen
as very broad (to include the Middle East and North Africa,
for example) or very narrow (to include only Western
Europe). But taking enlargement into consideration, it
would seem logical that the periphery would include at a
minimum the new NATO members. And yet 55 percent of
the same respondents in Germany who expressed support
for this expanded NATO mission “agreed that the
Bundeswehr’s role should remain limited to territorial
defense and that Germany’s allies must assume
responsibility for such missions [crisis management]
themselves.”21 Should the need arise to employ NATO in
either a new crisis management or even in a traditional
territorial defense role (with an expanded NATO territory),
a difficult domestic political debate could ensue. The effects
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of such a debate on the cohesiveness and effectiveness of the
Alliance is difficult to predict, but it is likely to be all the
more acrimonious in the absence of significant prior
discussion and debate as part of the enlargement process.
Overall, the picture for public opinion and NATO in the
existing member countries is also perplexing. While general
support for and confidence in NATO remains strong among
these publics, the issue of enlargement is much more
complex. Generally speaking, a substantial plurality and
perhaps an occasional majority of the publics support
enlargement. But as can be seen from the data, these
pluralities and certainly any majorities disappear when the
issue of specific countries joining NATO is raised and is
linked with the obligation to defend them. Underlying this
subtle but important shift in opinion is a public that is very
split on the notion of whether enlargement will be a net plus
or minus for European security. All in all, we conclude that
public opinion on the issue of enlargement is at best
characterized as “fragile support.” This fragility stems from
the fact that the support exists largely at the general level,
and as more specifics are added to the equation (countries,
obligations, and costs) that support begins to dissipate.
Even more significant is the fact that expressed opposition
begins to increase. This sets the stage for what could be
some very highly charged and difficult debates about
Alliance decisionmaking and participation in meeting
obligations in the future, a point to which we shall return
later in this essay.
The United States.
By now it should hardly surprise anyone that a similar
situation is found in the United States in terms of public
opinion and NATO enlargement. First, as was found in the
European NATO countries, there is broad support for
NATO generally. In a survey conducted by the Program on
International Policy Attitudes in September 1996, fully
two-thirds (67 percent) of the American public viewed
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NATO favorably, while only 20 percent had an unfavorable
view. Moreover, two-thirds (67 percent) “believed NATO is
still essential to our country’s security,” whereas only 30
percent did not. And finally from this same study, a majority
felt that the United States should “either maintain its
commitment to NATO at present levels (59 percent) or
increase its commitment (5 percent)” with only 24 percent in
favor of decreasing that commitment and 5 percent in favor
of withdrawing completely.22 In short, despite some of the
post-Cold War calls for reducing American commitments
abroad, including commitments to Europe and NATO, a
significant majority of Americans seem satisfied with U.S.
involvement in NATO and with the Alliance itself.
But here, too, the picture changes somewhat when we
turn our attention to the issue of NATO enlargement. In a
survey conducted by the Pew Research Center for the
People and the Press in April 1997, Americans appeared
largely uninterested in the issue. Only about a fifth stated
that they were following the issue very closely (6 percent) or
somewhat closely (16 percent), while more than threequarters were either following it not too closely (27 percent)
or not at all closely (50 percent). In terms of opinion content,
the American public was split on the issue. In the same Pew
Center poll in April 1997, 44 percent were in favor of
expanding NATO “to include some countries from central
and eastern Europe” while 41 percent felt NATO should
“stay as it is.” When the question was altered to mention
specific countries (namely, the three now being admitted),
American respondents were “somewhat more likely to
support enlargement (47 percent) than to say the Alliance
should stay as it is (39 percent).”23 But when asked whether
they supported enlargement to include the three proposed
countries “thereby committing the United States to defend
them against attack in the same way as we are committed to
defending western Europe,” Americans responded only
somewhat more favorably than Europeans: 44 percent
supported the idea and 47 percent opposed it.24 Once again,
this is hardly a ringing public endorsement for the
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enlargement process, and there also appears to be a similar
contradiction as observed among the European publics: the
public supports enlargement under the condition that the
Alliance never be called upon to perform its core mission.
But perhaps these data reflect the public’s views and
level of attention prior to the Madrid summit and the formal
launching of the enlargement process. Is there any evidence
that the public is better informed or that opinion has
crystallized more in the intervening months? In a word,
“No.” In another poll conducted by the Pew Center (this one
in the fall of 1997), 63 percent of the respondents indicated
that they supported NATO enlargement. And yet only 10
percent of those same respondents “could name even one of
the candidates” who were already selected as new members
(Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary).25 And in the most
recent Pew Center survey, conducted in March 1998 and
released in early April, “only 5 percent of those questioned
were following the NATO enlargement issue very closely”
and nearly one in three Americans “admitted that they did
not know if enlarging NATO was a good or bad idea.” This
led the Pew Center director, Andrew Kohut, to observe that
“as an issue that matters, it’s dropped off the screen,” and
the reporter to conclude that “the biggest extension of U.S.
security commitments since the end of the Cold War is likely
to pass into reality with little awareness on the part of most
Americans.”26 Even if we accept Ambassador Hunter’s
observations that an extensive and lengthy debate has
occurred, it appears hardly to have registered with the vast
majority of the American public.27
In Sum.
To summarize what we have found in this general
overview of the survey data on public opinion and NATO
enlargement, it appears that in all three subsets of
countries, support for NATO enlargement is at best quite
soft. General support for enlargement exists, but it weakens
considerably when some of the potential costs and risks

24

associated with the Alliance are brought into focus. Levels
of information on the central issues involved in the debate
are very low, leading to the obvious conclusion that such
opinions as do exist are very weakly held and therefore
potentially highly unstable. As one European analyst
observed in a 1997 study of public opinion, “. . . whereas
there may, for instance, be consistent support for NATO in
certain countries, public opinion is generally complex and
has weak cognitive foundations. . . .”28 For an issue
considered so important and of such historical and strategic
consequence, it is remarkable how little interest the subject
generates among the general publics. And perhaps most
surprising in this review of the data is the fact that some of
the weakest public support of the enlargement process is
found in the very countries that now aspire to full-fledged
membership in the Alliance.
IMPLICATIONS
Having now described some of the content and attributes
of public opinion and NATO enlargement in the new and the
existing member countries, including the United States, the
question remains: So what? What are some of the
implications for the future of the enlargement process and
for the future of the Alliance?
First, and as stated at the beginning of this analysis, the
weak levels of support for enlargement are highly unlikely
to lead to a collapse of the enlargement process. In fact,
weakly formed and held opinions have contributed to a
policymaking environment in all of the countries in which
political elites enjoy considerable latitude to proceed with
the process. Nowhere was this more evident than in
Germany where the Bundestag voted on March 27, 1998,
555-37, with 30 abstentions, in favor of enlargement,
despite the fact that its public remains among the most
skeptical about the desirability of the process.29 Similarly,
the U.S. Senate voted 80-19 (1 “not voting”) in favor of
enlargement, but only following a debate that the Senate
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leadership had great difficulty even getting on the schedule.
As one Senate aide put it: “The only people who care about
this are the think-tank folks and the academics—not much
of a voting constituency.”30 In the end, enlargement is
unlikely to encounter any serious opposition based in public
opinion. If the proposed enlargement does fail, it is unlikely
to be the result of any nonconsenting publics.31
This overview of public opinion suggests that only in the
concrete details is public opposition likely to crystallize,
such as actual costs and how they will be borne, the extent of
member obligations to defend other members, and decisions
to participate in NATO missions, especially out-of-area.
Given this context, it is therefore highly unlikely that
political elites will push to have these details considered as
part of the decisionmaking process surrounding enlargement. Instead, most political leaders will be content to
debate and decide the issue at the mostly symbolic level. So
phrases like the “historic moment” and “extending peace
and prosperity” to Europe are likely to be heard in the
remainder of the debate, not costs, risks, and new missions.
Simply put, the objective for political elites has been
reduced to obtaining approval for enlargement; the moment
to debate the issues and to build public understanding of
and support for the content and purpose of an enlarged
Alliance has either passed or, as I believe, been deferred to
the future.
But although political elites enjoy considerable latitude
today, there are some dangerous hurdles and potential
obstacles lying in the road ahead. Perhaps foremost among
these on the most practical level are clashes over costs.
Because we have largely deferred meaningful discussions of
who pays how much, when, and for what, it is only a matter
of time before these questions come into play. And because
they will occur after the formal entry of the new members
into the Alliance, they may become acrimonious. The
acrimony is likely to be visible both within and across
countries; within countries where publics are at odds about
overall levels of defense spending and the social opportunity
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costs that spending entails, and across countries where the
possibility is very real that there will be a clash between the
demands of current NATO members that the new members
“pay their fair share” of the burden and new members’
domestic spending agendas.
This potential rift within and between member countries
is likely to heighten not only as NATO enlargement
proceeds but also, and perhaps especially, as EU enlargement goes forward. NATO enlargement will confront all
countries with some serious economic challenges that will
be magnified by the requirements of EU enlargement and
the creation of the single European currency (the Euro). For
current NATO members there will be a double crunch:
fighting about the costs of enlargement and what that
means for defense-spending levels in the face of
requirements to meet the fairly strict Maastricht criteria for
the Euro. And this of course will take place in the context of
domestic economies that are anything but robust at the
moment. Given the picture of public opinion portrayed here,
it is at best difficult to be confident that the NATO side of the
debate will hold its own.
For new NATO members the challenge is even more
daunting, perhaps consisting of a triple crunch: costs of
NATO enlargement clashing with the costs of joining the
EU, and both of them clashing with economies that are not
only weak in performance but weak institutionally and
socially. It is one thing to challenge the German economy
and people to support the costs of enlargement and joining
the Euro while at the same time maintaining the social
programs they consider entitlements; after all, the German
public has a deeply embedded and reinforced psychological
commitment to its economic and political system. It may be
quite another challenge for the economies and people to
undertake such adjustments in countries that have only
recently made the change from command economies and
centralized political systems to market democracies.
Consequently, the deferred debates at this stage of the
process may have some serious consequences for the future
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of the Alliance and the overall success of enlargement as we
move down the road and are forced to address some of the
more specific costs.
Yet most of these issues related to costs (how much, who
pays, with what tradeoffs, etc.) may pale in comparison to
the even larger and more important issues related to
Alliance and member responsibilities: What is it that we
expect NATO and NATO members to do? We have seen in
the survey data that the support for NATO membership and
enlargement drops off considerably when the public is
reminded of the responsibility of Alliance members to come
to the defense of other member countries. The data suggest
that for much of the public in all of the countries (old and
new members alike) a larger NATO is only desirable if it (or
more accurately their individual country) never has to do
anything. For an Alliance that even at the height of the Cold
War had some serious debates about the credibility and
reliability of the NATO guarantee, generating the political
will to go to the military assistance of Prague, Warsaw, or
Budapest may be a bridge too far. And if the new members
themselves appear to be less than enthusiastic about
upholding that same end of their Alliance responsibilities, it
is quite possible that the other member countries will find it
impossible to generate and sustain even the appearance of
Alliance solidarity. Who in the United States will be
enthused about the prospect of going to the aid of a Czech
Republic that has openly expressed its unwillingness to
defend Germany? Perhaps this will be of little consequence
as long as there are no challenges to the security of any
NATO country. But that approach places all of the eggs in
one basket, namely the hope that Article 5 of the NATO
Treaty will never have to be invoked. And if that is in fact
what we think is quite likely, then the entire necessity for
NATO itself, let alone an enlarged NATO, comes into
question.
A second issue related to NATO responsibilities
concerns the most recent NATO strategic concept and the
role of peace support operations out-of-area. Although this
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question was not asked directly, we saw in Germany that
there was very little enthusiasm for using German troops in
support of “NATO involvement in new crises on Europe’s
periphery,” let alone in regions outside of Europe. It seems
reasonable to conclude that similar public views exist in
other NATO countries, including the proposed new
members. In general, there is public support for NATO
operations in Bosnia, and we see little reason to believe that
this support will weaken in the absence of any significant
change in the situation; as long as there are no substantial
increases in casualties or general risk, NATO will continue
to garner public support for the role it is playing there.
But other out-of-area operations are unlikely to meet the
same fate. The Albanian crisis in 1997 and the tensions in
Kosovo in early 1998 once again illustrate the difficulty in
all of the European countries of generating the political will
to act. And when the United States floated the idea of the
“new” NATO focusing on nonproliferation in the Middle
East, even usually supportive Great Britain responded that
the Middle East “has never been” a focus of NATO. French
desires to reorient some of NATO’s focus to the south (i.e.,
toward North Africa), which already tends to split the
Alliance along a North-South axis, is similarly likely to
generate little enthusiasm on the part of old and new
members alike. These publics are at best interested in
Europe only, and a Europe rather narrowly defined at
that.33 Publics that appear less than willing to come to the
defense of other NATO members are hardly expected to
support their own military joining in out-of-area operations
bey on d th e tra d i ti onal Eur op ean bound ar i es .
Consequently, what NATO can agree to do, and where, are
likely to be the sources of future and potentially
acrimonious debates within the newly expanded Alliance.
The absence of any significant debate in the preenlargement phase, which could serve to heighten public
awareness of the issues and to build some pre-crisis
consensus (or at least to prepare the public for such a future
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debate), will make these battles over how and where NATO
acts even more difficult to manage in the future.
In the end, the implementation phase of this process, not
the approval phase, will be critical in determining the
success of the overall enlargement process. Though to some
extent this would have always been the case—one can
hardly deal with the toughest issues until they have been
laid on the table in concrete, specific form—it is even more
the case because of the conscious decision of policymakers
today to defer the debates on such details to some
unspecified future time frame. As I observed earlier, the
underlying assumption has been that these details, some
fairly minor (interoperability) and some of grand strategic
importance (the core mission of the Alliance), can and
should be left to the future, at which time they will be
readily resolved. In my view this “ready resolution” will
occur only if policymakers handle the implementation
phase with great aplomb, a conditional assumption that I
am at best uncomfortable making. If, on the other hand,
NATO enlargement issues get all wrapped up with EU
enlargement and its requirements, the Euro and its
requirements, and a host of other existing and as yet
unforeseen sources of friction, the enlargement process may
succeed only at this, the most symbolic level, i.e., who
joins.34 At the most important level—how, when, and where
the Alliance acts, and what are the members’ responsibilities when it does—the light at the end of the
enlargement tunnel might well turn out to be a fast-moving,
oncoming train.
History tells us that effective grand strategy in
democracies, especially Alliance management, requires
some substantial levels of public understanding and
support for that strategy. At a minimum this entails some
minimal consensus on the objectives, if not on the actual
concepts employed in pursuit of those objectives and the
resources those concepts or policies require. Democracies
have been most successful in planning and implementing
grand strategy when public support was cultivated and
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opinion elites helped shape and frame public understanding. In the United States, the Cold War strategy of
containment provides a clear case in support of this
assertion. And if anything, the end of the Cold War and the
end of this century have witnessed an increased role for
public opinion in democracies. As one European official
observes,
. . . security issues are no longer the preserve of high office but
must increasingly involve public opinion, for reasons that
pertain to both democratic consensus and international
legitimation. . . . Politicians and policy-makers must therefore
involve the public in the new security culture that
circumstances suggest, inter alia in order to steer the
cooperative projects through the log-jam of structural reforms,
budgetary adjustments and institutional enlargements that is
looming ahead.35

Yet the overview of public opinion provided in this
analysis suggests that this cultivation of public opinion on
what may be the most significant shift in grand strategy
since the end of World War II and the start of the Cold War
has simply not taken place. Whether that is the fault of
opinion elites (including politicians and policy-makers) or of
inattentive publics is neither particularly relevant nor a
focus of this essay. The point is simply that the lack of a
clearer and deeper understanding of the central issues in
the enlargement debate is undesirable and potentially
dangerous for the success of enlargement and for the future
of the Alliance. Sinnott concluded in 1997 that “policymakers ignore public opinion at their peril; that they should
be highly critical of data from polls; that there is not just one
public but a series of publics; that the stratification of public
opinion is not rigid; and that attitude changes are likely to
occur as a result not only of public information campaigns,
but also politicizing events. . . .”36 The peril that lies beneath
the shallow surface of the public views outlined in this essay
is simply that policymakers face a very difficult challenge of
turning the symbol of NATO enlargement into the reality of
an effective, cohesive security Alliance for the 21st century.
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2
1. The author acknowledges that not everyone agrees with this
assessment that little meaningful debate has occurred. Of the few who
argue that such a debate has taken place, perhaps the most notable is
former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Robert E. Hunter who recently wrote:
“Rarely has any major foreign policy been developed over such a long
period, displayed so fully before the public and considered so
comprehensively with so many members of Congress.” The Washington
Post, March 23, 1998, p. 19. However, even if we grant the length of the
development process, as well as the attempts to display it to the public
and members of Congress, doubt remains as to the real quality of the
debate that has to date taken place. For example, consider the following
description of the debate in the U.S. Senate: “Confused efforts to
shoehorn the final hours of discussion on expanding the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization into gaps in a floor debate on education last month
reflected the fact that the issue, although enormously important for the
United States, has barely raised the average American’s eyebrow.” Or,
“Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) eventually suspended the
embarrassing on-again, off-again debate, saying he would try again
later. . . .” Tyler Marshall, “US Public Acutely Uninterested in Vote on
NATO,” Los Angeles Times, April 8, 1998.
2. This argument is rooted in Clausewitz’s concept of the
“remarkable trinity.” The effective use of military power in support of
national strategic objectives rests in a healthy relationship among the
people, the government, and the military. Although Clausewitz was
obviously concerned with military power, his analysis applies for all of
the elements of national power in a democracy. The effective use of that
power, whether political/diplomatic, economic, or military, depends on
the balance among the three parts of this trinity.
3. Among the voluminous literature on this topic, a classic remains
Gabriel A. Almond’s The American People and Foreign Policy, 1st
Edition (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1950). James N. Rosenau’s The
Attentive Public and Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Center of
International Studies, Princeton University, 1968) is another classic.
From the many contemporary analyses of public opinion and democratic
government, see Robert S. Erikson, Norman R. Luttbeg, and Kent L.
Tedin, American Public Opinion: Its Origins, Content, and Impact, 4th
Edition, New York: Macmillan, 1991.
4. For example, see John E. Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public
Opinion, New York: Wiley, 1973.
5. See Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin, American Public Opinion.
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6. Using the same general example, respondents are often asked
whether the country is currently spending too little, too much, or about
the right amount on a specific item (such as defense). Research has
consistently shown that in most cases people who express an opinion by
choosing from among these three choices can rarely come close to
specifying just how much is currently being spent. While one can debate
the meaning and implications of this lack of specific information, the
purpose for the present analysis is twofold: first, to illustrate that the
existence of a measurable opinion is independent of substantive
knowledge underlying it, and second, to reinforce the fact that
measuring public opinion on public policy issues is not as easy as simply
asking a question.
7. Note that this explanation accounts for the influence of both
broadly held mass opinion and the actions of well-organized interest
groups. The former holds sway because of its breadth, and the desires of
elected officials not to lose the next election. The latter is frequently
influential because the broader mass public is largely indifferent to the
specific policy issue area, and the organized interests are therefore
much more intense and stable (both relatively and absolutely).
8. The purpose of this section is to use some of the relevant poll data
to illustrate the current content and nature of public opinion on this
issue. This is not a systematic analysis of survey data; consequently,
there will be no lengthy discussions of methodology or detailed
comparison of survey results over time (trend analysis). While all of
these methodological issues deserve treatment in a detailed analysis of
public opinion, our more limited purpose here makes such a
methodological discussion unnecessary.
9. For purposes of this analysis, “new NATO members” are Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Although other countries aspire to
membership, and the possibility remains that additional countries will
be invited to join in the future, these three countries were given the
official invitation in July 1997 at the Madrid Summit. Moreover, the
current official debate on enlargement, necessitating the formal
concurrence of all sixteen current member nations and hence votes by
their legislative branches, is specifically limited to the accession of these
three countries. No formal vote has as yet been called on any other new
members, either specifically or in general.
10. Unless otherwise noted, all of the following survey data are from
USIA surveys conducted during the period 1995-97. Specific polls and
the results can be found in USIA Reports, the numbers of which are
available from the author on request.
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11. Similar but somewhat different results were found in a
Eurobarometer poll conducted in March 1997 in which respondents
were asked how they would vote “if there were to be a referendum
tomorrow on the question of your country’s membership of NATO.” In
Poland 65 percent said they would vote in favor, 14 percent against, and
5 percent were undecided. In Hungary 32 percent would vote in favor, 17
percent against, and 23 percent were undecided. And in the Czech
Republic 28 percent said they would vote in favor, 25 percent against,
and 21 percent were undecided. These results are reported in George
Cunningham, “EU and NATO Enlargement: How Public Opinion is
Shaping Up in Some Candidate Countries,” NATO Review, May-June
1997, pp. 16-18. With the exception of Poland, perhaps the most
significant point here is the very substantial number of undecided
individuals. Given the fact that only about one-third and one-fourth of
the publics in Hungary and the Czech Republic respectively said they
would vote in favor of joining NATO, there is obviously a significant
amount of potential volatility in the levels of public support.
12. For these questions we report only the 1997 data. In almost all
cases the expressed support in the three countries has increased
somewhat over time since 1995, whereas only in Poland has that
increase been fairly dramatic (with the notable exception of the
stationing of NATO troops which has remained at or near the 55 percent
level). See Tables 2-5 for all 3 years.
13. To be consistent with the argument of this essay, it is only fair to
acknowledge that a specific attack on another NATO member could
reconfigure public opinion in all of these countries. If, as we argue here,
these opinions are very weakly held and potentially unstable, then it is
certainly possible that public support could shift very quickly in the face
of a real crisis. However, and also consistent with the argument
presented here, hoping for such a serendipitous crystallization of public
support after a crisis has broken out is hardly what one would
recommend as sound strategy.
14. U.S. cost estimates alone have ranged from a low of $1.5 billion
by the Administration (certainly the cost optimists) to a high of $125
billion by the Congressional Budget Office. Other U.S. cost pessimists
have even scoffed at this latter figure as grossly underestimating the
total costs to the United States of NATO enlargement, pointing out that
such figures do not include the massive aid and low-cost loan programs
that are already going to these countries. As with so many aspects of this
debate, the approach being taken seems to be one of proceeding with
enlargement and then hashing out these specifics in later political
battles.
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15. An examination of public opinion in all 16 current NATO
members is obviously impossible in this essay. Therefore, we shall limit
this overview to the three major European members (France, Great
Britain, and Germany) and the United States (which will be covered in a
separate section). Additional survey data are available through USIA
on Italy, and a number of the smaller NATO countries have had
independent studies of public opinion conducted. So a more comprehensive analysis would be possible if time and space allowed.
16. “Out-of-area” or “out-of-business” was one of the many slogans
heard in the early 1990s that characterized this debate. If the Alliance
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CHAPTER 3
THE CHANGING FACE OF NATO AND THE
NEED FOR CHANGE IN RESPONSIBILITIES
Edward B. Atkeson
(Parts of this paper have appeared earlier in Army magazine,
January 1998.)

In his book, Diplomacy, Dr. Henry Kissinger describes
the art as one of balance, principally between moral and
efficacious approaches to international problems. His model
for the moral is Woodrow Wilson’s concept of universal law.
“[Neither] equilibrium, nor national trustworthiness, . . .
[nor] national self-assertion were, in Wilson’s view, the
foundations of international order,” Kissinger wrote.
Instead, “Wilson argued that binding arbitration, not force,
should become the method for resolving international
disputes.” And this would be achieved through the
establishment of his greatest prize, the League of Nations.
For the efficacious, Kissinger selected Theodore
Roosevelt and his notion of “muscular diplomacy.” Kissinger
asserted that:
Roosevelt commands a unique historical position in America’s
approach to international relations. No other president
defined America’s world role so completely in terms of national
interest, or defined the national interest so comprehensively
with the balance of power.

Kissinger went on to quote Roosevelt in a private letter
to a friend as saying, “If I must choose between a policy of
blood and iron and one of milk and water . . . I am for the
policy of blood and iron. It is better not only for the nation
but in the long run for the world.”
If we can accept Kissinger’s construct of Wilson and
Roosevelt as the poles, then most of our discussion lies
somewhere in between. The North Atlantic Treaty
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Organization (NATO) Alliance is neither a comprehensive
collective defense on the Wilsonian model, nor is it a cynical
figleaf for exercise of U.S. unilateral interests. Yet it has
aspects of both. On the one hand, NATO operates on the
principle of one-for-all and all-for one. On the other hand,
very little happens within the NATO structure that is not
either initiated by Washington or done with Washington’s
approval. The United States is the clear leader in the
organization, and, if any member wishes to develop some
new aspect of European or Mediterranean security—or in
some cases, in areas well beyond those regions—it must
make a point to check things out with the Americans.
Our question today is not whether it is good policy to
enlarge the Alliance or not. Expansion is a given. Our task is
to examine the security challenges and to determine our
force structure requirements in the wake of the decision.
But to do that, we need to have a firm understanding of what
we are dealing with.
The emphasis which the expansion initiative places
upon enhancement of a strong military alliance, amenable
to U.S. direction, would seem to place it considerably closer
to Roosevelt’s “muscular diplomacy” than to Wilson’s
“universal law.” Chancellor Bismarck, the all-time
champion of “blood and iron,” would like that. But the line
has not been so clearly drawn. If the pro-expansionist school
is sincere in its wishes to “stabilize” Central Europe and
rejects placing limits upon how far membership might
eventually go, the “universal law” school can take heart.
President Clinton has specifically refused, for example, to
rule out Russia as an eventual member. Perhaps it is a
matter of timing: Theodore Roosevelt today, Woodrow
Wilson tomorrow.
There is a secondary argument about costs, but in my
view that can be overdone. There was no a priori debate
about costs in the original formation of NATO, nor in any
previous expansion. The discussion of costs is like the
discussion of a gas in a closed container. The gas will expand
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or contract to accommodate any allowance or limitations of
space. Clearly, expansion costs may be higher or lower
according to how much the Alliance wishes to accomplish
among the new members and how expeditiously. It may also
depend rather heavily upon esoteric factors in the black art
of cost accounting. As in the law and religion, costs may be
interpreted to support almost any case one wishes to make.
Engineers may point out that compressed gasses generate
heat and pressure, but, in my view, that is not the same
thing as light.
More important, I believe, is an understanding of what
has happened to NATO since the collapse of the Warsaw
Pact. The NATO of yesteryear was an instrument of
collective military deterrence and defense, with a
multinational political structure resting on top of a hard
core of national military formations. The latter provided the
real strength of the organization. For the most part,
national ground forces below army group level had little to
do with one another.
In sharp contrast to this pattern, we now see the
operations in Bosnia being conducted with a much higher
degree of international intimacy, even though 18 of the
countries represented in the force are not members of
NATO. Some units are integrated at the platoon or
detachment level. And this is not unique to the Balkans.
International exercises, dealing with a much wider range of
possible contingencies, are under way somewhere in Europe
virtually all the time. And, as in Bosnia, participants are
drawn from a much longer list of countries than that
defining NATO. Further, not all the participants aspire to
NATO membership. As General William Nash has pointed
out, a Finnish major served on his Eagle Task Force staff in
Bosnia in an international capacity last year, although
Finland has not elected to apply for membership in the
Alliance.
What has happened? It may be too early to discern the
full dimensions of the phenomenon, but clearly this is not
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the NATO we all grew up with. The organization has been
downsized, reorganized, redeployed, and regenerated under
starkly different concepts. Currently deployed outside its
normal area of operations are 33,000 of its troops, and it has
picked up an association with 28 other countries.
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the precious words
which provide that “. . . an armed attack against one or more
of [the member states] in Europe or North America shall be
considered an attack against them all . . .” still apply, but the
milieu in which the organization exists has changed. Almost
all of the countries of Europe—including Russia—have
expressed a common wish to belong to a new continental
regime which features democratic governments, free
market economies, and military forces organized and
operated along Western lines, well interconnected with one
another. While many aspire to formal NATO membership,
others do not, and there is no obvious set of characteristics
determining the difference.
Countries from Slovenia to Kyrgyzstan have accepted
invitations to join a new organization dubbed the
Partnership for Peace (PfP). PfP is a grouping launched in
1994 to assist countries interested in developing closer
association with NATO. The surprise is that, while a
number of states have looked upon PfP primarily as a path
to NATO membership, the program has developed a
dynamism of its own, even among those without clear
NATO ambitions.
Early last year the Alliance moved to enhance the PfP
concept by strengthening the political consultative
machinery, increasing the operational roles of the
participants, and providing for their greater involvement in
decisionmaking and planning. National delegations at
NATO Headquarters may henceforth be accredited to the
new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) at the
ambassadorial level, and general officers from the PfP
countries may serve as chiefs of their staff delegations,
paralleling the NATO Military Committee. The list of areas
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of PfP cooperation have been increased to almost 1,000
different activities, encompassing virtually all of those of a
full member of the Alliance, including defense policy and
strategy, air defense, and service in combined joint task
forces (CJTF).
In the words of the U.S. representative to NATO,
Ambassador Robert Hunter, the difference between full
membership in NATO and participation in PfP is becoming
“razor thin.” Similarly, a senior Finnish official described
his country’s present strategy as coming within a “whisper”
of NATO membership while ensuring that the country
would be prepared to cross that line should the
circumstances warrant it. Finland belongs to the European
Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as well as PfP.
Dr. Paul Cornish, lecturer in defense studies at King’s
College, London, describes the changes in NATO as a shift
from “an alliance of necessity” (under the threat of Soviet
attack) to “an alliance of choice.” If this is true, it should not
be surprising to see increasing numbers of NATO
operations undertaken by an assortment of NATO members
and nonmember PfP participants under the CJTF concept,
according to their individual interests. In some cases, we
may find that some PfP states are more ready, willing, and
able to play important roles in local or regional contingencies than some allies of long standing.
While most of the funding for PfP reorganization and
training must come from their own resources, limited
amounts of aid may come from the Western Alliance. The
United States has pledged support to the extent of $100 to
$150 million per year. One can imagine that, if certain PfP
countries become especially supportive of the common
interest, such funding may increase.
There is no question that formal membership in NATO is
the front burner issue for some of the PfP participants—
particularly the Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania. These countries are among those which have
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historically suffered as much as any as a result of their
location between major warring powers or from chronic
local instabilities. They are looking to a new era of peace
through association with Western strength and organized
civility to protect them from similar depredations in the
future. Others, such as the neutrals of recent decades, are
less interested in NATO membership, but recognize both
economic and security benefits in other structures. As
Bundestag member Klaus Francke, chief German delegate
to the North Atlantic Assembly, wrote recently,
. . . in the long term, EU membership and hence participation in
the European area of economic prosperity, will offer as much
stability, and therefore security, as the guarantees contained in
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

And this is the point to be grasped from the great
changes which are happening on the European continent.
Barring reemergence of a totalitarian threat from the east,
NATO expansion may be overtaken by a related, but much
broader, development impacting many more countries. As
they develop, many PfP forces will become virtually
indistinguishable from those of the lesser NATO partners.
The sole difference will be the applicability of Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty. Yet this trend is in motion at the very
time when there is no visible existential threat to anyone,
member or nonmember. Hence, the instrument which is
supposed to make the difference (Article 5), while important
psychologically, is likely to become less defining of a nation’s
security than other aspects of association with the West.
Fortunately, most analysts agree that the Alliance has
time to assess and adjust its course over the next few years.
There is no acute threat in Europe. If Russia can survive the
internal assaults of its fringe politicians, the likelihood of
European continental polarization will decrease substantially. A deemphasis by the West on NATO expansion over
the next few years may be just the matter which would most
help the moderates to hold on to power. In the meanwhile, a
broad array of countries, together with their armed forces,
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will be drawing closer to the Western model. What, then,
does this analysis suggest to us for our force shaping?
First, it suggests that there is a wealth of potential
power contained in the forces now seeking to identify
themselves with NATO. While many of them may appear to
have limited combat capabilities by big-war standards, they
are proving themselves capable of more modest operations,
especially peacekeeping. As they gain experience and
further develop their capacity for interoperability with
Western forces, they should be capable and willing to play a
larger role in such undertakings of common interest.
Second, commensurate with a larger role for the smaller
states should be a gradual reduction in the requirements for
major power involvement. Undoubtedly, forces from one or
two of the major powers will be required to provide the
critical nucleus for successful operations under the NATO
standard, but the requirements for a high density of U.S.,
British, and French forces should diminish.
Third, the seachange in NATO’s functions and
capabilities does nothing to diminish requirements for U.S.
forces elsewhere in the world in pursuit of U.S. national
interests. The United States should encourage the gradual
shift of weight of military responsibilities in Europe, and
possibly beyond into neighboring regions, to its NATO
partners, to include the forces of the PfP. U.S. forces should
be more carefully husbanded to emphasize their capabilities
for responding to the national strategy, featuring a
capability for dealing with two near-simultaneous major
contingencies, either unilaterally or in conjunction with
friendly states.
Finally, we do not have the comfort of a clear choice
between Wilsonian idealism and Roosevelt’s brand of “blood
and iron.” The world will remain a complex environment in
which there will be occasions for the exercise of a full range
of political, economic, and military initiatives and policies,
either in conjunction with allies or unilaterally, for the
protection of our interests. As far as military options are
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concerned, they may extend from such limited undertakings
as the protection of our shores against hoards of unwelcome
migrants, to the deterrence or execution of intercontinental
nuclear exchange with a mid-level state of a revanchist
bent, or with a major peer-level power. And yet, we have not
devised an economic system or social structure willing, or
able, to underwrite all of the costs.
We have shrunk our forces to the point where they can no
longer reasonably shoulder all of the responsibilities we
have so glibly assigned to them. The tempo of their
operations in both the Eastern and Western Hemispheres is
approaching the breaking point. We must allow them to
shed some of the missions which are in the common interest
but which impinge most sharply on their capabilities for
meeting others less cogent to our friends in the NATO
regions of concern.
We have, of course, spoken of burdensharing for many
years, but never before have we had such an opportunity for
divestiture of tasks which have threatened to overload our
military capabilities. There are many more potential
load-bearers today than in the past. Wilson’s concept of
comprehensive international engagement in the peacekeeping business, while still, perhaps, beyond the reach of
the world community in all its particulars, is becoming
much more feasible in the NATO area than when he first
suggested it. Whether that may eventually come to embrace
a larger area of the globe, or to be suitable in a broader range
of in tern ation a l p r obl ems, r emai ns to be s een.
Unfortunately, for the foreseeable future, we must continue
to depend on “blood and iron,” as we do on milk and water,
but we may be able to shift the balance somewhat.
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CHAPTER 4
THE MILITARY ASPECTS
OF NATO EXPANSION
Frederick W. Kroesen
The pros and cons of North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) expansion have received wide attention in the past
many months, with no diminution effected by the decisions
made to invite Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to
join. If anything, the arguments have heated up, and the
predictions have been stated with greater conviction.
Absent still, however, is much serious attention to the
military aspects associated with the addition of new
territory, the introduction of new forces, and the absence of
common military doctrine.
The Dilemmas of Coalition Command.
NATO, since its inception, has faced a number of
organizational and operational demands that can be
referred to as the dilemmas of coalition command. Among
the many challenges associated with the planned
expansion—money, materiel, combined training, and
operational doctrines—these dilemmas form a foundation
from which to consider the requirements of the future. Even
collectively they do not present insurmountable obstacles,
but they do demand sober consideration and an understanding that costs, resources, and change are part and
parcel with expansion.
First is the requirement for an organizational structure
that can respond rapidly to a military crisis and effect the
command and control of a force adequate for resolving an
issue. NATO has such a structure, made up today of
national commitments of like-minded people, equipped,
trained, and organized in similar units and organizations
that have become, if not interchangeable, certainly
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interoperable on the battlefield. Their communications are
linked, they are supported by certain common logistics
systems, and their weaponry is compatible with the
employment doctrine and munitions of NATO. In effect, the
NATO armed forces have been shaped into round pegs
provided by many nations to fill the round holes of the
NATO structure. And they can be controlled by
international headquarters schooled and practiced in
common operational doctrine.
All of the newly invited nations have armed forces
designed and organized generally as they were when they
were members of the Warsaw Pact. They lack familiarity
with the role of the military in a democratic society and for a
democratic government. Their equipment is incompatible
with the NATO systems, both operationally and logistically,
they cannot communicate with NATO forces, their
operational concepts and doctrine are different, and the
functioning of their staffs and other headquarters agencies
does not link them with common NATO entities.
None of these characteristics presents an unsolvable
problem, nor do they imply inferiority of either system, but
each is a major change that will require time, money, and a
psychological acceptance that may be in short supply. The
willingness of each nation, both old and new members, to
contribute to the solutions of integrating the organizational
structure must be assured, and some positive effort must be
initiated to fit things together.
Second, there is the need for common understanding, a
language with which to exchange thoughts, ideas, and
directives. There is no more unifying human attribute than
common language and no more divisive influence than an
inability to communicate, to understand. In NATO, the
adoption of a single language, English, has provided the
common understanding necessary for coalition operations.
This, despite the fact that NATO’s current 16 nations speak
at least 10 different languages as their native tongues.
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The original NATO agreement decreed that all orders,
directives, etc., would be published in both French and
English. Although time and effort at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) is still spent in
preparing translations of documents, all work in the field at
the international headquarters level is in English, and
proficiency in English is expected as a criterion for assignment to a NATO headquarters. Conferences, meetings,
training exercises, and NATO schools’ instruction all are
conducted in English, whether in Oslo, Izmir, London, or
Mons.
Three factors have contributed to this condition. First,
the United States and Great Britain, long the principal
contributors to NATO, distributed manuals, maintenance
directives, and training literature for their equipment that
was printed only in English, and the armed forces of other
nations, equipped with this materiel, had to accommodate
to the available documentation.
Second, the German armed forces, from the date of their
incorporation into NATO, have required their officer corps
to develop a working knowledge of English. Over the years,
this has resulted in a German officers school system in
which NATO officers can address, lecture, and answer
questions in English as readily as German and in German
headquarters in which a foreign liaison officer can operate
with no difficulty using the English language. The
Germans’ willingness to adopt English has made common
understanding commonplace.
The third factor was the withdrawal of French forces
from the military alliance. Following their departure, there
was little practical reason for continuing the dual-language
effort. As a consequence, the ability at the various echelons
of NATO command to conduct activities in two languages
atrophied over time to an almost complete ignoring of the
original demand.
The ultimate impact of this development is that the new
nations of NATO must be prepared to operate in English,
49

not internally among their own forces, but certainly
whenever they are to be employed in coalition and when
their officers and noncommissioned officers are assigned to
NATO headquarters. We must presume that they are aware
of this need, but the capability to fulfill it is another
time-consuming demand.
The third dilemma is a question of loyalty—not as
contrasted with disloyalty, but rather as a function of split
loyalties. No one takes an oath to serve the NATO Alliance.
In every Army, Navy, and Air Force, the officers and
noncommissioned officers serve first their national
responsibilities and serve NATO only as they are directed
by their national authorities. The international command
must develop, then, a belief in a common cause and rely on
the voluntary commitment of forces and people to the
resolution of a crisis.
Often these interests are in conflict. National forces
train to their own standards, and not all are seen to be
equally proficient. The limitations of some, because of less
modern equipment, less intensive training, or less
responsive logistic systems, affect the collective confidence
of a coalition and thereby, perhaps, influence a
commander’s decisions in the field. Will an American
commander hesitate to employ a Czech (or Belgian or
Italian) artillery unit in a “danger-close” fire mission in
front of American troops because he knows they have not
trained as intensively as his own troops? Will he overwork
his own helicopter pilots because other armies have not
perfected night operations?
Prejudice grows easily when collective confidence is
suspect. Troops have a natural affinity for their own even
when there is no animosity among the nationalities
engaged, but when a commander must make decisions
regarding priorities for allocating a dwindling ammunition
supply or medical evacuation missions, the observation that
“He’s taking care of his own first!” is always a threat to
morale and to a commitment to a coalition mission.
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There is also, at times, a conflict between missions
assigned by national authorities and the demands of a
NATO commander. Often a nation’s forces have an area
defense or security mission in their own country assigned by
their own national command authority. When a NATO
commander, given operational command of these forces,
orders them to conduct operations out of their assigned
territory, the national commander may have to abandon one
responsibility or plead for some higher authority to change
its requirement. In either case, operations are affected, and
critical time may be lost.
The current NATO commands are aware of these
conflicts and work in the environment with sympathy for
each other’s problems and an understanding that
coordination, cooperation, and interoperability are goals
that demand constant attention, practice, and good will. But
this current status is the result of years of exercises,
combined training, and diligent staff work that the new
nations have not been party to. Their education in this
regard is an essential task.
A fourth NATO dilemma has always been the
complications of international requirements as they are
affected by national capabilities. It has long been an axiom
that logistics are a national responsibility. The absolutism
of that requirement has been softened over the years as
NATO built petroleum oil lubricants (POL) pipelines (none
of which, incidentally, reach into the new territories) and
standardized its munitions so that ammunition depots and
supply points can serve all forces, but the fundamental
policy remains in effect.
When a commander commits forces to a combat mission,
he has an obligation to assure that the force is supportable,
that is, he must be confident that national intelligence,
logistics, and other support will be available. In NATO for
the past almost 50 years, there has not been a major
problem because forces were located generally in the areas
in which they would fight, and each nation built its systems
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to support its forces in those areas. In effect, the obligation
prevented an Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT)
commander from transferring the Canadian brigade from
Central Army Group (CENTAG) to Northern Army Group
(NORTHAG) or from committing a Dutch brigade to a
mission in Bavaria. It also required an American
commander to give pause to a plan for using a German
brigade in an American corps because American
maintenance units were not equipped or trained to repair
German tanks. And everyone was aware that most troops do
not want to subsist very long, if at all, on rations provided by
another nation, nor do they want to wake up in a medical
facility where nurses and doctors speak another language.
A final dilemma is the matter of political controls. In
World War II, the directive to General Eisenhower stated,
“You will enter the continent of Europe and in conjunction
with other Allied Nations, undertake operations aimed at
the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed
forces.”
Such a directive is unthinkable today unless it is
accompanied by book-length explanations of how-to-do-it,
rules of engagement, cautions regarding casualties, the
employment of minimum force, and the expending of
minimum resources. Decisions controlling operations, the
allocation and employment of firepower, and the direction of
the intelligence effort are today made at national political
levels strongly influenced by the views, concerns, and
sometimes vetoes of coalition partners.
In NATO such controls always limited the employment
of nuclear weapons in exercises, always ignored questions
or policies relating to chemical warfare, and always
prohibited plans for cross-border operations regardless of
the military requirements relating to such subjects. The
addition of three more voices at the policy and decisionmaking levels now extant does not promise any reduction in
the limitations now suffered by field commanders.
Nevertheless, training as part of a coalition functioning
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under these kinds of restrictions is a necessary exercise, and
the plans and resources needed to conduct such training are
a fundamental requirement.
The Founding Act.
These national and international commitments become
extremely important when considering the varying
interpretations of the Founding Act (NATO-Russia
Founding Act signed in Paris, May 27, 1997). Whether or
not there are limitations on the movement or location of
forces, weapons systems, or NATO infrastructure in the
new territories will have a major impact on coalition plans
for operations and for national limitations, restrictions, or
requirements to be assigned to their own forces.
The Founding Act, itself not a particularly limiting
document, has given rise to complex statements regarding
what it says, or should say, or is believed to mean. In general
these comments express three positive statements:
• Adding new members will not over-extend NATO or
demand military commitments beyond its current
capabilities.
• No additional Army divisions, air wings, or naval
carriers and submarines will be required to defend the new
territories.
• There is no military requirement to station combat
forces or nuclear weapons in the territories of the new
members.

Unfortunately, these statements, usually associated
with studies or reports projecting very modest “cost
estimates,” are not quite believable if one gives any thought
to conducting military operations. NATO does not now have
a power projection capability that can deploy and sustain a
combat force. It relies exclusively on U.S. assets and
capabilities for any crisis reaction, and there is no indication
that any nation plans to expand its current arsenal to
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provide the mobility needed to operate in the new
territories. Given this lack, the third statement is just
incorrect—there is a requirement anytime actual military
operations are to be contemplated, let alone carried out.
Furthermore, the addition of new frontiers and the
incorporation of many square miles of land area make the
first statement suspect if there is any credence to the
original Article 5 statement that an attack on one is an
attack on all.
Operations.
NATO no longer must maintain a monolithic defensive
wall along a geographic boundary against an enemy whose
total power approached equivalency, even superiority in
some areas. It now must think more in terms of the rapid
movement of forces to cope with a smaller threat or to
reinforce the efforts of a member nation engaged against its
neighbor. One can envision Turkey requesting NATO
assistance against an Iraqi attack or if Azerbaijan and
Armenia go to war on her border.
The need for NATO in Bosnia might someday be a
pattern for settling a Rumania-Hungary dispute or another
outbreak of hostilities in Cyprus. These kinds of operations
will require the maintenance of quick-reaction forces,
trained, well-equipped, and supplied, that are not delayed
by questions of whose forces can be committed or
encumbered by political restrictions established by
individual nations.
There is also a problem of geography and the military
weaknesses associated with a lack of contiguity. The Swiss
have always been a nonthreatening island of nonmembership, but with the extension of NATO boundaries
eastward, the Austrians became another neutral zone,
benefiting from their association with NATO, but not
contributing to its resources. If and when the Baltic States
join, the Swedes and Finns will also be “behind the lines.”
And then there is the small enclave that used to be East
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Prussia, now seen as belonging to Russia. Each of these
areas presents military complications, blocking transportation routes, flight paths, and waterways. The states of the
former Yugoslavia divide NATO from Greece and Turkey.
Except for Slovenia, no mention is made of these states
joining NATO, but their military potential presents
concerns for operational planning.
Requirements.
The following, in general terms, express requirements
facing SHAPE and the national military establishments of
NATO.
First is the reshaping of the whole to guarantee that
NATO compatibility is created and furthered with the
introduction of new forces. Doctrine, the functioning of
systems, plans for operations, and common training
standards all must be incorporated in a single program
whose purpose is the infusion of new military forces into the
whole. That program then must be the base upon which
combined, integrated training and exercises are developed
and practiced routinely.
Secondly, the reorientation of all forces to the needs of
force projection. The employment of a Dutch brigade on the
Polish frontier or a British contingent in Turkey demands a
revised and revamped NATO capabilities plan. The
demands for transport, supply and service, medical support,
postal service, rear area security, etc., will require the
projection of these functions into operational areas, a
projection exercised now only by the Americans and to some
extent by the British. Importantly, such projections must
consider the operational and security aspects of those
territories not a part of NATO but which encroach or
influence NATO operations.
As stated earlier, none of these requirements present
insurmountable obstacles, and many have been addressed
in the commitment of NATO forces to Bosnia and to the
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Partnership for Peace activities engaged in by the forces of
many nations in many locations. What is needed, primarily,
is recognition and support for a long-term program that will
address and reconcile the dilemmas of coalition operations
to assure NATO compatibility of all of the forces of all of the
nations of the Alliance.
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CHAPTER 5
SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE
AFTER NATO ENLARGEMENT
Simon Serfaty
The post-Cold War years are over. A quick thought for
the years lived since the reintegration of the two Germanys
into one, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union into
many, serves as a reminder that they have proven to be less
demanding than in 1919-24, when the post-war system
emerged only in the aftermath of the ill-fated French
occupation of the Ruhr, or than in 1945-49, when the
post-war structure began to settle with the signing of the
Washington Treaty and, subsequently, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). The future is about to begin.
Moving the clock forward to April 1999, when revisions to
the Washington Treaty will be formally signed, helps
anticipate issues of European security beyond the first
phase of NATO enlargement, which can also be declared as
over.
But what future—one that will resurrect the worst
features of the distant past or one that will strengthen the
best legacies of a more recent past? The evidence gathered to
date remains contradictory. As should have been expected,
the post-Cold War era in Europe was fraught with many
instabilities and much uncertainty. These were seen and
endured most visibly and most painfully in the Balkans,
including but not limited to Bosnia and what used to be
known as Yugoslavia. They have to do, too, with future
conditions in what used to be known as the Soviet Union,
including Russia, the defeated state, but also many of the
countries that fell under its domination before and after the
Revolution of 1917. On the whole, though, these post-Cold
War instabilities and uncertainties have little to do with the
Cold War. Rather, they mainly grow out of earlier wars,
including the two world wars that conditioned the
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distribution of power in Europe and beyond, during much of
the 20th century.
As a result of these instabilities, the debate over the
post-Cold War future of NATO proved to be stillborn. With
the post-war expectations quickly exhausted, calls for new
structures that would substitute for wartime alliances
quickly faded: the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) gained a new name and then
disappeared. For a short while after 1989, calls for a
dissolution of NATO were heard, mainly from those who
had been making the same calls during the Cold War as
well. Since 1993, however, these calls have become less
frequent and the centrality of NATO has been less and less
challenged. Concomitantly, expectations of a quick and full
completion of the European construction have lost the
intensity they had after the Maastricht Treaty which had
been signed in December 1991. Instead, the war in Bosnia
has confirmed that this is not Europe’s time after all,
whether for its separate nation-states or for the European
Union (EU), to which 15 nation-states already belong, with
more to come. At best, the time is half-before-Europe,
pending on Europe’s ability to take further and better care
of its security needs.
Nor are there many questions raised any longer over the
centrality of the U.S. role and power within NATO, and
hence in post-Cold War Europe. If anything, compared to
the aftermath of either one or both of the previous two world
wars, there have been fewer calls for a return home, fewer
indications of a collapse or a fragmentation of the victorious
wartime alliance, and fewer indications of new hegemonial
bids from either the defeated states or new contenders for
regional or global hegemony.
In and of themselves, therefore, the legacies left from the
long reprieve from history imposed by the Cold War are
sound. These are especially in evidence in the West—the
part of the continent, that is, that begins mainly where the
Ottoman and Russian empires used to end. The legacy,
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there, is that of a new European space that has been
modified by five major events that have truly changed the
established course of Europe’s history: the collapse of
colonial empires; the erosion of the nation-state; the end of
the the Left-Right cleavage; the de-legitimation of wars; and
the return of the New World into the Old.
Considered separately, these changes are well-known.
The colonial wars that followed the two world wars provided
a global stage in which conflicts in East-West relations
could erupt at the least cost for its main protagonists, but
they also served frequently as a catalyst for discord in
transatlantic and intra-European relations. The Left-Right
cleavages, which had been a recurring source of serious
instabilities from within each European state since 1919,
became an invitation for destabilizing political intrusions
from without after 1945. After Europe’s nationalisms were
protectively forced into the cage loosely called “Europe,” the
progressive transformation of nation-states into member
states has imposed the institutional obligations made to the
collective “We” by all member states on the sovereign “I” of
each nation-state. On the western side of the continent at
least, Europe’s taste for armed conflicts, too, has soured
after the orgy of violence endured during both world wars,
but also because of the impotence showed during the Cold
War when the countries of Europe could neither gain their
autonomy nor regain their independence, let alone
whatever control they used to hold over distant lands. Last
but not least, the post-war U.S. decision to stay in Europe,
which defined Europe after 1945, proved to be far more
entangling than the Truman administration had
envisioned, both during the Cold War when the U.S.
commitments grew steadily and since the Cold War as these
commitments could no longer be reversed.
These developments were all linked, and how these
linkages worked has not been discussed as fully as the ways
in which each emerged and unfolded separately. For
example, it is after the small states of Europe had lost their
empires in Africa and Asia that their quest for space took
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the more civil form of European integration. Thus, the
colonial wars end at about the time when a small European
Community is launched and the political wars within each
of its six initial members begin to recede—say, between
1958 and 1963. In turn, the sense of an ever wider European
“community” of states enlarged to nine and more states,
coupled with the rise of never-ending affluence and the end
of increasingly debilitating colonial conflicts, helped
delegitimize the use of force both from within and from
without. Such prosperity and stability among the allies in
turn emerged as an open invitation for the United States to
disengage from the “over there” of yesteryears, or at least
achieve a more equal and more equitable sharing of the
many burdens of the West, whether in defending its values
in the East or in extending its interests in the South.
As the century ends, sustaining the changes that have
conditioned the transformation of Europe since the century
began represents a defining challenge for the years to come.
A reversal of the trends inherited from the Cold War could
take different forms. Thus, with regard to countries at the
periphery of the continent, there is little danger, of course, of
the European states attempting to rebuild their empires in
Africa or in Asia—at least not by force. These days are over.
Still, the South will continue to play a central role in the life
of Europe, as well as in Europe’s relations with the United
States and Russia. This role is especially decisive on the
southern shores of the Mediterranean, where lies an arc of
Islamic crises extending from Algeria and the balance of
North Africa and farther south, to Turkey and the Muslim
republics of the defunct Soviet Union.
The return home of Europe’s old empires can take many
forms. Most evident is the fact and the threat of large
inflows of immigrants intent on leaving the harsh economic
and political conditions that prevail in their respective
countries to settle in the former mother country or
elsewhere in a broad and affluent Europe made wide open
by agreements designed to end frontiers. Alternatively,
former imperial dependencies can export to the former
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mother countries either economic scarcities with a
manipulation of the price and supply of vital commodities,
or they can export sheer violence with terrorism and the
like—either export being, of course, the source of serious
political instabilities.
In either of these conditions, the question of Islam in
Europe—a question distinct from, but admittedly related to,
the question of Europe and Islam—is real and may raise a
significant, possibly decisive, challenge to European
security. Relations with Islam have been experienced in
Europe differently than in the United States, and they are
still lived differently not only from one side of the Atlantic to
the other but also from one European state to another. After
1999, this challenge to Europe’s security could quickly
become internal, even more than it might be external, as the
threats raised by the radicalization of an Islamic dispora
within many European states would be all the more genuine
as they could rely on potential ties with the radical Islamic
states abroad. More broadly, Europe’s relations with Islam,
and Islam’s relations with Europe, impact on political
trade-offs and bargains within the EU: such important
issues as Schengen or the allocation of structural funds, and
by implication of EU enlargement to the East, fall into the
new North-South divide that characterizes the EU at 15.
Finally, in a growing number of cases—including the Gulf
(over “dual containment”), the Middle East (over the
Arab-Israeli peace process), and even North Africa—how to
deal with Islamic revolutionary states has a significant
impact on Europe’s relations with the United States, and
even Russia.
The end of the Left-Right cleavages does not mean the
end of political divisions and hence, the end of political and
even regime instabilities. Already during the Cold War,
cleavages within the Left and within the Right were often as
significant as the Left-Right cleavage, just as the U.S.
opposition to the Left, especially the communist left, was
occasionally more significant than the U.S. opposition to the
conservative Right, especially the nationalist Right. Now,
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however, the collapse of communism has given the socialist
Left a new lease on life in the largest European states: in
Britain and Italy first, and in France next. Later in 1998,
the social democrats’ new bid for power in Germany may
end 15 years in the opposition. Europe’s non-communist
Left is all the more at ease in this new political environment
as it no longer needs to be revolutionary. Compassion for the
unemployed sells well, and claims of competence are
especially convincing if and when these claims are made
relative to, and against, the insufficiencies of those in
power.
On the other side of the political spectrum, the collapse of
the Soviet Union restores for the extreme right prospects for
a legitimacy denied by its conservative competitors because
of the Cold War against totalitarianism. Being an assertive
nationalist may no longer be as “bad” as was the case
earlier. In countries like Austria and France, the extreme
right commands between one-sixth and one-fourth of the
electorate. In Italy, a reborn neo-fascist party regains its
political legitimacy around a dynamic new leader who
contends for national leadership. In this case, too, Germany
might be next as it unloads the debilitating burdens of
uniqueness and rediscovers a past that Germans had
previously learned to master by pretending that there was
no past.
Political changes in Europe after NATO enlargement
could be quite significant. Renewed clashes within the two
sides of the political spectrum and between them risk a
fragmentation of the current consensus and public
outbursts of anger aimed at the EU or NATO, as well as at
the United States. The risk, too, may be over changes in the
constitutional frameworks that helped achieve stability
during the Cold War. In some cases, the constitutional risk
is to do nothing, as in France where political cohabitation
between President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister
Lionel Jospin until 2002 would erode the presidential
identity of the 1962 constitution, and end the Fifth Republic
as it has been known since de Gaulle. In other cases, as in
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Italy, the risk is over doing something, like a constitutional
reform that would launch a presidential regime that gives
precedence to charisma à l’italienne (i.e., that of the
neo-fascist Fini) over competence à l’américaine (i.e., that of
the neo-centrist Prodi).
Whatever may happen, it will happen around “Europe”
as the defining political issue. For it is now the intrusion of
the European Union into the day-to-day lives of each
nation-state that can best motivate political ideologies that
will enable the state to claim that it protects the citizens
from the market, and the nation’s identity from the Union.
In a narrow sense, the EU is the victim of its own agenda:
too much Europe may be killing it, and the EU suffers from
an agenda overload whose rigid timetable carries dangers of
derailment with every delay or setback. The main issues of
the agenda are known: the euro of Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) in January 1999 when the EU states will
begin a long farewell to their currencies; another InterGovernmental Conference (IGC) in or around the year 2001,
to address the issues of institutional governance that were
not settled in 1996; and enlargement by 2003, when the EU
will begin its expansion to 21 states. The scope, complexity,
and significance of this agenda are truly unprecedented:
deepen in order to widen, widen in order to deepen, and
reform in order to do both. In every instance and for all 15
members, the EU will cost a lot of money, will take away a
lot of sovereignty, and will impose a lot of austerity—in
short, the EU now promises to impose a lot of pain that will
cause a lot of public resentment.
In a broader sense, the EU is victimized by its own
successes. Nonmembers view it as a short cut for economic
prosperity and democratic stability. Members continue to
view it as a recipe for affluence at home and influence
abroad. The latter’s growing awareness of the costs of
integration, and the former’s future discovery of the costs of
membership are what gives the process unprecedented
fragility. For the past 40 years, whenever community

63

building in Europe carried a cost (meaning, economic
dislocations or erosion of sovereignty) that cost could be
contained with vocal national leaders (whether General de
Gaulle in the 1960s or Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s) or
with new institutions (like the European Council in the
1970s). Now, in the 1990s neither can be found. Although
Helmut Kohl remains a forceful and committed “European”
leader, he is not an identifiable “national” leader for Europe.
Similarly, the Euro-Council envisioned to protect each EU
state from the European Central Bank is not likely to be
effective if the euro is going to work: no institutional
gimmick is going to hide the further erosion of sovereignty
under conditions of economic hardship in the continent.
The mixture of economic and cultural crisis—meaning,
questions over affluence and identity—has never had good
consequences on Europe. Now, however, the countries of
Europe lack the means and the will to fight together as a
union of states, let alone fight alone or, least of all, with each
other. Plans for a Western European Union (WEU) should
be encouraged, but they remain an aspiration more than a
reality. The war in Bosnia could have been the catalyst for
the further development of WEU, but the issue proved to be
too demanding militarily under conditions that were too
distracting politically. As elsewhere and nearly everywhere,
the mood in Europe is inward and the interests are
self-centered. Now, the focus of EU attention is on EMU.
After 1999, only a derailment of monetary union could
create enough national urgency, and release enough
institutional energy, for a relaunch of Europe along the
lines of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP)—as
proved to be the case in the mid-1950s, when the collapse of
the European Defense Community became the catalyst for
the decision to launch an economic community. To be sure,
even a CFSP launch in 1999, whatever form that decision
might take, would still leave any credible common security
policy postponed for many more years, pending the
resolution of numerous and complex institutional issues.
Yet, in the intervening years, a CFSP could display a
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common foreign policy centered on enlargement to the East
before or after 2003, depending on how well EMU proceeds.
Finally, the future of the Cold War legacies in Western
Europe is related to the future of U.S. involvement in
Europe. Some still view the fact of even the perception of an
American withdrawal, whatever form it might take, as a
catalyst for action. Rather, it should be feared as a trigger
for a generalized sauve qui peut whereby the nationalisms of
Europe would be unleashed with a variety of bilateral deals
within Europe, including Germany looking to the East, with
France initially but alone next. A Franco-German ménage à
trois with Moscow might thus balance an Anglo-Saxon pas
de deux choreographed by the United States. Depending on
the goals which these bilateral deals might seek for Europe,
not to mention other deals struck between European states
and non-European rogue states like Iraq, vital U.S.
economic and strategic interests might be progressively at
risk.
With the end of the Cold War transition, U.S. leadership
is questioned more openly in much of Europe, and by many
of the European states, as unreliable, hazardous, deceptive,
intrusive, and unpredictable: unreliable because it tends to
come late and remains tentative even after it has come;
hazardous because the risks of failure are often assumed by
the protected parties; deceptive because of a tendency to not
do what is said and not say what is done; intrusive because
of an overbearing hegemonial posture that is all the more
cumbersome as, precisely, it is viewed as unreliable,
hazardous, and deceptive; and, last but not least,
unpredictable because the quality of U.S. leadership and
the sustainability of U.S. policies seem to depend on
internal factors which many in Europe view as
incomprehensible or irrelevant. Still, even as American
power and leadership are questioned, neither is truly in
question, whether in Europe or in the United States. That
such would be the case matters. On both sides of the
Atlantic, the case for American involvement is a case based
on interests: nowhere else can there be found a relationship
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that is as complete as the relationship between North
America (the United States but also Canada) and Europe, a
relationship that relies on decisive security ties, as well as
on inescapable economic, political, and even cultural ties.
There are many remaining points of strategic, economic,
and political derailment, however. Thus, in coming months
and years causes for concern might include a defeat in the
Balkans, meaning an unlikely decision to withdraw U.S.
forces before the Dayton agreements would have been
convincingly fulfilled or without preserving minimal order
in Kosovo; unmanaged conflict in the Gulf or in the Middle
East, meaning a European perception of U.S. policies
implemented for national goals at the expense of the allies’
needs, combined with a U.S. perception of the allies as
good-weather friends; or even a military conflict in Asia,
including the like of Korea or Taiwan, which the European
allies would choose to ignore. No less significantly, points of
transatlantic derailment might also include an economic
crisis reminiscent of the interwar years that bridged the gap
between the two world wars: for example, a monetary storm
in Europe after the hypothetical collapse of EMU—with,
without, or because of an economic meltdown in Asia—could
trigger an agonizing reappraisal of the post-Cold War
transatlantic economic ties notwithstanding the interests
that justify these ties. Finally, a political crisis that would
result from an open discord over security issues in the Gulf
or elsewhere, or from an open confrontation over competing
corporate interests, and lead the U.S. Congress to force
unilateral actions on the part of the U.S. president and
counteraction on the part of the EU Commission prompted
by some of its members, would be a great concern.
Thus, the main security challenges in Europe are mostly
of its own making. An enlarged NATO does not truly
address many or most of these instabilities, except for the
fact that it represents the conduit for a U.S. commitment
which, as argued, Europe continues to need because of its
own insufficiencies, and continues to expect in spite of itself.
That NATO might stand at the margin of the most direct
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challenges to Europe’s stability during the coming years is
not troubling. In 1949, too, the North Atlantic Treaty signed
by the United States and 10 European states plus Canada
did not attend to many of the most immediate security
issues faced by the European allies, including imperial wars
in the South and political wars at home that came
dangerously close in some cases to outright civil wars. After
the Cold War, the commitment to NATO enlargement was
made without explaining the interests that would justify it.
Needless to say, it should have been the other way around:
interests define commitments, and the will for a commitment emerges out of a shared awareness of the interests
that justify that commitment.
After 1999, the case for enlarging NATO beyond its
then-19 members will have to be made on strategic grounds
as well as on institutional grounds. In other words, it will no
longer be enough to suggest that this is Romania’s turn—or
that of Slovenia or that of the Baltic states. Instead, it will be
necessary to define the Alliance’s needs for the missions and
objectives sought by its 19 members, and it will be
necessary, too, to determine which new members either
Western institution should welcome in order to fill the new
gaps open by the ongoing rearticulation of Europe’s civil and
stable space.
The full institutional logic of NATO and EU enlargement has not been articulated yet. Even as NATO
enlargement proceeds, it remains a policy without a
rationale, notwithstanding the body of scholarly literature
that helped promote it during the early post-Cold War
years. In 1998, the decisive argument for enlargement was
that the predictable cost of not enforcing the commitment to
enlarge would far outweigh the unpredictable costs of going
ahead with a fairly prudent decision—prudent vis-à-vis the
new members (limited in number and carefully selected as
to their location) but also, therefore, vis-à-vis Russia. After
enlargement has been voted in the U.S. Senate, the decision
to enlarge beyond 19 should be based more explicitly on a
strategic rationale. An exclusively institutional case can be
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made for the EU, which has an identity of its own as,
literally, the 16th member of the European Union:
affluence, and hence stability, without the EU is difficult to
imagine. The same case cannot be made for NATO, whose
members would not necessarily lose their security without
the guarantees offered by the treaty and its organization.
Now, instead, the rationale for NATO enlargement ought to
be realistic, meaning that it should be threat-conscious in
addition to being institution-conscious. It must be made
differently—either more or less convincingly—about
Romania than about the Baltic states or the Ukraine, on the
basis of security needs and pending the evolution of Russian
policies and objectives in the affected regions.
In 1949 as now, NATO and its subsequent enlargements
(in 1952 and 1955) provided a security context within which
Europe’s internal questions of political stability and
economic growth could be addressed, and communitybuilding could be launched. In other words, while it may be
argued that NATO alone did not produce peace within the
North Atlantic area, the fact that it deterred war from
without that area helped buy the time needed for the good
Cold War legacies to build up. This carries two implications.
First, the European economic community was a by-product
of, and a prerequisite for, the transatlantic security
community. In other words, the idea of Europe and the
Atlantic idea were not only compatible, they were also
complementary. It was understood that they would follow
parallel tracks—each with its own locomotive, its own
ambitions, its own capabilities; but it was also anticipated
that at some point these parallel tracks would converge,
with a Europe so self-sufficient as to make the Atlantic idea
redundant, or with an Atlantic idea so well-rooted into
reality as to make the idea of Europe secondary.
Accordingly, the evolution of NATO and the EU,
including their enlargement as well as their institutional
reforms, must be made not only compatible but also
complementary. Both respond to a comprehensive
institutional logic that shapes the patterns of space
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redistribution. Questions of membership and interests, but
also questions of timing and procedures—who and why,
when and how?—are raised on behalf of a common
Euro-Atlantic space whose articulation began more or less
consciously after the two world wars, and proceeded more or
less effectively during the Cold War. Each institution must
remain aware of what the other does and cannot do: NATO
and the EU should be aware of states that cannot enter the
EU and NATO soon, whatever the reasons, and of any state
that belongs to only one of these institutions. Within such a
common space, the two processes of NATO and EU
enlargement cannot be separated even as they remain
separable because that space would achieve its coherence
when a finite number of European states achieve
converging membership in both institutions and with the
United States. Such convergence can be anticipated in three
successive phases.
First, after 1999, a NATO at 19 members would expand
toward EU countries that are not yet NATO members,
including Austria and (possibly) Sweden and Finland. With
Romania, too, a strong candidate for NATO membership on
grounds of security in the Balkans (but an unlikely
candidate for EU membership for many more years), a
post-1999 NATO expansion would respond to military
needs in southeastern Europe and political realities in the
EU and WEU without raising new risks in, for, or from
Russia and other nonmembers. Simultaneously, an EU at
15 members would expand to 21 members by 2003, even
though early admission for the smallest of the five Eastern
contenders, namely, Slovenia and Estonia, would help
confirm the seriousness of the EU process and the firmness
of its members’ commitment to achieve enlargement at the
earliest possible time.
After 2003, a NATO at 21+ (NATO at 19 + Austria + . . . +
Romania) could consider additional enlargement to
remaining EU neutral states (including, by that time,
Ireland), the newly admitted EU states (including Estonia
and Slovenia), and even the other two Baltic states
69

(depending on conditions in Russia). This next phase would
also carry a 4-year timetable during which the EU, too,
would expand to new NATO members not yet members of
the EU (including Romania) and to states that complete the
regional clusters in the Baltics (Latvia and Lithuania) and
Central Europe (Slovakia). By that time, too, Norway might
reconsider its long-delayed interest in EU membership.
Finally, late during that period, too, access talks with
Turkey could finally be launched lest Turkey be “lost” by the
end of the decade as the only European member of NATO
that would not be a member of the EU as well.
After that, past the year 2007 and nearing 2010, the
convergence would be completed with decisions as to how
much farther, if at all, the process might continue. By that
time, too—for the 50th anniversary of the Rome Treaties—a
new relationship between the United States and the EU
would engineer explicit ties between NATO and the EU.
These ties might take the form of a U.S.-EU treaty, a
TAFTA (Transatlantic Free Trade Area), and new institutional arrangements for binding consultation between the
United States and whatever type of institutional
governance might have then emerged within the EU.
The integrated economic space of the EU, in close
association with the United States, and a common
Euro-Atlantic security community explicitly based on U.S.
power are both futures that have already happened. That
space will be all the more cohesive and safe as it continues to
respond to some of the features that helped define it over the
past 50 years.
• First, the United States may not be a European
Power, but it is a Great Power in Europe. To pretend the
former is misleading: the very history of the United States
makes the closeness of its relations with Europe still look
somewhat unnatural. But the tangible components of the
U.S. presence in Europe can no longer be ignored: unlike the
U.S. relationship with Asia, the U.S. relationship with
Europe is complete.
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• Second, the Atlantic Idea and the Idea of Europe are
complementary. To pretend otherwise is self-defeating.
After World War II, each was a precondition for the other;
during the Cold War, each helped strengthen the other.
After the Cold War, the future of each will condition that of
the other, as well as of all others.
• Third, NATO and its enlargement is only one
institutional venue for a return of the East into the West as
part of the rearticulation of space in Europe and across the
Atlantic. To pretend otherwise is not only to reduce the
totality of the Cold War legacies to one dimension, but also
to distort that dimension.
• Fourth, the enlargement of the Western institutions is
only beginning, but it must be and remain finite. In other
words, membership for all is not desirable for the good
performance of either or both NATO and the EU, and
membership in either the EU or NATO may not be desirable
for all states in Europe.

Integrating these features in the formulation of the
questions and answers raised by the new security
challenges faced by Europe after the enlargement of NATO
will help pursue the vision that was articulated 50 years ago
as the Cold War was about to provide the rationale for a
North Atlantic Treaty designed to extend America’s stay in
Europe. As these 50 years are remembered, they provide
much room for satisfaction over what has been accomplished and leave much room for apprehension over what
remains to be done.
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CHAPTER 6
THE MIDDLE ZONE
AND POST-ENLARGEMENT EUROPE
Sherman W. Garnett
and
Rachel Lebenson
The three countries of the middle zone between Russia
and NATO—Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine—represent a
new and important forward edge of the Atlantic Alliance
and a crucial borderland in the new Europe. Barring any
surprises in the current ratification process of NATO
members, Belarus and Ukraine will soon share a border
with the expanded Alliance. If, as some predict, a second
round of enlargement in 1999 includes Romania for
membership, Moldova will also become a border state. The
proximity of these states to an enlarged NATO, their
relationship to Russia and the other states of the former
USSR, and the still unfinished work of political and
economic reform in the region make them simultaneously
states of great importance and great uncertainty.
By enlarging to the edge of this region, NATO
encounters a qualitatively new boundary, different from
both the current German-Polish border or the former inner
German border. This boundary is neither a zone of
near-term transition nor a clear division between allies and
enemies. The character of this boundary will be crucial in
determining the relationship between the Europe of the
West’s great institutions and the larger Europe from the
Atlantic to the Urals. Belarus has made plain its opposition
to enlargement and has dramatically turned its back on
Europe as a whole; however, it presents no serious military
threat to the Alliance. Both Moldova and Ukraine look
westward for assistance and long-term opportunities to
participate in Europe, yet these two states are plainly
unprepared for membership in any of its great institutions.
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The West must plainly turn to a set of policies that reflect
both the character and importance of this middle zone.
However, the boundary between this region and the rest
of Europe will not simply be determined by Western
policies. These states themselves have a great deal to say
about whether that boundary is hard or soft, relatively
permanent, or liable to shift eastward. These countries are
in the midst of transformations and will themselves
determine what kind of states they will become, and
ultimately, what kind of neighbors they will be. Belarus,
Moldova, and Ukraine are not simply slower developing
versions of the Visegrad states. They have a history of
statelessness. In particular, they were in recent decades
members of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).
The tasks of forming state institutions and launching a
sustainable economies are more daunting than those faced
by Poland or the Czech Republic. These states not only must
undertake political and economic reforms but carry out the
fundamental work of building up the state itself. These
complex tasks are still unfinished in all three states,
making their future internal architecture and even stability
less certain than that in Poland or Hungary.
Finally, Russia will also have an important influence on
this region. Given long-standing Russian interests and
constraints on its power, it is here that Russia’s relationship
to the West may well be determined. Geographically and
historically, the three states of the middle zone have been
more intimately tied to Russia or the Soviet Union than
Poland and the other states of Central Europe. They have
been the target of Russian integration policy in a way that
the states of Central Europe have not and cannot be. All
remain dependent on the Russian market and Russian
energy supplies. Simply by their independence, Belarus,
Ukraine, and Moldova challenge Russia’s notions of itself,
its boundaries, its identity, and interests. Ukraine and
Belarus are important tests of Russia’s attempts to create
more closely integrated structures on the territory of the
former USSR, yet they have responded in diametrically
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opposite ways. NATO and eventual European Union
enlargement mean that this middle zone will also be a
region where Western and Russian interests crisscross,
overlap, and potentially conflict.
The set of challenges likely to arise for the West from this
middle zone is illustrated by the examples below. These
include Ukraine’s political and economic stagnation, the
danger of violence in Transdniestr and possibly Crimea,
Russian-Belarusian integration, the long-term stability of
Russian-Ukrainian relations, and the constraints on Russia
itself. These examples are by no means exhaustive, but they
indicate the range of problems that are likely to emerge
from the region. Ukrainian internal stagnation illustrates
the continued problem of weakly established political and
economic reforms. Transdniestr and Crimea recall the
continued possibility of ethnic conflict. Russian-Belarusian
integration, Russian-Ukrainian relations, and the systemic
consequences of the constraints on Russian power offer the
various options reshaping the region’s international
relations.
Ukraine Flirts with Stagnation.
Despite real progress, particularly after the election of
Leonid Kuchma in 1994, Ukraine’s political and economic
reforms have slowed to a crawl.1 Economic reforms have
ground to a halt as key political and economic interests
divide up the spoils that are emerging from privatization. A
host of officials at the central and regional level who derive
their power and wealth from the current system are
attempting to preserve the Byzantine bureaucratic
structure that gives them their say.
Corruption is pervasive, while foreign investment is
rare. The general population has been worn down by 6 years
of economic hardship, energy shortages, and collapsing
social services. The government owes over $2 billion in back
wages and pensions. The Economist Intelligence Unit
predicts modest real growth for 1998. These official
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statistics still do not capture the yet unmeasured dynamism
of the “informal sector” of the economy. The state remains
the majority or largest shareholder in many cases. The lack
of a clear legal base, weak courts, and bureaucratic corruption scares off most foreigners. Opposition to privatization,
particularly in the communist and socialist-dominated
eastern part of the country, remains strong.
To compound problems, Ukraine has entered a
prolonged political season, framed by parliamentary
elections in March 1998 and presidential elections in
October 1999. What is at stake in the upcoming elections is
not, as many observers feared in the early days of Ukrainian
independence, the very existence of the state itself. Rather,
the question is now what kind of state Ukraine will become.
The broad alternatives can be stated starkly as a choice
between Ukraine being part of Europe, even if imperfectly,
or being relegated to Europe’s periphery. A European
Ukraine requires bold choices and actions. A peripheral
Ukraine comes by default: the leadership need only follow
the political rules of the game already deeply ingrained in
the country.
The real prize in Ukrainian politics is not a seat in
parliament but rather the presidency, and the events
leading up to the 1999 elections will determine how much
deeper the current stagnation becomes. Five of the six
leading political parties in the country now define
themselves in opposition to the president. The political
infighting is already bitter. Kuchma has, in fact, had several
of his rival’s newspapers closed for violation of election laws.
They are in turn accusing him of “authoritarianism” and
threatening impeachment. It is quite likely that Ukrainian
politics after the March 1998 elections will focus on
weakening Kuchma still further.
As crippling as these conflicts of policy and personality
are, they are only half the story. The most intense struggles
in Ukrainian politics take place, not between parties,
ideologies, or branches of government, but among the
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political and economic leadership in Kiev and the regions.
Various coalitions of leading politicians, bankers, and newand old-style business leaders struggle for control over the
state’s wealth and for positions of power that will control its
divestiture into private hands. As long as these elites are
distracted by the still unfinished competition for power and
property, there will be little energy left over for sound policy.
Despite the corruption and disenchantment which has
come to characterize Ukrainian politics, elections have
become a fact of Ukrainian political life. In time, elections, a
stronger civil society, and the growth of independent media
and non-governmental organizations might even force the
candidates to differentiate themselves on the basis of policy
and performance. Both former Prime Ministers, Yevhen
Marchuk and Pavlo Lazarenko, are leading challengers to
Kuchma. Marchuk has embraced the weak Ukrainian
variant of European social democracy. Lazarenko has set
his sights on the emerging business class, which he himself
represents with all its virtues and vices. Kuchma has at
times shown himself adept at cultivating both business and
moderate Ukrainian ethnic constituencies. As of yet,
however, there are no deeply rooted party organizations, no
real labor unions or business organizations of the kind we in
the West understand, and certainly no deep popular
support that would ensure a grass roots base. In this
election season, favorable long-term trends are likely to give
way to opting instead for business as usual.
If this is the state of Ukrainian politics, why should the
West care? Ukraine’s problems are man made. They can and
must be addressed by Ukrainians themselves. If the
Ukrainian leadership is able to avoid the hard choices, then
let them enjoy their spoils on Europe’s periphery. After all,
Ukraine is a stable enough place. Does the West really have
much of a stake in Ukraine, especially a Ukraine that
appears to have no real intention to take the steps necessary
to show it wants to belong to Europe? As tempting as such a
conclusion is, Ukraine’s choice between Europe and
Europe’s periphery matters to the continent as a whole.
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A choice in favor of the status quo in Ukraine does not
merely perpetuate the country as it is today. It undermines
the foundations that have made the current situation
bearable inside the country and less dangerous for
Ukraine’s neighbors. It would certainly put in danger the
policies that have dramatically lowered inflation and
brought Ukraine a stable currency. It would exacerbate
economic deprivation in the country as a whole, particularly
along crucial ethnic and regional fault lines, such as
Crimea.
A stagnant Ukraine will grow weaker and less coherent
as a government, depriving it of the ability to handle future
crises, whether inside the country or with its neighbors.
Finally, it would convince the many skeptics in the West
that they were right all along about Ukraine. It does not
belong in Europe. The current momentum in Ukraine’s ties
with the West would erode in a way that would undermine
the most important external supports for the political and
economic reforms that are underway in the country. A
western disengagement from Ukraine would adversely
influence the course of Ukrainian-Russian relations, which
have stabilized, in no small measure, because of the current
strategic context provided by U.S. and Western interest in
their normalization. A peripheral Ukraine would increase
the danger that enlarging European institutions like NATO
and the EU would find themselves on a much more
unpredictable and unstable frontier.
The West, of course, cannot force the Ukrainian
leadership to act against its immediate political interests. It
cannot impose sound economic reforms or more open
politics. It can, however, remain a strong stimulus for these
reforms by reminding Ukraine of the choice it faces and the
basic requirements for participation in Europe. The West
can also make plain that its long-term support will be there
for whichever leader, President Kuchma or one of his
opponents, understands the choices and acts in a serious
way to get the country moving in the right direction.
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The Continued Dangers of Regional Conflict.
Both Ukraine and Moldova host potential sources of
conflict inside their borders, which, if ignited, could have
regional and even continental implications. The
self-proclaimed Transdniestr Republic (PMR), in the
eastern portion of Moldova, made a forceful break in 1992
when armed militia occupied Moldovan administrative
buildings on the right side of the Dniestr River, the crucial
boundary between the sparring regions. The decision to
launch armed attacks was prompted by the initial rhetoric
which dominated Moldovan politics in the first years of
transition. The Popular Front of Moldova, the primary
political force at the time, tended to see independence as a
transitional stage to reunification with Romania. Latin
script for the Moldovan language replaced Cyrillic in 1989,
and the Romanian flag was adopted in 1991. The prospect of
what the Transdniestrians called “Romanization” alienated
critical portions of the country, and in 1990 the
Transdniestrian capital of Tiraspol voted to make the region
autonomous territory. In 1991, Transdniestr seceded from
Moldova just days after Moldova made its break with the
Soviet Union.
Transdniestr is both ethnically and politically at odds
with mainstream Moldova. In Transdniestr, fully 25
percent of the population is Russian, 28 percent Ukrainian,
and only 40 percent Moldovan.2 The ethnic difference is
exacerbated by the region’s overtly anti-democratic,
nationalist, proto-Soviet political style. Igor Smirnov,
self-appointed leader of the PMR, plays on nostalgia for the
USSR and the desire for order and peace to maintain his
“dictatorship” and advocate incorporation into the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The presence
of the Russian 14th Army in Transdniestr further
complicates the situation. The Soviet 14th Army was a
rather modest force by the standards of the Cold War, a
second echelon mobilization base which could support
operations in the Balkans and against Turkey. It has
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declined in the past 6 years but still represents the greatest
concentration of military power in the region and a source of
supply for the PMR itself. It is not just the arms cache and
materiel of the 14th Army to which the Transdniestrians
are attached. A large segment of the population is retired
14th Army soldiers who identify not only with their former
brigade but also with an empire which no longer exists.
Fighting in Transdniestr ensued in 1992 and continued
until a cease-fire was imposed by Russia in July. Various
and irregular Russian attempts to carve out a peaceful
resolution failed. The Russians were more interested in
wooing Moldova into the CIS than they were in brokering a
peaceful resolution to the conflict. At times, Russia seemed
to be using Transdniestr mostly as leverage to secure
Moldovan entrance into the CIS. Russia, in fact, failed to
transfer its dominant position within Moldova after the
1992 cease-fire into any real sustainable advantage.
In 1997, Russia, the Moldovan government, and
representatives of Transdniestr and Ukraine made another
attempt, concluding a Memorandum of Agreement in May
1997 that lays down the basic principles for resolving the
conflict. Moldovan President Lucinschi and self-appointed
Transdniestrian leader, Igor Smirnov, have held a number
of face-to-face meetings attempting to translate the
Memorandum’s principles into a specific agreement that
balances autonomy for Transdniestr with the unity and
territorial integrity of Moldova itself. This process has
produced agreements on military confidence-building
measures in October and economic cooperation in
November 1997. Yet the two sides remain far apart on basic
political questions, with the Transdniestrians still seeking
a measure of autonomy that is barely distinguishable from
full sovereignty itself, including demarcated borders and
membership in the CIS.
The May Memorandum, although it has not yet been
implemented, does hold promise for a near-term resolution.
The reason for this is that Russia is no longer the sole
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outside power engaged in active mediation of the conflict.
Ukraine signed the May Memorandum as a co-guarantor
and has been active in direct mediation with the Moldovan
government and the Transdniestrians. Ukrainian
President Leonid Kuchma has even offered to deploy
Ukrainian peacekeeping forces to supplement Russian
forces already on the ground. At Ukraine’s insistence, the
May Memorandum strengthens the role of the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) at the
expense of the CIS.3 Although multilateral mediation has
been tried before, what separates the current effort from
past failures is the level of Ukrainian activity, Russia’s
apparent willingness to tolerate it, and an increased role for
the OSCE.
In Crimea, Ukraine has managed to avoid the eruption
of deep ethnic and regional divisions into bloody conflict.4 A
strong nationalist challenge arose in Crimea in 1994-95. A
coalition of Russian parties emerged dominant in the
parliamentary elections and elected one of their own
presidents in 1994. Long-standing demands for a special
status for the peninsula and wide-ranging autonomy
appeared to be on the verge of escalating into full blown
secession or unification with Russia. The Crimean
leadership threatened a referendum to this end. Three
factors defused the challenge. The Ukrainian leadership
succeeded in making the dispute one of laws, not of force.
The Russian government, especially after the invasion of
Chechnya, stayed out of this dispute and did not support the
Russian nationalist parties. Finally, economic and
nomenklatura interest groups on the peninsula itself
believed they had more to gain by dealing with
Ukraine—especially as privatization began to take place in
1994-95.
Still, Ukraine’s Crimea problem is not gone forever.
Economic malaise or difficulties in implementing the
Russian-Ukrainian agreement on the Black Sea Fleet could
well restart dormant conflicts among Russian nationalists
and partisans of an accommodation with Kiev on the
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peninsula. The aggrieved Crimean Tatars could also
become a source of political conflict as they seek a greater
voice over political and economic life on the peninsula, a
development that would clearly be opposed by the Russian
nationalist parties and others on the peninsula who
benefited from the forced exile of the Tatars and do not want
to see old property issues reopened. Any flare-ups in Crimea
could have deleterious effects on Ukraine’s Russian and
highly russified eastern regions.
These two potential sources of conflict, the still festering
Transdniestr and the now quiescent Crimea, are daunting
challenges to regimes still being tested by political and
economic challenges of the first order. Any outbreak of
violence in these areas would directly influence not only the
forward edge of NATO itself, but bilateral and multilateral
ties in the region that are crucial for the stability of Europe
as a whole.
Russian-Belarusian Integration.
The Russian-Belarusian relationship comes the closest
to “special” relations of any two countries in the former
Soviet Union. Sharing common ethnic, religious, and
cultural identities, Belarus has from the beginning sought
close relations with Russia whom it historically sees as its
chief protector and benefactor. The height of this
relationship came on May 23, 1997, when they signed the
Union Charter, bringing their two states into one
theoretical body. Of course, the elaboration of this charter
revealed deep sources of opposition in both countries to the
practical development of this concept, leaving the two
countries somewhere between allies and integrated
partners.
In one aspect, the security relationship, integration has
proceeded, albeit with fits and starts and with important
limitations. The two sides have signed a series of military
agreements which commit them to regular staff talks on key
defense issues. The air defense systems of the two countries
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have exercised together and are becoming more integrated.
Russia is training key elements of Belarus’ future officer
corps. Russia also appears to have real influence over the
personnel policies and the Belarusian Ministry of Defense.
Belarusian air defense assets, early warning radar, and
other military infrastructure are already a part of long-term
Russian planning and joint use. However, Belarus still
insists on restrictions that prevent the deployment of
Belarusian forces outside the country and Russian forces
inside Belarus.5 The staffing levels of Russian personnel at
early warning and submarine communications facilities
within Belarus is strictly capped and regulated. Cooperation among the border guards of the two countries has
deepened, but Belarus continues to deploy only its own
forces along its borders.
Thus even in the security sphere, this relationship falls
far short of the union which its central document’s title
suggests. First, Belarusian President Lukashenko and the
elite which supports him are not interested in opening up
their own power base to unrestricted competition from
Russian political and economic elites. Indeed, some of the
Belarusian opposition to integration has arisen precisely
because some of the Union’s most vocal supporters in
Russia, as well as key opponents, argue that in the long run,
the union will not be that of two equal partners, but of a
larger and smaller state. When Yeltsin welcomed Belarus
into a “unified state” on national television on the eve of
signing the Union Charter, Lukashenko responded that
Belarus preferred a confederation. Speaking to his
parliament in February 1997, Lukashenko vowed never to
become part of a merged state with Russia, as a proposal
from Russia had evidently outlined.
Second, part of the ruling elite in Russia considers
Belarus to be dead weight obstructing Russia’s own
development. Due to last minute efforts by Russia’s chief
economic reformers, particularly Anatoly Chubais, the final
charter did not allow for Belarus to have an equal voice in
economic matters, something which Russian reformers felt
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would doom their economy. In other words, the momentum
of state-building has swept both Russia and Belarus up in a
desire to pursue their own interests. At every point along
the path to integration, these national interests have
trumped alternative desires for a union.
Finally, Russia and Belarus have chosen different
political and economic fates. The crisis during the summer
of 1997 and its follow-up have borne out the comparatively
enlightened character of Russian political influence. Pavel
Sheremet, director of the Russian bureau of the Moscowbased ORT television network, was detained at the
Belarusian-Lithuanian border on July 30, 1997, and
charged with “premeditated crossing of the state border in a
group.”6 Over 2 months of heated negotiations took place at
the highest levels before Lukashenko released Sheremet,
and not without provocative comments from Russia. In fact,
Russia would not dismiss, even at Lukashenko’s insistence,
Russian presidential spokesman Sergey Yastrzhembskiy’s
statement that “when the protection of the honor, dignity,
and health of Russian citizens is at stake, the geopolitical
interests of the country must become of secondary
importance.”7 In such an environment, Russia’s relatively
pluralistic political system and open media represent a
subversive force in Belarus, and the regime has regularly
complained of biased Russian television coverage.
Given the still uncertain nature of the RussianBelarusian union and the West’s obvious interest in
ensuring that any future bilateral relationship takes a
course conducive to stability in the region, a policy of
isolating Belarus is counterproductive. Of course, no one is
urging Western leaders to embrace Lukashenko, but the
isolation of the Belarusian military at a time when they are
formulating the terms of a long-term security relationship
with Russia amounts to forfeiting Western interest in this
crucial question. The range of bilateral and NATOsponsored military-to-military programs, coupled with
NATO’s announced posture of military restraint in Poland,
provides the perfect basis for a modest yet sustained
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security dialogue with Belarus. Belarusian diplomats
discovered rather late that they too would like a special
agreement with NATO. Pursuing such an agreement is in
Western interests, though celebrating its completion by a
summit is not (as long as the politics of Belarus remains
repressive).
Russian-Ukrainian Relations.
Russia’s relations with Ukraine constitute one of the
most significant bilateral relationships in Europe, and one
of the most complex. Russia hopes that, over time, the two
countries will return to what one former Yeltsin advisor
called “a fraternal Slavic compromise,” that is, an
integrated relationship far closer than normal stateto-state ties. Ukraine wants an unambiguous state-to-state
relationship with Russia—a view which is widely supported
in the West. Both Ukrainian Presidents Kravchuk and
Kuchma have worked hard to produce such an outcome. In
the past, these differences brought prolonged disagreement
on key issues of the bilateral agenda, from the basic
foundations of the bilateral relationship to the division and
basing of the Black Sea Fleet. In the past 2 years, both sides
have taken steps to move toward a new legal foundation for
their relationship. In May 1997, Russia and Ukraine
concluded an agreement on the status of the Black Sea Fleet
and the Russian-Ukrainian Friendship treaty.
The Black Sea Fleet agreement ends 5 years of
negotiations on the disputed Soviet fleet. In it, the two sides
agreed to grant Russia a 20-year lease to key port facilities
in Crimea. In return, the treaty is a clear Russian
acknowledgment that Crimea and its chief port city,
Sevastopol, are Ukrainian. The treaty also provides
Ukraine with rent for the facilities in the form of debt relief
and access to port facilities in Sevastopol, a provision the
Russian side long resisted. The Friendship Treaty provides
the basic outlines of the normal state-to-state foundation
sought by Ukraine. In it, Russia provides the first legally
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binding recognition of Ukraine’s existing borders without
conditions. While the Ukrainian parliament ratified the
treaty in January 1998, Russia has yet to ratify it.
These recent breakthroughs in bilateral relations,
however, come after several years of cautious crisis
management by both sides. They have continually been at
odds over the importance of the CIS and integration in
general, NATO enlargement, economic issues, such as
Ukraine’s debt and the provisions for Russian-Ukrainian
trade. While Russia has made integration of the former
Soviet space a centerpiece of its foreign policy, Ukraine has
relegated it to a necessary mechanism for achieving a
“civilized divorce.” Ukraine has, in fact, argued that
integration has to be voluntary, primarily economic, and
open to the broad integrative processes underway in Europe
and the global economy. On NATO enlargement, once the
question of nuclear weapons deployment in the new
member states was resolved, Ukraine came out in favor of
enlargement for Poland. Kuchma explicitly denied that
NATO’s new boundaries posed any military threat. Russia,
on the other hand, saw nothing positive in NATO
enlargement. On the economic front, Ukraine’s nearly $5
billion in debt to Russia, largely from unpaid energy bills,
had to be renegotiated in 1995 and may come up again this
year. In 1996, Russia slapped a 20 percent VAT on the
importation of Ukrainian sugar and other goods, a matter
settled only in late 1997.
In both countries, foes of normal state relations remain.
Some in Russia still resent Ukrainian independence and
Kiev’s reluctance to support integration. Many in Kiev fear
long-term Russian ambitions. The two countries are out of
step economically, with each fearing that the other is using
economic issues to its advantage. The long time frame for
the Black Sea Fleet agreement—20 years—raises the
prospect of a two-decade-long disagreement over implementation of what is a controversial agreement in at least some
of its provisions for both sides.
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The Russian role in Ukrainian foreign policy is still
important, however. Kuchma and Yeltsin signed a 10-year
economic cooperation agreement during his visit in early
March 1998. Whether this economic agreement will
actually be implemented remains an issue of debate. With
upcoming Ukrainian parliamentary and eventually
presidential elections, observers in Moscow fear the
warming trend from Kiev is simply an election scheme. That
Ukrainian politicians believe they must tilt toward Moscow
demonstrates Russia’s importance for the domestic
Ukrainian political scene, especially in times of elections.
Despite the priority of Russia in Ukrainian foreign
policy, Ukraine has fixed a firm gaze on the West and
continues to seek its support. Ukraine recently decided not
to supply Iran with two turbines it had promised in
connection with building a nuclear power plant in Busheri,
Iran. Ukraine’s turbines were supposed to complement
Russia’s addition to the power plant. Although Russia will
now simply contract out the turbines to a Russian company,
the Ukrainian involvement was Russia’s way of keeping
Ukraine concentrated on the Russian vector of its foreign
policy.
The West can and has already been involved in
normalizing Russian-Ukrainian relations. The successful
denuclearization of Ukraine, moreover, required U.S.
political and financial support. Without the trilateral
process and U.S. leadership, it is likely that the weapons
would still be the subject of difficult bilateral talks. The IMF
played a similar role in Russian-Ukrainian negotiations on
bilateral debt relief. Arguably, the Ukrainian-Russian
Friendship Treaty and Black Sea Agreement are
by-products of NATO’s intention to expand eastward and
Ukraine’s deepening ties with the West. The Russian
leadership did not want to compound the problems of NATO
enlargement by alienating Ukraine. This pattern of indirect
W estern in v olv ement i n the Rus si an- U kr ai ni an
relationship is vital and all too little understood in the West.
With many issues still dividing Kiev and Moscow, as well as
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continued mutual suspicions and differences over the future
of bilateral relations, there is still a need for the West to
encourage the normalization of this relationship.
The Role of a Constrained Russia
and the Diversification of Regional Ties.
Russia continues to labor under the enormous strain of
its internal political and economic transformation. In this
sense, Russia faces the same problems that its neighbors to
the west are facing, although its sheer size often precludes
the comparison. Russia’s foreign policy resources have been
severely limited by its internal crisis. The Russian economy
is barely half that of the former USSR. Even a period of
sustained economic growth will not alter Russia’s place far
from the world’s largest and most powerful economies.
Russia’s military remains in deep crisis, with most experts
predicting further cuts in both conventional and nuclear
forces and further declines in readiness. The basic
mechanism for making and implementing foreign policy
remains fragmented. Serious strategic guidance is provided
by President Yeltsin, who is himself often absent from
day-to-day policy control. Yeltsin and key advisors provide
needed stability on the most serious issues, but there is
often little follow-through even on these. Other issues
appear not to receive high-level attention at all. Ministries,
financial and industrial groups, and regions often pull
Russian policy in different directions.
This fragmented mechanism also faces a wide array of
challenges outside the middle zone. Festering problems to
the south and east distract Russian attention from its
western border region. The conflagration in Chechnya has
taken a large toll on Russian forces and on the Russian
public at large. Russia has also contended with conflict in
Dagestan, Ingushetia, and North Ossetia. Russian forces
are deployed in the frozen conflict zones of Abkhazia and
Tajikistan. The problem of stabilizing its Far Eastern and
Siberia regions in the face of a rising China, moreover, is
also a drain on foreign policy attention.
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It is not surprising, given the above, that Russian foreign
policy has not been able to concentrate fully on the
challenges of the middle zone. It has not been able to turn its
dominant position in Moldova since the cease-fire of 1992
into any sustained advantage. Indeed, the greatest leverage
over Moldovan policy has come from Gazprom, not the
Russian government. Russia has maintained a more
pragmatic relationship with Ukraine, though only recently
and with much controversy, has it begun to settle
outstanding issues that have kept the bilateral relationship
from developing normally. Moreover, the expected progress
with Belarus on integration has not materialized. It is more
likely that the opportunity for such an arrangement has
passed. In the near term, Russian foreign policy toward the
region is likely to remain an awkward mix of state and
private interests.
Yet Russia has important and long-standing interests in
this middle zone, even as the area is itself changing in ways
Russia has not yet understood. The rise of three new states
here has created a more diverse pattern of international
relations. This diversity is, in fact, a direct result of the
immense changes that have given rise to new states in
combination with the weakening of Russian power. The
formerly closed space of the former USSR, therefore, has
gained increased access to the outside world.
Both Russia and the West must cope with a pronounced
trend in the region toward the diversification of ties. Each of
the states is a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace
(PfP), though Belarus’s participation has, in fact, dwindled
to near inactivity. Ukraine signed a special charter with
NATO during NATO’s July 1997 summit in Madrid.
Moldova has also expanded its interaction with NATO. Both
Ukraine and Moldova seek long-term membership in the
EU.
Ukraine and Moldova have also radically expanded their
interaction with their Central European neighbors and
with each other. Ukraine in particular has formed strong
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ties with Poland and, in 1997, transformed a prickly
relationship with Romania into a potentially productive
one. Ukrainian-Polish relations include bi-national
commissions at the highest levels, identifying broad areas of
economic, political, and security cooperation. Warsaw
played an important role in Ukraine’s admission to both the
Central European Initiative and the Council of Europe. The
two countries also agreed in February 1996 to form a joint
peacekeeping battalion. Ukraine and Romania concluded a
ground-breaking treaty on cooperation on June 2, 1997,
settling key territorial questions as well as agreeing on a
framework for approaching future problems over the
development of energy resources around Ukraine’s Serpent
Island. Ukrainian-Romanian rapprochement has given
renewed impetus to Romanian-Moldovan ties, as the
presidents of all three states met to discuss common issues
and concerns in 1997. Indeed, the three countries signed a
cooperation agreement in February 1998 to protect ethnic
minorities and to set aside territorial disputes.
Within the former Soviet Union, Ukraine has also been
at the center of a new sub-group. Building on the informal
cooperation among so-called flank states during the late
1996-early 1997 debate over revisions to the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Moldova, Georgia,
Ukraine, and Azerbaijan issued a formal declaration at the
October 1997 OSCE meeting in Strasbourg aimed at
sustaining and extending their cooperation. The group,
known as GUAM, is far from an alliance or integrated
community, but does well illustrate the trends at work
breaking down the formerly unified Soviet space.
Neither Russia nor the West are fully adjusted to the
reality of this diversification of international relations.
Neither the opportunities nor the pitfalls of this new set of
relations are well understood. Meanwhile, both Russia and
the West face the problem of untangling their overlapping
and intersecting interests in this zone, both now when
Russian power is constrained and later after Russia has
recovered its economic and political coherence. The work of
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fashioning stable regimes and rules for managing this
diversified system of international relations has barely
begun, yet it must be accelerated in the years ahead to
ensure the stable international environment these states
need to survive and reform.
The Need For Sound Policy.
These examples suggest a policy horizon in the middle
zone that differs sharply from that which the West has
encountered to date in Central Europe. The United States
in particular finds itself on unfamiliar ground. The
requirements for U.S. engagement in this region at this
time are not what they were in Europe during the Cold War.
Yet U.S. and Western engagement remains crucial for
helping to stabilize this zone and prevent it from becoming a
challenge to the new forward edges of both NATO and the
EU.
NATO remains the leading security institution in
Europe and one crucial to the overall stability of the
continent, but NATO will simply not play the role in the
middle zone that it has played in Central Europe. The states
of this region are not candidates for membership any time
soon. Their greatest problems are internal. NATO can be a
leading force for encouraging genuine military reform,
transparency, and military-to-military contacts, not only
between the region and the West but within the region
itself.
What is vitally important for NATO now is to carry out a
successful and transparent enlargement, sustain its
cooperative programs to all willing non-members and work
to make the NATO-Russian and NATO-Ukrainian
partnerships real. Russia, the states of the middle zone, and
Europe as a whole also must live for a while with the new
and transformed NATO. The voluntary restraints on
nuclear weapons and large-scale conventional deployments
in Poland are an important show of NATO’s long-term
intention, but Russia in particular needs to see that Polish
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membership in NATO is not the beginning of a new military
competition. Poland also must decide whether the
realization of its goal of NATO membership frees it for a
creative eastern policy. Such a policy would be an important
and positive force in the middle zone.
The Joint NATO-Russia Council provided for in the
Founding Act must be given time. Russia’s internal
distractions and external frustrations make it an awkward
partner. Many Russians look upon the new institution more
as a sop than an opportunity. There are also voices in the
West who argue that the council gives Russia too much
power over the Alliance. In fact, the real problem in the near
term will be making this new institution function in a
meaningful way, creating the basis for genuine cooperation
on future security challenges. Giving the new arrangements
time and effort does not guarantee Russia’s reconciliation to
the new status quo, but it will establish a secure baseline for
military power in Europe, create opportunities for
cooperation and test the creativity and the motives of all
concerned.
Given the weakness of the western CIS states
themselves and the simultaneous strengthening and
broadening of NATO to the region’s edge, this middle zone
could be a crucial testing ground. The interaction of
diminished Russian power and an increased Western
presence in the middle zone could make for a potentially
unstable combination. For this reason, the enlargement of
NATO to Central Europe must be accompanied by the
construction of sound patterns of cooperation which will
produce soft landings. Precedents are already at hand.
These include the mechanisms created to manage the
Russian troop withdrawals from the Baltic states,
Ukrainian denuclearization, and, to a still untested degree,
the enlargement of NATO itself. Each of these efforts
brought together Russia, leading Western institutions, and
states and regional actors to negotiate an acceptable
resolution. More of such efforts will be needed in the region
in the future.
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These efforts are needed first and foremost in the area of
political and economic reform. Moldova has quietly
sustained genuine progress in both areas, despite the ulcer
of Transdniestr, but cannot be expected to sustain these
trends without the prospect of acceptance in Europe.
Belarus’s defiance of Western and Russian norms places an
unpredictable regime in the center of the region. Ukraine’s
stagnation could well become the central destabilizing
trend in the region. Leading Western nations, the EU, and
key international financial institutions must expand their
reach in this zone, setting up incentives to sustain progress
and encourage new momentum where reforms have been
halted. None of these states have a near-term claim on EU
membership, but all need the prospect that economic and
political progress will be met by enlightened engagement
from Europe and the global economy as a whole.
Given that Europe has two great core institutions,
NATO and the EU, Western management of the middle
zone will require a truly integrated policy between them. It
will also require mutually supportive efforts involving
international financial institutions and leading industrial
states, working in tandem with the EU and NATO. The role
for the United States in this region of Europe is far less
demanding than the one played during the Cold War, but
nearly as crucial. U.S. engagement directly in the
region—and encouragement of parallel efforts by its
Western allies—could provide the difference between
stability and instability there. It also offers the exciting
prospect of fashioning a new post-Cold war consensus
among old allies, one in which the various burdens and
responsibilities are more equitably divided and the
Transatlantic partnership is given new life.
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CHAPTER 7
BEYOND THE FOUNDING ACT: THE NEXT
STAGE OF NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
Stephen J. Blank
The Soviet Union and the United States sleep in the same bed
but they do not share the same dreams.
Zhou en-Lai

Zhou En-Lai’s observation captures the new relationship between NATO and Russia enshrined in the Founding
Act of May 1997. The Founding Act will now govern their
relationship. But while it satisfied some of Russia’s
unmerited and insatiable craving for equality with the
United States and the West by creating a regular
mechanism for bilateral and multilateral discussions on
topics of mutual interest, it is by no means clear that
Russia’s relationships with NATO and the United States
will therefore improve. If anything, recent signs point to the
opposite conclusion, partly due to the deliberate intent of
elements in Russia to make these relations worse, and
partly due to American illusions.1 Russia may prove to be
NATO’s greatest security challenge because of the immense
range of issues where Russian and U.S. or NATO interests
now diverge. The Permanent Joint Council created in the
Founding Act could easily become as much a vehicle for
stalemate as a force for true mutual understanding.
Therefore we must examine the diverging dreams that both
the United States and Russia have dreamt.
With enlargement underway, many U.S. officials,
especially in the State Department, now invoke new
missions for NATO. These statements represent ex post
facto attempts to justify enlargement and find some great
central idea for NATO when no threat is currently
discernible. These prescriptions also entail a much greater
geographic scope and new missions for NATO. And, to
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realize this new vision, NATO must change its raison
d’etre and modus operandi. It now must adapt to face, not a
Russian threat, but internal wars that could, if left
unattended, escalate to interstate wars. Therefore, as a
matter of U.S. high policy, NATO must be open to all
qualifying comers so that it embraces all potential
members. Speaking at the British Embassy, in April 1998,
Under Secretary of State Strobe Talbott stated that
President Clinton has emphasized in public and in private
to Russian President Boris Yeltsin that no emerging
democracy, including Russia and the Baltic states, should
be excluded from potential future membership in NATO
because of its size, history, or geographical location. Talbott
also stated that he saw Russia as a democratic state
undergoing a most arduous transition to democracy, which
makes it eligible for future membership in NATO. This
high-level U.S. policy divides NATO governments and was
not presented to the Senate for debate during the Senate’s
debate on NATO enlargement.2 With regard to issues of
conflict prevention in Europe or “out-of-area,” the emerging
official U.S. position is no less expansive and unilateral.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright recently stated in
Brussels that NATO would evolve into “a force for peace
from the Middle East to Central Africa.” This statement
immediately triggered European foreign ministers’
opposition to so radical an expansion of NATO’s
geographical scope.3 But this is not the sole transformation
of NATO’s approach to conflict resolution.
Since the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) and/or the United Nations now provide the
authorization for such pan-European operations, NATO
must obtain their blessing in order to participate in these
conflicts.4 Furthermore, before acting, we must do so in
partnership with Russia through a “special” NATO-Russian
consultative mechanism wherever possible. Ideally, to
attain this blessed state, the OSCE would have to replace its
principle of unanimous consent with majority rule and all
NATO members must become perfect democracies. They
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must guarantee to NATO, on pain of exclusion, that they
assure equal treatment for their minorities. Then, through
a series of building blocks, we can begin building collective
security from the bottom up and extend it beyond Europe.
Even though NATO will remain an institution for the
collective defense of its members, in practice its main
missions will increasingly be peace operations “out of area”
and NATO will become a primarily peace-making, keeping,
or enforcing organization. Thus it will become mainly a
political, not a military, organization devoted to the
mechanisms of crisis management and preventive
diplomacy. NATO’s main function would then be to become
the vehicle for the integration of ever more areas into the
Western economic-security-political-cultural “ecumene.”5
And this presupposes the fundamental harmony of
interests and wills among NATO members and Russia to
share present and future burdens and perceptions of crisis.
This vision of an emerging priority for collective security is
very strong now that no external threat is visible.6
This view is not confined to academics or Americans.
Secretary-General Javier Solana, speaking of NATO’s
Mediterranean Initiative, stated that all the allies must be
collectively involved here because geographic proximity or
distance cannot be the basis for calculating the allies’
security interest. Collective security overcomes geopolitics’
founding principles. NATO must participate in the
Mediterranean through a series of military and political
dialogues to ensure security throughout that basin, i.e.,
beyond Europe. These initiatives are primarily political and
respond to the fact that most Mediterranean security
challenges are socio-economic and/or political in nature.
Since Solana outlined primarily political challenges to
security, the response to them must also be political ones
that enhance stability and expand partnership. NATO’s
interest reflects its belief that European security is
indivisible.7
Solana also advocates an international police force to
fulfill peace missions in areas where governance has broken
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down or is in danger of doing so, and when the troops who
intervened previously can “hardly act.” These forces should
be like France’s Gendarmerie or Spain’s Guardia Civil, and
he requested that the U.N. Security Council determine
whether or not NATO’s forces should remain in Bosnia next
year. The U.N. or the OSCE must be the agencies which
provide a mandate for NATO’s forces to conduct these peace
missions, either solely with NATO or jointly with the
Russians, on the basis of decisions achieved in the
Permanent Joint Council.8
Ambassador Matthew Nimetz likewise postulates the
growing importance of the Mediterranean region as a
whole. Therefore a clear U.S. commitment to remaining a
local military power will markedly enhance regional
security. This is also true for the other major NATO powers:
France, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, Spain, Greece, and
Turkey.9 To maintain regional security, NATO must not
only integrate the entire region into the Western economy
and foster the development of “pluralistic institutions,” it
must also grasp the military nettle.
The Pax NATO is the only logical regime to maintain security in
the traditional sense. As NATO maintains its dominant role in
the Mediterranean, it must recognize a need for the expansion of
its stabilizing influence in adjacent areas, particularly in
Southeastern Europe, the Black Sea region (in concert, of
course, with the regional powers, primarily Russia, Ukraine,
Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey) and in the Arabian/Persian
Gulf. The United States must continue to play the major role in
this security system. The Sixth Fleet will be the vehicle to
implement this commitment for years to come, although this is
something that might be reviewed some time down the road.10

Supposedly Russia’s views either do not count or Russia will
blithely accept this outcome.
The emphasis on the Near East and Southern
Mediterranean area is increasingly loud as officials echo
Nimetz’ call for NATO to emphasize a new southern
strategy. While ensuring the integration of Central Europe
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into NATO, NATO must also look to the Near East as the
seat of instability and should conduct negotiations among
its members on threats like Iraq or Algeria. While this new
strategy may require modifications of the current NATO
process of allied consultations, and leave to the Europeans
the lead on operations relating to peacekeeping, failing
states, evacuation, and refugee management, the United
States would retain primacy over high-intensity military
operations.11 On the other hand, it is quite likely that
Europe would see the adoption of such a strategy as a
harbinger of an increasing U.S. disengagement from the
burdens of providing for European security and would not
welcome it.
Former Secretary of Defense William Perry and former
Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who undoubtedly
argued for such a line when they were in office, likewise
recently wrote that,
The Alliance needs to adapt its military strategy to today’s
reality: the danger to the security of its members is not
primarily potential aggression to their collective territory, but
threats to their collective interests beyond their territory.
Shifting the Alliance’s emphasis from defense of members’
territory to defense of common interests is the strategic
imperative. These threats include the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of oil, terrorism,
genocidal violence, and wars of aggression in other regions
that threaten to cause great disruption. To deal with such
threats Alliance members need to have a way to rapidly form
military coalitions that can accomplish goals beyond NATO
territory.12

Finally, Secretary Albright told the December 1997
Permanent Joint Council and the North Atlantic Council
Foreign Ministers meetings that it is essential for NATO
allies and Russia to collaborate against new threats, the
gravest of these being proliferation beyond Europe’s borders
(i.e., Iraq and Iran), but also including terrorism,
environmental clean-up, counters to drug smuggling, etc.13
She thus confirmed that, “What the allies must guard
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against, the administration believes, are terrorism, illegal
drugs, nationalist extremism and regional conflicts fueled
by ethnic, racial, and religious hatreds.”14
In short, NATO should become an “intercontinental
policeman” to deal with all manner of socio-political and
military threats from abroad based on the premise of an
existing or emerging European collective security system.
This system presumes the pervasiveness of shared interests
and common views among states and European security
institutions on the nature of the threats to security and the
appropriate responses to them. Likewise, NATO does or
should follow the U.S. definition of its objectives, missions,
and threats to members’ security. In defense of security,
stability, and democracy, Europe and the United States
must become more nearly equal in their burdens, although
we are reluctant to yield our political-military primacy.
Russia, as a status quo, democratic partner, should have a
real voice in issues. And the principal vehicle for arranging
this cooperation to include Russia, especially in the joint
conduct of peace operations, will be the Permanent Joint
Council, or the OSCE, or the U.N. Security Council.
Similarly, the main mission is a multilateral one comprising
the various kinds of peace operations, or countering the new
threats enumerated above. Furthermore, there is a
generalized right of intervention by NATO out-of-area,
provided that the OSCE lets NATO do what it wants by
approving its operations, and that the U.N. Security
Council (UNSC), the embodiment of collective security,
gives NATO a mandate for doing so. On the other hand, if
Europe refuses to collaborate with us and share the burden
of defending vital interests and appropriating the needed
resources, Washington should seriously consider
reorienting its resources away from defense of ungrateful,
recalcitrant Western Europe towards those other crisis
zones.15
These principles and axioms of international politics
rest upon an updated version of Wilsonian liberalism’s
hopes and postulates—the end of major power competition
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in Europe where states’ fear of other governments’ “relative
gains” at their expense, the presumed benevolence of
American power, and the endless stabilization of today’s
status quo under the dream of liberal democracy. This
outlook of global redemption also embraces the corollary
notions that the foregoing ideas and the doctrine of the
harmony of interests, i.e., a democratic peace that precludes
political and military conflict among democracies, an end to
old notions of politics, and instead stresses their shared
interests in perpetuating, if not extending, democracy, are
the foundation of the new order. And these axioms are
included to a large degree in notions of cooperative and
collective security.16
However, only one thing is wrong with this vision.
Namely, it is not grounded in the realities of European, U.S.,
or Russian politics. Certainly this vision of a new peace
order fails to answer the first question of strategy, i.e., what
is the threat and how do we meet it? Washington has not
spelled out the ways in which NATO or the United States
would meet the threats cited above. As R.W. Apple wrote in
the New York Times, “Warplanes are of little use against
terrorism and drug smuggling, and naval power is of little
help in fighting racism.”17
It also seems odd that we need NATO to discuss with
Europe and Russia environmental, immigration,
counternarcotics, out-of-area, and proliferation issues. Are
there no other fora for dealing with these issues on their own
considerable merits without burdening NATO with them?
Second, having failed in the U.N. to obtain support for
forceful ripostes to Iraq, why should we try again publicly to
raise the issue in NATO to no avail and merely reveal again
the lack of an allied consensus? As it is, in early 1998 the
U.N. Secretary-General had to rescue the United States
from its isolation vis-à-vis Iraq in one of our more
ignominious moments. The same may be said of our Iran
policy, which clearly reached a dead end by the end of 1997
and could easily lead us into trade wars with our allies and
difficult political contests with Russia. Whatever merits
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dual containment may or may not have, NATO is not the
venue for discussing it.
We can discern three reasons why the U.S. vision of
NATO remains unrealistic. One is our own unwillingness to
confront the realities of our own policy and behavior abroad.
A second is our exaggerated expectations vis-à-vis our
European allies. And the third is our failure to grasp the
driving forces of Russian policy and ambitions, i.e., Russia’s
opposing dream.
The American Vision and its Illusions.
Many of our elites take their rhetoric about allied unity,
progress towards global democratization, and the end of the
“old politics in international affairs” too seriously. As
suggested above, this vision of the world evokes much
apprehension abroad among our allies who cannot see
either the goals or strategy of U.S. policy abroad. Instead
they see muddle, incoherence, lack of will, and/or an
attempt to obtain cheaply a hegemonic or neo-colonialist
position through NATO.18 While the administration’s most
consistent success has been in implementing advances in
free trade, this traditionally Wilsonian agenda has little or
nothing to do directly with the concrete security issues that
must be on NATO’s agenda.19 And indeed, even now it is
difficult to locate a compelling strategic rationale, other
than the political ones of democratization, stability,
integration, and free trade, for NATO’s enlargement.20
Indeed, one State Department paper stated in April 1997
that we are not doing this for any geopolitical reasons.21 If
so, then why bother with enlarging our security
commitments? Indeed, Secretary Albright in Brussels
committed us to a second, if not third, round of enlargement
based on the procedures and principles that governed the
first round.22 And the Baltic Charter of 1998 committed the
United States at some future unspecified date to support
Baltic membership in NATO.23

102

Given the power and pervasiveness of U.S. illusions, it is
hardly surprising that many analysts believe that NATO
either was, or is becoming, or should become a collective
security institution. President Clinton’s former National
Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, in his major 1993 speech
laying out the agenda of democratic enlargement as the
administration’s strategic global objective, stated that, “at
the NATO summit that the president has called for this
January (1994-SJB) we will seek to update NATO, so that
there continues behind the enlargement of market
democracies an essential collective security.”24 Stephen
Flanagan of the Clinton State Department in 1993, and a
strong advocate of NATO’s expansion, in 1992 explicitly
labeled any new agreement to expand NATO as a “new
collective security pact.”25 Likewise, many civilian analysts
now assume, in flagrant disregard of the facts, that, since its
inception, NATO has formally acknowledged the
importance of being able to act only through the U.N. and its
charter. Or else they prefer this subordination to the U.N.
for NATO to retain its effectiveness even though such an
outcome, as in Yugoslavia, was most ineffective.26 This
argument flies in the face of the fact that NATO has always
rejected the idea that it would base its actions exclusively or
even primarily on Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter dealing
with regional arrangements, precisely to avoid the need for
Security Council or General Assembly authorization.
Accepting the authority of U.N. mandates as the exclusive
principle of action would, as in Bosnia, severely limit
NATO’s ability to perform collective defense and many
conceivable peace operations, e.g., in the CIS.27 Not
surprisingly, it is Moscow that most strongly urges just this
subordination upon NATO.28 Clearly the aspiration to
transform NATO into an intercontinental security system
based on a supposed break with the entire past history of
international relations coexists with a substantial
misrepresentation or ignorance of NATO’s history and
purposes.
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Unquestionably this approach emanates from our
unreflective instinct to conflate the notions of collective
security and U.S. interests and thereby deprecate, if not
de-legitimize, other states’ interests. Since this conceptual
operation takes place almost unconsciously, it reflects our
own unwillingness to admit the truth about our interests
and employ the appropriate language for such discussions.
As Martin Walker, the Washington Bureau Chief of the
London and Manchester Guardian, observes, “It would be
difficult to exaggerate the ambition of the current foreign
policy thinking of the Clinton administration.”29 President
Clinton, whom Walker interviewed, believes that his
strategy of engagement and democratic enlargement, and
in particular the agreement with Russia that facilitated
NATO’s enlargement,
Is a fundamental departure from the way geopolitics has been
practiced by nation-states. We are trying to write a future for
Europe that will be different from its past. What we have done is
to create a balance of power that restrains and empowers all
those who come within the framework of the agreement.30

Clinton also maintains that we can create a new reality
and “define our greatness in ways that do not entail the
necessity of dominating our neighbors.” And further, he
said, “All of us are trying to change not only the facts on the
ground, but the whole pattern of thought that has
dominated the international politics of Europe for 50
years.”31 Of course, not everyone sees the legitimacy of the
self-appointed U.S. role as “pathfinder”of a new world order
which shapes history and helps construct “a global network
of purpose and law,” in Secretary Albright’s words. 32
Clinton also inadvertently conceded here that, as the
creators and primary power of the system, we did all this in
our interest. The notion that we have created a unique
equilibrium and are writing a new page in European history
unconsciously admits that as the authors of this play we
would resent challenges to our authority by the characters,
like France and Russia, should they rebel against their
assigned parts. Furthermore, the stated aspiration of U.S.
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policymakers to remove Central and Eastern Europe from
history signifies the grandly revisionist aspirations of
American policy. Just as Russia is a revisionist power (see
below), we too refuse to accept the status quo and seek to
move beyond or overcome the whole history of Europe and
do away with the balance of power as fact, not just as idea.33
Truly Walker was right in portraying American ambitions
as large for they are truly revolutionary in scope.
Essentially this outlook rejects and dismisses the fact
that power in all its many forms continues to play a key role
in world politics and that we are, even now, defending our
vital interests by using one or more forms of that power. We
flinch from confronting the reality of our impact abroad. For
example, one of the newest areas of interest in Europe’s
security agenda is the Caucasus and beyond that the
Transcaspian where the states of Transcaucasia and
Central Asia have joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP)
program and, like the Baltic states, now participate in
exercises under PfP’s auspices. Administration officials
regularly deny that they seek anything other than a
“win-win solution” for the Caucasus and Central Asia where
enormous energy holdings that apparently have a
skyrocketing strategic significance are concentrated. These
areas are allegedly not zones of bilateral contention with
Russia but regions where, if Moscow only understood our
benevolence, we could jointly and profitably cooperate.34
U.S. officials regularly deny that these exercises have any
kind of sinister intent, an accusation made by Russian
Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov and Defense Minister
Marshal Igor Sergeev.35
But these denials and NATO’s approach to these areas
do not comport with the program of military exercises
through the PfP program. Indeed, the actual avowed U.S.
aim is to integrate these regions’ economies and security
firmly with the West and “break Russia’s monopoly.”36 U.S.
military officers and analysts frankly describe how these
activities, not only in Europe or Central Asia, are essential
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aspects of the U.S. strategy of “extraordinary power
projection.”
It is often the action and activities of these forces that provide
the dominant battlespace knowledge necessary to shape
regional security environments. Multinational exercises, port
visits, staff-to-staff coordination—all designed to increase force
interoperability and access to regional military facilities—along
with intelligence and surveillance operations, are but a few
examples of how naval forces [and the same undoubtedly
applies to other services-author] engage actively in an effort to
set terms of engagement favorable to the United States and its
allies. These activities are conducted at low political and
economic costs, considering the tangible evidence they provide
of U.S. commitment to a region. And they are designed to
contribute to deterrence.
Deterrence is the product of both capability and will to deter a
nuclear attack against the United States, its allies, or others to
whom it has provided security assurances, . . . Deterrence of
other undesirable actions by adversaries or potential
adversaries is part and parcel of everything naval forces do in
the course of their operations—before, during, and after the
actual application of combat force. . . .
That the United States has invested in keeping these ready
forces forward and engaged delivers a signal that cannot be
transmitted as clearly and unequivocally in any other way.
Forward deployed forces are backed by those which can surge
for rapid reinforcement and can be in place in seven to thirty
days. These, in turn, are backed by formidable, but slower
deployed, forces which can respond to a conflict over a period of
months.37

Such operations permit the United States and NATO to
prepare for peace, or short, or protracted military
operations in crucial security zones. And our recent actions
point to these regions’ rising strategic profile as such
zones.38 In this light, assurances of a benevolent win-win
policy ring hollow, not just to Russia, but also to oilmen who
are prospecting in the region, and to the local governments
who rightly feel threatened by Russia’s neo-imperialist
policies. And Russia has good reasons for its suspicion.
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Russian authorities, perhaps to our discomfiture, correctly
view these activities, not necessarily as rehearsals for
invasion, but at least as preparation of the theater and the
extension of a security umbrella and influence to regions
that Moscow deems as vital to Russia’s interests.39
These U.S. assertions ring hollow, not because we are
either evilly inclined or lacking in intelligence, but rather
because we hide from ourselves the true significance and
risks of our policy. This self-deception continues at our own,
our allies’, and our partners’ risk even though we can justify
NATO enlargement on its own strategic merits in Europe
without invoking the kind of moralizing that now justifies
enlargement and the search for new missions.40 These risks
are not only the ones inherent in any military operation.
They are also the domestic risks of failed foreign policies
because our real policies and goals and their likely
economic, military, and political costs are concealed from
congressional or public debate like our support for future
Russian membership in NATO. Thus, when Senators Roth
and Lugar led the defense of enlargement in the Senate,
they maintained that the “open-door” policy whereby entry
is open to democracies who qualify on strategic grounds, the
harmonization of their democracies with NATO’s
standards, and the Alliance’s perception of threats to
security and stability, is not the open-ended policy that
Talbott said was U.S. policy.41 The potential for substantial
discord between the executive and the legislative branches
that might arise on this basis could undermine much of our
foreign and defense policy and return us to the past.
The U.S. foreign policy consensus died in Vietnam. Since
then, in virtually all crises abroad, we have experienced
what former Assistant Secretary of State Richard
Holbrooke calls the Vietmalia (i.e., Vietnam plus Somalia)
syndrome. One may also call it the quest for a zero defects
security policy. Key elites view any extended foreign
involvement with the utmost trepidation and want
extensive assurances of success beforehand. Otherwise they
may use their formidable power to prevent the deployment
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of U.S. resources or forces, obstruct any real action, or
restrict the scope of presidential decision-making.42 In the
aftermath of Vietnam, in 1975 Earl Ravenal observed that
all future challenges will be seen as resembling Vietnam
regardless of the realities of the case. And this perception
will inhibit or constrain effective U.S. responses to these
challenges.43 Since Vietnam, and in part thanks to it, there
has been an enormous proliferation of reporting,
bureaucratic, investigative, and legislative requirements
that constitute efforts to micromanage foreign policy. These
obligations have frustrated administrations and
contributed to major crises like the Iran-Contra affair which
only intensify the demand for more controls over policymaking.
As Congress is swayed more by short-term, and partisan
political calculation than by any long-term vision of the
national interest, few members will support policies to deal
with protracted and complex crises. As former Senator
David Boren observed,
With each new breakdown of bipartisan consensus and trust
comes a new list of congressional restrictions on the executive
branch. With new restrictions come new initiatives by the White
House aimed at evading what are viewed as unwise limitations
upon the prerogatives of the commander in chief. Executive
evasions breed more congressional distrust and the cycle
continues, paralleling the arms race in its destructive and
irrational escalation.44

This process occurred regarding Bosnia policy where the
administration had to covertly allow the Croatians to
receive foreign arms and training, then commit U.S. troops
to get Congress to take responsible action. It ultimately had
to accept, as the price of the budgetary authorization,
arming the Bosnian Muslims against the wishes of our
allies and perhaps enhancing the risks to our forces there.
Moreover, the administration either wishfully believed, or
deceived itself into thinking that troops could come out after
18 or 30 months of political inaction on NATO’s part and
that somehow magically peace would prevail in defiance of
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all the local political strife. But what is worse is that
Congress’ desire to posture nationalistically and act
timorously undermines the support for NATO expansion or
intervention in Europe that it is simultaneously urging.
Observers worried that if Congress is so unable to resolve
itself on sending troops to a peace enforcement mission in
Bosnia, what will it do to defend NATO members in a real
crisis and will it pay the price of doing so?45 Thus, in future
crises, we cannot take for granted Congress’ informed
understanding of and agreement with an administration’s
goals, strategy, and policy rationale.
These structural constraints, in the absence of a postCold War consensus on national interests and strategy,
compel presidents to engage in foreign policy adhocery and
make periodic understandings with ever shifting
congressional coalitions (as in the case of the North
American Free Trade Agreement) on each issue. This
process inherently diminishes presidential authority,
power, and the consistency of policy.46 This process erodes a
president’s authority and the credibility of U.S.
commitments since broad coalitions are a prerequisite of
success in the United States and policies that take time to
mature are penalized. That psychology and political culture
are inimical to successful diplomatic strategies for
international security.47
Today these factors make it harder for presidents to
articulate and implement policies with a broad strategic
sweep that respond to novel conditions like the end of the
Cold War. One allied ambassador with considerable
experience of dealing with the 104th Congress of 1995-97
said, “These people don’t seem to have a formed opinion of
the outside world at all. It simply does not feature on their
agenda.”48 This disinterest in foreign policy certainly has
not changed much since then.
A further cause for concern is the growing saliency of two
related outlooks of American constituencies and elites. The
first stems from the traditional cognitive effort to separate
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war from politics and regard the military instrument as
suitable only for operations, e.g., MacArthur’s “no
substitute for victory.” “For many Americans, U.S. foreign
military involvement is designed not to project national
power or to buy influence—but only to deal with threats and
to oppose aggression, especially from non-democratic
states.”49 This outlook is probably more true of elites than of
the American people, for elites are uniquely sensitive to the
pressure emanating from CNN and other telecommunications media for a zero defects security policy, i.e., instant,
clean success, or withdrawal. Indeed, one major reason for
the adoption of our high-tech military strategy is precisely
because it supposedly offers quick victory at low cost and an
ability to prevent CNN and other networks from reporting
the war as it really is over time.50 In a post-Cold War world,
troops should logically come home and not be engaged in
faraway indecisive peace operations where clear national
interests or overwhelming threat are not readily
discernible. When this precept is coupled with the second
belief that important constituencies and the politicians
share, that the United States is somehow being
economically victimized by its allies in Europe and Asia, the
prognosis for coherent policy worsens because its coalitional
base is further fractured. Patrick Buchanan’s campaign for
the Republican Party’s presidential nomination in 1996
publicly exposed this fault line. But it is not restricted to the
most conservative segment of the Republican Party. Indeed,
a recent Rand Corporation study, many of whose contributors either are now in key government offices or were,
maintains that Europe somehow is refusing to live up to its
fair burdens and must be cajoled and even threatened with
the withdrawal of our support to redress this balance.51
This feeling sharpens burden-sharing disputes because it
devalues the benefits Americans might receive from any new
arrangement. It may not change since it reflects a deep-seated
inclination to see international relations in terms of domestic
values.52
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Debilitating debates along these lines have characterized U.S. policies since the Reagan administration. One can
even trace today‘s inter-branch conflicts and lack of
strategic consensus back to the fights over Iran-Contra,
foreign and military aid, and SDI in the Reagan years.53
Since the executive branch is not a place where long-range
strategy can be formulated easily or effectively given its
present structure and responsibilities, it becomes almost
impossible for a president to do much more than deal with
short-term solutions. The upshot of this structural
conundrum is that on every major issue of European
security (or foreign policy) where Congress has a major
voice, a new coalition must laboriously be formed. Forming
these coalitions entails great delay, equivocation, large
amounts of “side payments” on issues that can and do come
back to haunt us later, and high risks of failure. Interested
observers watching this spectacle must be concerned at the
durability of the U.S. contribution to a new order in Bosnia
and more broadly the Balkans. The absence of a reliable
consensus for long-term, steady, U.S. policies in Europe
when only the United States can lead Europe has to unnerve
European politicians.
Indeed, it is not only the French argument that the
United States will ultimately leave Europe. British analyst
of Europe William Wallace observed that there no longer is
a solid congressional or institutional basis for the U.S.
commitment to European security, and that U.S. leadership
rests far too dangerously on the mutual suspicion of
European states for each other, not on the vision coming out
of Washington.54 Hence it is not surprising that both France
and Germany are working together to reform NATO so it
can act without the United States, a trend that can only
lessen our ability to lead while not visibly augmenting
Europe’s capacity to act.55
Furthermore, in both the Bush and Clinton administrations, policy choices and personal idiosyncrasies have
made it harder for the United States to exploit in strategic
terms the victory of 1989-91. These policy decisions apply
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both to process as well as to content. George Bush’s
administration was singularly adept at making policy with
a minimum of friction and at consolidating opportunities
presented to it by the end of the Cold War, namely German
reunification, restructuring of NATO, and the CFE
Treaty.56 The Bush administration opted to sustain Mikhail
Gorbachev’s power because it feared that no other Soviet
regime would be so compliant on those issues and we would
then lose the chance to “lock in” those concessions. Similarly
Soviet officials, virtually to a man, claimed that it was the
Bush administration’s proposals to recast NATO’s
military-political functions, doctrine, and nuclear policy in
1990 that allowed them ultimately to accept the terms of
German reunification.57
Nonetheless this approach, though superbly managed,
inevitably entailed serious costs. It was essentially a
strategy for ending the Cold War on U.S. terms, not
recasting a new order that included the former Warsaw Pact
members and/or their successors in a viable new
architecture. As two executants of American policy wrote,
The United States intended to consolidate the democratic
revolution in Europe, reduce Soviet military power in Eastern
Europe, and eliminate the Soviet armed presence in Germany.
American forces—though fewer in number—would remain. The
harsh truth was that the American goal could be achieved only if
the Soviet Union suffered a reversal of fortunes not unlike a
catastrophic defeat in a war. The United States had decided to
try to achieve the unification of Germany absolutely and
unequivocally on Western terms. Yet American officials wanted
the Soviets to accept this result and believe that they retained
an appropriate, albeit diminished role in European affairs. They
did not want Moscow to nurture a lasting bitterness that would
lead them someday to try and overthrow the European
settlement.58

Yet while this self-interested approach to the problem
gave the Soviets, and now the Russians, implicit hostages
against the future, nobody had any interest or expectation
in redeeming those pledges. At the same time, the policy
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goal was to preserve a U.S. dominated security structure for
a fundamentally new Europe. Although Moscow was
implicitly guaranteed a place in a more peaceful Europe,
nothing was made definite. Now, due to NATO’s expansion,
policymakers in Moscow loudly, and to some degree rightly,
complain of betrayal. As then German Foreign Minister
Hans-Dietrich Genscher said during the negotiations over
Germany’s unification, “the Alliances will increasingly
become elements of cooperative security structures in which
they can ultimately be absorbed.”59 Furthermore, the
fundamental conservatism of the U.S. Government in
1989-92 meant that it was afraid up to the last moment to
embrace or help manage the revolutionary change within
Russia and the other Soviet republics even into 1992-93
when our policy was aptly summed up as “Russia plus
branch offices.”60 This policy lasted well into 1994 and the
Clinton administration.61
Russia’s stagnating political and economic systems also
show that despite talk of promoting democracy, the Clinton
administration’s real efforts have not been particularly
innovative or of sufficient scale to affect Russia’s internal
evolution. If anything, U.S. policies on democratization
have corrupted both our own and Russian political figures.62
The administration’s vacillation on Bosnia until 1995, its
unwillingness to admit that its strategy seeks to limit
Russia’s coercive diplomacy of reintegration in the CIS, and
its “continental drift” on NATO enlargement all suggest a
policy or policies that are ad hoc, reactive, and anything but
strategic. 6 3 In short, both the Bush and Clinton
administrations, having won the Cold War, lost focus on
what ought to be done in Europe afterwards to create a
durable new order.64 So, absent grand strategy, we have
drift, not mastery.
Even though we have now moved back to a policy of
selective, rather than total universal engagement abroad,
our policy aspires to the latter and ultimately appears
disingenuous. When the chips are down on vital interests,
as in Asia’s current financial crisis, we act brutally in
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support of our great power interests. Nor did we intervene in
Bosnia until NATO’s solidarity, not Sarajevo’s survival, was
endangered. Otherwise we avoid doing anything much and
try only to contain the crisis at the starting point, a laudable
first step, but something that, in the absence of strategy,
invariably entails protracted conflict and pressure to get
involved when the risks and costs are much higher. We
would do better to acknowledge Charles De Gaulle’s
observation that the state is a cold monster and act
accordingly from the outset, for, shorn of rhetoric, our
policies have been and remain calculated in classical terms
of great power politics.
Our behavior and that of our partners and interlocutors
has not suddenly become more angelic. The United States,
since 1990, despite its rhetoric, has not followed the
demands of collective security or the new doctrines of
international relations theory that deprecate realism and
the anarchical “self-help” nature of the international state
system. Instead,
And how has the United States responded? Just about the way
that realism would predict. Great powers need not go to war
against weakened foes in order to seize opportunities to enhance
their positions, and U.S. leaders from Reagan to Clinton have
clearly seen the Soviet collapse as a golden opportunity to shape
the world to their liking. Our leaders may cloak our action in the
selfless rhetoric of “world order,” but narrow self-interest lies
behind them. The United States has imposed one-sided arms
control agreements on the Russians, [this may be debatable but
certainly many Russians believe it-SJB], pressured the
post-Soviet republics to give up their own nuclear arsenals,
fought a war in the Persian Gulf in order to disarm Iraq, sent
troops to Haiti to impose a democratic system, bombed the
Bosnian Serbs to the bargaining table, and proceeded with
plans to expand NATO into Russia’s backyard, generating a
predictably negative response from Moscow.65

Hence many prominent Americans see nothing to be
gained, and much to be lost from NATO expansion which
they believe is a truly bad, mischievous, and potentially
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catastrophic idea. At the same time few of those in power
have been willing or able to give a satisfying and/or realistic
portrayal of how enlargement serves real U.S. interests.
Indeed, talk of real, strategic U.S. interests is frowned upon,
and we hear instead arguments about democratization and
international liberalism. By relying on a Wilsonian rhetoric
of values and these principles to justify NATO’s enlargement, the administration defends a noble, even radical goal
with bad or weak arguments deriving from unproven
theories of international relations or Wilsonian pieties, not
the language of U.S. interests. This risks serious dangers,
e.g., domestic or foreign opposition to U.S. and NATO
policies.
Worse yet, Wilsonianism’s language of moral crusade
invariably fosters an American triumphalism and
unilateralism that leads us astray with non-allies and
injures ties to our allies. Officials in the administration now
call for double enlargement of European security
institutions to encompass areas beyond Europe and a global
security partnership. But they also threaten Europe that if
it does not cooperate with American programs for security
beyond NATO’s frontiers, the United States, when faced
with challenges “out-of-area,” will have to cut its forces and
commitment to Europe to face those challenges.66 Either
Europe conforms to U.S. policy or else. Here collective
security rhetoric visibly slides into the language of coercive
diplomacy.67 A policy that shuns talk of real interests other
than free trade and democracy runs a serious risk of
repeating Wilson’s experiences of utter failure. Or, we run
the risk of making grandiose and foolish threats that we
cannot fulfill.
Misreading Our Allies.
In this connection, one of the most serious illusions with
which we console ourselves is that somehow our allies can
be persuaded or browbeaten into supporting our
redefinition of NATO as an intercontinental force for doing
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good. This illusion misreads the extent to which our allies
have also renounced traditional international relations,
share our interests “out-of-area,” or aspire to play a serious
role in defense of peace in Europe or elsewhere during
peacetime. German ambivalence will cause great hesitation
before embarking on any such operations and France is
shrinking its military forces and will not spend more on
NATO, a program that rules out such international
crusades. And France also has several sharp points of
difference with the United States about the nature of
NATO’s future evolution.68 The 1997-98 discord on policy
towards Iraq and Iran where France and Germany publicly
snubbed what the United States deemed to be vital interests
vis-à-vis these two so-called rogue states should dispel any
illusions about NATO allies’ shared viewpoint about the
Near East. Nor does the EU’s blackballing of Turkey or the
decidedly more pro-Palestinian stance it has taken in the
peace process suggest that this situation will change
anytime soon. Bosnian type crises are a more likely future
scenario than is Saddam Hussein’s outright invasion of
Kuwait, and we saw in Bosnia and in Chechnya how
unwilling Europe is to intervene. Indeed, Germany, which
resorts to multilateralism on principle, ostensibly because it
has so many neighbors that it has to reassure them, has long
since made it clear that it will never challenge Yeltsin or
Russia’s position even when doing so may be warranted.69
Nor is Germany alone in this habit of seeking refuge in
inactivity masquerading under the guise of multilateralism. If anything, that has become the general European
line of action.
Nowhere has the West’s failure to rise to the occasion
been more striking than in Europe. As the late Colonel S.
Nelson Drew observed in 1994,
Indeed, while many of NATO’s new “partners” have expressed
concern that the “Partnership” has not evolved far enough or
fast enough, a convincing case can be made that the events of the
past five years may have outstripped the capabilities of

116

Trans-Atlantic and European security institutions—and the
political will of their members—to adapt to them.70

Drew’s concern was hardly his alone. Many Western
observers express increasingly dyspeptic views of European
institutions’ capability for constructive action vis-à-vis the
Balkan, Central European, and Russian challenges.
Vojtech Mastny of Johns Hopkins University calls the
OSCE hapless. A leading U.S. analyst of Eastern Europe,
James Brown, in 1995 called the OSCE moribund, useless,
irrelevant, and unwieldy. Brown also wrote that one good
thing to come out of its 1994 Budapest meeting, that
generated an international code of conduct and confirmed
its work in mediating and preventing ethnic conflicts, was
that the OSCE “will generate no more false hopes.”71
Catherine McArdle Kelleher darkly opined that the OSCE
might be growing in scope only because it actually does little
or nothing.72
The same bleak view applies to the EU/WEU and the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) agreed upon
at Maastricht by the EU in 1991 and that would take place
through the WEU. At the WEU’s 1995 Madrid summit,
leaders congratulated themselves in the official communiqué about the CFSP’s progress.73 However, a WEU
committee led by Lord Finsberg referred so scathingly to the
WEU’s failure to make progress on its agenda as to call its
very utility into question.74 In February 1996 the WEU’s
Assembly concluded that NATO remains the sole effective
provider of European security. The WEU, absent any real
resolve on the part of states to create a pan-European
collective security system, “is not at present able to
establish a basis for a European defense policy.”75 Talks
since then about combined joint task forces (CJTF)
operating as a European pillar dissolved into the reality
that only if the United States provides these CJTFs with air
and sea lift, intelligence, and other capabilities can they
function. European talk of a security and defense identity
through the WEU remains just that, talk. And many
American and European analysts worry that the gap
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between American and European military capabilities is
already so wide as to call true coalition partnership in the
future into question.76 Similarly, observers of the EU’s
expansion or widening process agree that the EU has made
little effort to overcome its agricultural or industrial
barriers to European integration and dare not do so lest
domestic interest groups take umbrage. Thus economic
outreach to the East lags.77 Helmut Kohl has confirmed the
EU’s basic unwillingness to expand even now after it has
invited five new states to accession. And even though
NATO’s and Germany’s pressure for enlargement forced the
EU to begin discussions with 11 new states and 5 potential
new members, it does so unwillingly and imposes niggardly
and tough conditions upon potential members.78
Nor has the EU overcome its apparent somnolence, if not
paralysis, regarding security issues. In the Greco-Turkish
crisis of 1996 neither NATO nor the EU was anywhere to be
found. Certainly those organizations did not act when those
two states almost went to war for a rock in the Aegean, even
though both states are NATO members. France blamed the
lack of a response on the fact that Italy, the EU’s current
president, was undergoing a cabinet crisis and had no
effective head of government.79 This cheap shot only
confirms the EU’s bankruptcy. A U.S. report of the EU’s role
in this crisis noted,
Meetings of European foreign ministers to thrash out common
policies, participants say, have become hopelessly bogged down
in arguments as trivial as the order of the agenda and where to
hold the next meeting. The struggle to achieve “foreign policy by
committee” has threatened to paralyze the Union when it
expands to as many as two dozen members over the coming
years.80

Moreover Europe still seems reluctant to acknowledge
that it must show political will that may include the use of
force to build security.81 The wars in Yugoslavia and the
Caucasus since 1992, Russia’s trampling of Moldovan
integrity and sovereignty, the Chechnya war, Russia’s
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general regression to the language and aspirations of
neo-imperial spheres of influence and a wholly 19th century
Machtpolitik outlook, all demonstrate the failure of the
grand hopes of 1989-91 and validate Drew’s insights for
Europe’s agencies, including NATO and the U.N.
Domestically as well there is little basis for reorienting
European thinking on international affairs to unlock
Europe’s resolution. A recent study of European public
opinion on security issues concluded that,
In all EU member states, however, it is essential to take
account of the cognitive dimension of attitudes on this issue.
The evidence suggests that on this very fundamental question
of the level of governance at which defense policy is decided,
and, indeed, in regard also to the level at which foreign policy
is decided, European public opinion encompasses vast areas of
ignorance or incomprehension: an accurate view of foreign and
defense decision-making is not in fact found in any member of
the union.82

In virtually every major Western state since 1989 the
domestic economic-political basis of government has
collapsed leading to high inflation, long recessions, currency
collapses, high unemployment, and protracted political
crises. Whether it takes the form of continuing scandals and
political gridlock in Italy, the collapse of political parties
and the agitation for Quebec’s independence in Canada,
France’s continuous strikes due to its inability to meet
current economic challenges at home or abroad, or the
annual budgetary gridlock in the United States since 1986,
the result is the same. Virtually every Western government
of 1989 was overthrown by inward looking political blocs
who are either insufficiently aware of or not interested in
Europe’s needs, or who cannot conduct a consistent policy
responsive to those needs because they cannot secure a
viable domestic consensus. The unresolved struggle in
Great Britain over policy towards the Maastricht Treaty is
another perfect example as it has already claimed at least
two conservative prime ministers since 1990. Therefore,
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since domestic politics are increasingly narrowly focused,
international cooperation weakens.
Not only is the structure of international organizations set up to
cope with the problems of the Cold War ill-suited to deal with
post-communism, but Western Europe has found itself in a
twofold dilemma. The end of the Cold War has placed the
question of the distribution of power and the nature of
democratic institutions on the domestic agenda of most if not all
of these states, the fate of Italy being the most vivid illustration,
while at the same time the security vacuum in Central and
Eastern Europe has posed a question of strategy to which they
have no answer precisely because their domestic politics are in a
state of turmoil. The economic recession has simply made this
situation worse, because investment capital that might have
gone to central and Eastern Europe is not available, even while
domestic pressure groups impose restrictions from the
post-Communist world.83

At the same time, the Western governments since 1989
were far too conservative and muscle-bound to respond to
the fast-moving challenges of the period. France has still not
devised any positive response on European security other
than to try and weaken U.S. influence in NATO and Europe
while also tying Germany down to Paris. This policy only
tied France more to Germany and impeded both states’
ability to deal with European issues.84 Hence France’s
foreign policy failures were very much due to France’s
inability to define positive French interests, or ways to
realize them.85
And when the successors of the regimes of 1989-91 came
in they were even less able or inclined to make the case for
Europe. For example, Canada’s defense policy, stated in its
recent White Paper, stresses tailoring its armed forces to
what domestic tolerances will allow, diminishes the
formerly central role of NATO, and endorses a new
multilateral orientation. This multilateralism should not be
seen as a genuine commitment to truly multilateral or
collective security but paradoxically as an assertion of a
strategy dictated by the national interest. It is a step

120

towards a renationalized and minimal defense strategy.86
While this strategy probably accords with domestic and
fiscal constraints, it also fosters a self-centered and even
potentially schizophrenic outlook. A penetrating analysis of
the White Paper observed that,
Canada views multilateralism as a means of continuing to
participate actively in global affairs so as to increase the
influence it might otherwise not exercise, including influence
over the United States. It does want to see Washington take
the lead on many issues but hopes to use multilateralism as a
mechanism of restraining unilateral American actions and
policies. Above all, Canada does not equate a commitment to
multilateralism as requiring that it assume a greater share of
the burden for defending Western interests around the globe.87

The scant utility of this approach for international or
just European security readily emerges when one ponders
the nature of multilateralism according to international
relations theory. According to one recent analysis,
Multilateralism tends to make security a nonexcludable good.
This minimizes the hegemon’s coercive power and its ability to
extract payment for protection. It makes the sanctioning of
free riders difficult (because domestic coalitions then feel
exploited-SJB) and threats of abandonment almost
impossible. From a choice-theoretic perspective,
multilateralism does not seem a convincing bargain or a
determinate solution.88

In other words, Canada’s and other, similarly inclined
states’ stance makes it harder for anyone to contribute
positively to security and encourages other states to
complain about their disproportionate burdens. As former
British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind said, the EU’s
foreign policy is failing because it is a policy of the lowest
common denominator and hence useless as a means of
advancing European security.89 The mirage of multilateralism and the quest for it in the belief that the situation
is now ripe for it, and that this will bring European security
closer, have instead made it harder to create either a
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Machtordnung or a Friedensordnung (a power-based order
or a peace order) as Yugoslavia so tragically shows.
Yugoslavia’s and Russia’s travails show that the current
order is inherently unstable and contains too many
tendencies towards military resolution of crises. The
inability to progress beyond the status quo spells either war
or regression to new forms of blocs or spheres of influence
policies in Europe as a last resort.
As a result the West has had no coherent policy for
dealing with the challenges coming from east of the Elbe. As
the prominent French analyst Nicole Gnesotto observed,
The truth of the Yugoslav conflict is that our democracies are in
such a state of conflict themselves that they are no longer
capable of differentiating between the manageable and the
unacceptable, even in the case of Serbia. Not that Realpolitik
has not been a consideration in matters of war and peace—quite
the contrary; but when in the name of strategic stability, some
intend to negotiate, for each crisis, our principles in exchange
for our interests—stability being more crucial than morals—is
it not, mutatis mutandis, as a result of a confusion of values of
the same order which previously led pacifists to proclaim “better
red than dead”? . . . Apart from any moral considerations, should
not the Western countries have in particular concluded, with a
view to their own strategic interests, that a certain level of
barbarity was in the long run incompatible with the security of a
democratic Europe? . . . In the end what threatens the European
order today is not so much the spectre of ethno-nationalism as
the inability of the democracies to define the boundary between
the legitimate and the unacceptable.90

Europe’s inability to act in a coherent unified fashion
assumes many forms. In 1997 it assumed the form of an
unwillingness to act when Albania collapsed and appeared
on the verge of civil war even though the United States and
Europe had plenty of advance notice. And it is equally
apparent in 1998 that significant inter-allied differences
exist with respect to the Kossovo crisis. The refusal to act
despite “early warning” was also prevalent in Rwanda’s
massacres in 1994 and suggests that the answer is political
will, not more diplomats arguing about architectures.91 But
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a deeper cause of this malaise is that despite the triumphs of
the West, concerns about other states’ relative gains, e.g.,
Germany’s power after unification, still drive much of
governments’ foreign policies and make it difficult, if not
impossible to achieve unified European policies. As Helmut
Kohl observed, Germany’s dominance “would necessarily
provoke fear and envy among all our neighbors and move
them toward common action against Germany.”92 A foreign
policy based on the postulate of a European harmony of
interests on all issues of European security, not to mention
“out-of-area” issues, is factually wrong and carries the risk
of dangerous outcomes. It belongs to the realm of illusion,
not fact.
Europe, rather than rushing off to a united policy, craves
the American umbrella, for without it a “security competition” based on a renationalization of foreign and defense
policies would necessarily ensue as Kohl and other
European elites believe.93 While such a competition may not
lead to wars of the nature of 1914 or 1939, it would probably
lead to regional blocs, spheres of interests and of influence,
and what French analyst Francois Heisbourg called “la
geopolitics du Grand-papa” (old time power politics).94 This
observation represents the settled belief of West European
and Central European elites themselves. Central European
officials, despite their friendship with Germany, desire
NATO membership, not only because of their residual fears
of Russian policy, but also because they do not want to be left
alone in Europe without the Trans-Atlantic connection,
with a unified Germany.95 And Bonn, as Kohl’s observations
show, knows it.
Thus Washington cannot and should not take for
granted European integration and unity, i.e., unity behind
its aims and objectives. Similarly, support for one or another
brick in the West European security architecture is
generally motivated as much by fears of other states’
relative gains as it is by a desire to do something for
Europe.96 When we hear politicians or analysts tell us that
Europe has reached the millennium and has renounced
123

power politics, Bismarck’s acid comment comes to mind that
politicians who invoked the name of Europe generally did so
because they were afraid to ask for something that was in
their selfish interest. We would be wise to observe the
realism behind that in analyzing European policies as well
as our own. Likewise more realism in our study of Russian
policies in Europe would also help us wake up from our
“dogmatic slumbers.”
NATO and Russia after Madrid.
The Russian problem in this context is twofold. Russia
not only has a radically different dream than does the
United States, it also refuses to play the role assigned to it
by Washington. A most dangerous delusion is the
continuing belief that after the Cold War Russia will
cooperate with our agenda and not follow its own concept of
its interests. Thomas Friedman, the International Affairs
Correspondent of the New York Times, strikingly illustrated
the prevalence of this illusion.
Personally, I thought we fought the Cold War not to contain
Russia but to change Russia—so Moscow could really work with
the U.S. in reducing both countries’ nuclear arsenals, stemming
weapons proliferation and confronting rogue states. I thought
the real fruit of the Cold War would be to have a Russia that
cooperates with us on our post-Cold-War agenda.97 (Italics in the
original)

Sadly, such historical revisionism and illusions
concerning past history and present realities are all too
pervasive. They do not speak well for our elite’s
understanding of the current international situation.
Unfortunately, Russia remains unreconciled not only to
NATO enlargement but also to both the European post-Cold
War status quo and the U.S. vision of the future. Moscow
opposes the use of NATO as a political or military
instrument for out-of-area operations in the Middle East, as
its stout resistance to U.S. policy in Iraq, Iran, and
increasingly the Arab-Israeli peace process illustrates. But
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it also remains firmly opposed to NATO’s enlargement or its
role and scope in Europe. And its opposition is based on
principle, not just temporary calculation of material
advantage. Moscow repeatedly announced that there were
no concessions that could get it to change its mind on these
issues and that it opposes NATO enlargement (if not NATO
itself) on principle. Yet American officials regularly deny
this. For instance, Secretary of Defense William Cohen
stated that his “private conversations” with Russian
legislators led him to believe that expansion was not “a
serious issue.”98 It is not Moscow’s fault if we refuse to
believe its genuine protests against our policy. Therefore it
is worth focusing on how Moscow views the postenlargement process of European security development,
and especially its concept of the Permanent Joint Council
with NATO.
Clearly Moscow’s attitudes on these issues have their
roots in the past (even the 1970s and 1980s). Moscow still
thinks in terms of the past when it approaches the
European security agenda. As James Sherr observes, there
has been a regression in Russian thinking to pre-1914
approaches to security, hardly an efficacious way to advance
Russia’s European position today.99 Indeed, the fundamental principles that underlie Moscow’s approach to
European security today could have been formulated by
Peter or Catherine the Great or any of their more intelligent
successors or diplomats if they faced today’s situation. This
historical basis for Russia’s position on European security
issues appears in what Moscow advocates for European
security.
• Russia, to be secure, must have a sphere of influence
where it can dominate the security system of its neighbors
from the Baltic coast (including Finland) to the Black Sea.
This is the motive force behind the priority goals of Russian
foreign policy, the integration of the CIS around or under
Russian auspices in politics, economics, and defense.
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• Central Europe in general and Poland in particular
must not be able to defend themselves by means of
alignment with other European states. Nor should they be
able to resist Russia’s superior military, political, and
economic pressure by their own power. Therefore, as far as
possible, NATO should not be allowed to develop those
states’ militaries or use their territories for military
purposes and development. The basis for this belief is that if
these are not “friendly” countries as Russia understands the
term, then they are hostile states that can become bases for
Western enemies.
• Furthermore, Europe must not be united in a security
system that excludes Russia because any such unity is
inherently directed against Russia and restricts its free
hand. Russia must be part of a system encompassing all of
Europe at all times in order to retain a free hand in its
self-defined sphere of influence and the means to veto and
constrain the rest of Europe from uniting against it here. As
Dmitry Trenin of the Carnegie Endowment observes, the
shrewder opponents of NATO enlargement deliberately
fought so hard about Central Europe to prevent expansion
to “the Niemen and Naretowa,” the rivers that demarcate
Poland and the former Soviet republics from each other.100
• Failing an optimal outcome, European states must be
divided against each other to prevent a continental bloc
from emerging. Historically Russia sought to keep Germany
divided and France and England at odds. Once that policy
failed in 1870, Russia endeavored to prevent its isolation in
Europe vis-à-vis Germany or England, its two main rivals.
After the Cold War, this policy shifted to entail Soviet efforts
to divide the European allies from the United States, a
policy that has now been revived.
• Thus two corollaries flow from those principles. Russia
cannot be a great power in Europe, which it must be for it to
survive, unless it is reintegrated along lines that
compromise the sovereignty of its neighbors and make
Russia the arbiter of their security. If Russia is not an
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empire, it is little or nothing in the great game of states, a
vision that has haunted Russian statesmen from time
immemorial.
• Hence there is the abiding Russian belief that it must
have more security than anyone else along its periphery,
otherwise it would be worse off than its neighbors. And if it
cannot control their security policy, than it is inevitable that
hostile powers, bent on destroying Russia’s power,
integrity, etc., will take over Russia’s neighbors. This belief
was common to Tsars and Soviets alike and still reigns in
Moscow. Sergei Rogov, head of the USA/Canada Institute
and a major advisor to and spokesmen for the Foreign
Ministry and government, recently wrote that,
First of all, Moscow should seek to preserve the special
character of Russian-American relations. Washington should
recognize the exceptional status of the Russian Federation in
the formation of a new system of international relations, a role
different from that which Germany, Japan, or China or any
other center of power plays in the global arena.101

• Elsewhere Rogov wrote that, “The Russian Federation
is unwilling to consent to bear the geopolitical burden of the
defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War or to be reconciled
with an unequal position in the new European order.”102
Nor is this an isolated view. Russian elites still assume that
Russia is or is entitled to be seen as a superpower or great
power that must have equality with the United States
throughout the world, and a place at the “presidium table” of
any European security system. As Yeltsin’s senior foreign
policy advisor, Dmitri Ryurikov, observed in 1997, it was
“strange, unjust (or unfair) and wrong” for NATO not to
grant Russia such a veto and that “refusal to give Russia
this right actually deprives it of the possibility of taking part
in settling European security problems.” 103 Finally,
Primakov’s insistence on equality with Washington is
well-known and a cornerstone of his standpoint on Russian
foreign policy’s cardinal tasks. As he stated, the Founding
Act had to be a document that would “reflect real
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possibilities for us to influence whatever decisions might be
taken by the Alliance.”104
• In practice, this demand for a superior status means
that Russia assiduously shuns a true security dialogue with
the smaller states and pursues it instead with the big
powers so that it can reassure itself about its status, as
noted above. As Yeltsin wrote to the major European
governments and the United States in 1993,
On the whole, we are of the opinion that the relations between
our country and NATO should be several degrees warmer than
the relations between the Alliance and Eastern Europe. The
rapprochement between NATO and Russia, including the direct
cooperation in advancing peace, could progress at much quicker
pace. It would be possible to include the East Europeans in this
process.105

Russia’s obsession with its status as a great power and
its demand for a special privileged position at the expense of
other states dates from its earliest appearance in
international affairs some 500 years ago. This obsession
betrays an abiding insecurity regarding its ability to
compete in that world. NATO enlargement will hardly
supersede so deep-rooted an instinct by proclamations of its
benign intent.
Russia is not only obsessed with its great power status
and its diminishing relevance to European security. Russia
also looks only at military power and does not sufficiently
take account of an institution like the EU as a security
provider. It views the EU only as a trading bloc from which
Russia stands to benefit economically. Moscow remains
blind to the security aspects of the EU.106
Russia’s peculiar mentality concerning Europe also
means that not only does NATO’s advance haunt it. It also is
gripped by the fear that unless some new mechanism,
specifying its unique greatness, is established, it will be
consigned to the periphery of American interests. If
Washington will not regard it any longer as its equal
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partner, then a kind of nightmare scenario that seems to be
unfolding before Russian eyes even now will take place. In
effect, it wants what it awkwardly tried for in the 1970s, a
superpower condominium, or as Primakov’s predecessor as
Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, observed, Primakov is
not proposing strategic partnership with the United States
as much as he is proposing “something akin to peaceful
coexistence.”107
Likewise, European security should be organized along
such lines that would most effectively leave Moscow’s hands
free to revise both the territorial and defense arrangements
of 1989 to its best advantage. Those revisions could include
revising the CFE treaty to minimize NATO enlargement’s
consequences, or even refusing in practice to accept the
post-1989 borders. Even though Moscow signed treaties
recognizing the borders with Ukraine and Lithuania after
the May 1997 Paris conference, it has brought neither
treaty to the Duma for ratification. Neither has it done
anything to implement the May 1997 Ukrainian treaty. And
Russia continues to refuse to sign the border treaties that
are ready for completion with Estonia and Latvia, allegedly
on the grounds of maltreatment of their Russians, more
accurately because they refuse to accept Russian guidance
over their domestic and security policies. Indeed, in 1998
Russia unilaterally instituted sanctions against Latvia in
response for police brutality against Russian demonstrators
there, and for bomb threats against the Russian embassy.
Nor is this trend accidental. As Primakov told the OSCE
in September 1996,
Today, the balance of forces resulting from the confrontation of
the two blocs no longer exists, but the Helsinki agreements are
not being fully applied. After the end of the Cold War certain
countries in Europe—the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and
Yugoslavia—have disintegrated. A number of new states were
formed in this space, but their borders are neither fixed nor
guaranteed by the Helsinki agreements. Under the
circumstances, there is a need for the establishment of a new
system of security.108
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Accordingly, the advocacy of a pan-European collective
security system, which goes back at least to Molotov in 1954
and was taken up by Yeltsin as quoted above in 1993, is
essentially an attempt to achieve the following practical
results in Europe:
• NATO, while remaining in business, would lose its
collective defense aspect and become merely an agency for
peace operations in Europe with or without Russian
participation. It would only be able to function out-of-area
with U.N. or OSCE authorization, and thereby become an
auxiliary of either or both of these organizations where
Russia would have a veto.
• NATO would then be unable to undertake any peace
operations in the CIS, given Russia’s veto there, through the
superordinate agencies over NATO and/or the NATORussia Council where it has a veto as well. Moreover, NATO
would not be able to stop any Russian activity inside the
CIS, not just what is now recognized as spheres of influence
peacemaking.
• Russia and NATO or Russia alone would offer security
guarantees to states outside of NATO. This action would
place them once again in a situation of compromised
independence, sovereignty, and security. Meanwhile
Moscow would advance to its long-stated policy of dividing
Europe with NATO in a straightforward sphere of influence
deal. That status quo could then provide the basis for a free
hand in reintegrating the CIS. We could also expect to see
pressure for territorial revisions as well. Moldova and
Belarus represent the prime examples of what we could
then expect from Moscow.

Even if the first round of NATO enlargement takes
place, Russia’s ideal outcome entails demilitarizing Central
Europe and further disarmament in the West. Then Russia
would remain as the strongest European military power
and the only one with real freedom to act in its sphere of
vital interests. Russian elites greatly fear that NATO
enlargement represents a future preparation of the theater
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for potential attacks against Russia itself, or at least to
detach the CIS from its orbit. Therefore Russia must have a
correlation of forces vis-à-vis NATO designed to meet the
worst case scenario imaginable. As Russian force models of
security and threats in the European theater indicate, the
principle of a sufficient defense (PSD) underlying Russian
defense planning is one of at least 90 percent. In other
words, if the success of defense equates to the failure of
offense or aggression, Russia’s PSD highlights the belief
that NATO will attack (in a conventional war) even if its
chances of success were at best 1 in 10 (10 percent).
“Obviously NATO and the United States are perceived as
being quite reckless.” And this formulation leaves out
Russia’s nuclear deterrent.109
While such a view seems outlandish given Russia’s
weakness today, it still animates far too much thinking in
Russian security policy and creates a glaring disparity
between means and ends in Russian strategy. That
disparity is quite possibly the greatest threat to peace in
Eurasia. It also makes for a security situation east of
Germany where we are dealing with an unpredictable state
that does not truly know where its writ stops and which has
yet to come to terms with reality.
Just as Russia’s dream is wholly at odds with the vision
of cooperative security that most of Europe and the United
States shares, its internal system of governance also mocks
international accords like the OSCE’s Code of Conduct.
Russia is in violation of over 50 percent of the Code’s
provisions.110 The return to pre-modern Tsarist forms of
rule, which is acknowledged and even glorified by
prominent Russian officials like Deputy Prime Minister
Boris Nemtsov, is not irrelevant in this context to the
pursuit of similarly antiquated notions of security.111 It was
precisely those pre-modern forms of rule that launched
Russia repeatedly upon suicidal foreign and military
policies that led to the Russo-Japanese war, the Balkan
wars of 1912-13, World War I, and more recently,
Chechnya.112
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Russia has obstructed to the maximum degree possible
OSCE and U.N. peace efforts in the CIS, preferring instead
to create an exclusive military sphere of influence, often by
forceful means. To this end, Moscow has dismembered
Moldova and Georgia, launched coups in Azerbaijan,
violated its own collective security treaty (the Tashkent
treaty of 1992) with Baku and Erevan, and sent massive
amounts of illegal arms to Armenia. Moscow has also
intermittently threatened Baltic and Ukrainian
boundaries, waged economic warfare against CIS and Baltic
states, demanded extra-territorial rights for Russians in
the CIS and the right to influence Baltic citizenship
legislation, imposed unilateral sanctions on Latvia to this
end, and attempted to unify the CIS under its own
auspices.113
In Chechnya, Russia sowed the whirlwind and reaped it,
violating binding political agreements with the OSCE
signed only a week before the invasion. But the ultimate
result of its folly has been to force the general retreat of
Russian power in the Caucasus and Central Asia as
Russia’s military debility became too obvious to ignore.114
Yet these forced retreats have not yet forced an adequate
reassessment of Russia’s well-known strategic goals or
overall policies.
These same goals and outlooks still animate Russia’s
approach to European security. They invalidate the U.S.
dream of a democratic partner who is reconciled, albeit
unhappily, to the status quo and the vision of intercontinental security based on democratization, NATO as
international policeman, etc. Today Russia cannot be
persuaded, or bought off, to go along with that view in
return for essentially symbolic, meaningless concessions. It
insists on playing a lone, free, and unpredictable hand in
Europe. This is unacceptable to Europe, not just
Washington. As German analyst Heinrich Vogel writes,
The critical variable for assessing European security in this
perspective is the calculability of political structures and
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decision-making processes in Russia and the other CIS states
which are still based on precarious political, economic, and
social conditions. Since the rhetorics of brinkmanship can
become addictive, the cooperation of the Russian governments
to come is not assured. Therefore promoting the consolidation
of political systems in this region in the direction of
democracy—i.e., rule of law, balance of constitutional powers,
and civilian control over the military—is the only option of an
enlightened Western policy.115

The Struggle over the Founding Act
and within the Council.
Since the Founding Act between NATO and Russia was
signed, a “battle of interpretations” has broken out between
them. When we look at the Founding Act’s text, it becomes
clear that this Act constitutes not only the creation of a
mechanism for Russo-NATO relations but also an invitation
to an ongoing political struggle to define the future scope of
those relations.
NATO diplomats acknowledge that some powers will have to
be delegated to the new councils with Russia, Ukraine, and
other European and Central Asian partners or their
functional roles will wither and die. Though the United States
insists the North Atlantic Council will remain the Alliance’s
premier policy-making forum, senior NATO officials
acknowledged that Russia’s concerns will be taken into
account by many allies. They said the psychological need to
keep Russia involved in sustaining NATO’s new role as a
pan-European organization will mean that the West must be
much more responsive to Moscow.116

Thus the core of this struggle is defining just what powers
Russia will have in the Council. This struggle has already
began since Russia’s concept of the Council remains
fundamentally at odds with NATO’s.
Russian spokesmen from Yeltsin down insist that the
Paris agreement on the Council gives Russia a veto over its
activities.117 This view contradicts the official statements of
the United States that Russia has a voice, not a veto in
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NATO. Ambassador Robert Hunter states flatly that issues
that could affect third countries are fenced off from the
Council and Russia will have no influence or authority over
“anything that NATO does with Central European or other
countries.”118 Not surprisingly and as could have been
foretold, the result has been a stalemated council and great
Russian bitterness, if not claims of being deceived. It is
noteworthy, in this context, that Russian analysts, despite
the Paris accord, still talked of worst-case scenarios of
trying to overturn the European settlement if it cannot
prevent NATO’s further enlargement.119 And they also
maintain that the Founding Act neither gives NATO the
rights to veto Russia’s actions, nor can it effectively prevent
a Russian veto.120
Accordingly, the Council has become either the forum in
which stalemate is made visible or where Russia outlines its
countervision for Europe. The most recent account of the
Council states that it is deadlocked due to the competing
Russo-Western visions of its role and activities. Thus it is
bogged down in disputes over procedures, the agenda’s
items, and other minutiae. Klaus-Peter Klaiber, NATO’s
Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs has said
that there is a “clash of cultures at every level of
participation between Russia and NATO.”121 Despite the
strong U.S. priority to counter proliferation, there has been
little serious discussion in the Council with Russia,
something consistent with NATO’s past record of minimal
activity in regard to WMD proliferation.122 Moscow wants to
use the Council to prevent enlargement, find markets for its
conventional arms producers in Europe, insert itself into
NATO’s military plans for the new members, and enhance
defense technological and industrial cooperation with
European states.123 Policing the CIS and the Middle East
through NATO has no place in Moscow’s concept for NATO.
Russia’s main objective in the Council is to use it to
prevent NATO’s expansion, particularly its military arm,
into Central Europe. It has pressed to use the Council to
discuss issues of infrastructure and insert itself into
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discussions on the extension of NATO’s infrastructure
eastward. And obviously NATO refuses to accept this
interpretation of the Council or Russia’s efforts to obtain a
veto over NATO’s internal military decisionmaking.124 “The
upshot is that the PJC has achieved next to nothing and
actually has served to highlight the continuing disconnect
between Russian and European security.”125
Moscow has also already intimated that unless the
revised CFE Treaty sets NATO’s post-enlargement ceiling
at or below NATO’s existing levels, it may not sign the new
treaty. And, in particular, NATO forces must not advance
towards its borders. Thus Moscow is trying to use its
long-held goal of demilitarizing Poland as blackmail
vis-à-vis NATO.126 Similarly, inside the Council and at
NATO ministerial meetings, Primakov and then Prime
Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin have insisted on a European
security structure where NATO is converted into a
peacemaking operation that cannot act without Russian
consent and participation, where the OSCE is the
coordinating agency of European security.127 Primakov has
charged that NATO exercises assume a quasi-offensive
character, that the European-Atlantic Political Council
(EAPC) is in danger of becoming a surrogate for the OSCE
where Russia will be excluded, and that Russia must have a
mechanism to inspect NATO’s military infrastructure as a
vital interest in defending its essential military and
security concerns.128
Similarly, the issue of peace operations is now moot. The
Founding Act, though not a legal document, does carry
implications of a politically binding document and it can
easily be construed as giving the OSCE and the U.N. further
authority over NATO (and thus giving Russia a legitimate
right as well) to determine the scope of NATO and Russian
participation in peace operations.129 While U.S. officials cite
Bosnia as a positive sign of Russo-American and East-West
cooperation in peace operations, Russian opinion is rather
different, and Russia still insists on an untrammeled
freedom to engage in unilateral peace operations in the CIS,
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its “backyard.”130 Since peace operations are today’s prime
instrument for the expansion of the great powers’ spheres of
influence, Russia still seeks a free hand in its sphere, but
that is unacceptable to Europe.
We may see the continuing adherence to spheres of
influence and attempts to detach regions from an indivisible
Europe and place them in a situation of unequal security for
them vis-à-vis Russia in the Baltic and even Ukraine.
Though Russia has signed treaties with Lithuania and
Ukraine, it has done nothing to implement those treaties
and the new borders; nor has the Duma passed these
treaties, making them legally binding.131
In late 1997, Moscow’s collapsing military forces led it to
make interesting new proposals for confidence-building
measures and disarmament in the Baltic. But it still aims to
give the entire littoral, the Baltic states, Sweden, and
Finland, security guarantees in order to keep them out of
NATO and confer a superior position on Russia. In the
meantime, it has stated it will not negotiate borders with
Estonia and Latvia unless they meet Moscow’s desiderata
for legislation on their Russian population, a long-standing
red herring in regional diplomacy.132 Unfortunately this
goodwill was destroyed by Russia’s unilaterally imposed
sanctions against Latvia in 1998.133 Clearly Russia could
not resist the temptation to score cheap, short-term points
unilaterally against Riga by instituting the sanctions. Such
actions betray Moscow’s great power chauvinism at its
unreconstructed worst and remind everyone why we need
NATO. As Henrik Landerholm, a Moderate Party member
of Sweden’s Parliament, observed in 1997,
In the last analysis, NATO naturally also constitutes a
guarantee that small states with insufficient defensive
capacity—to which category Sweden as well belongs following
the 1996 defense decision—can develop in peace and freedom.
This is particularly true if Russia’s course should change.134

Sadly, too much still suggests that Russia has not yet
changed enough from its former course to nullify
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Landerholm’s warning. And if one looks at the European
security agenda today, it becomes clear that there are
divisions on issues within NATO and that Russia opposes
the U.S. policy on virtually every aspect of that agenda.
Consequently, the Permanent Joint Council will continue to
be stalemated and ineffectual.135
Conclusions.
It is now clear that renewed East-West tension in
Europe will be the order of the day for quite a while. It need
not have been this way. But the incompatibility of
Washington’s and Moscow’s dreams makes it all but certain
that this will remain the case. Neither side will admit that
both are revisionist powers, with Washington seeking to
democratize all of Europe and creating an international
posse that it leads, while Moscow still wants to undo at least
some of Eurasia’s 1989-91 territorial settlement.
This double revisionism all but guarantees a substantial
degree of East-West political tension in Europe and
elsewhere. But it is not the case that NATO enlargement
caused this discord, although it surely aggravated it. Russia
and the United States entered into this period with
diverging illusions. Russia thought it could dominate the
CIS with U.S. blessing and thereby supersede Europe’s
smaller states, and the United States believed that it could
make the world safe for democracy through a strategy of
democratic enlargement and collective security.
While Zhou En-Lai’s metaphor above is apt, it should be
remembered that the bed the superpowers slept in was not
the conjugal bed but rather Procrustes’ mythological bed
that altered to fit his shape. Unfortunately, they could not
restructure it as he did to accommodate their differing
dreams. And the dream of lasting partnership that led them
into the post-1991 relationship was based on ultimately
incompatible understandings of the mutual passion for
partnership that drove them together. The future appears
to be one of a realistic divorce, hopefully without undue
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acrimony. But, today at best, we can now only hope for what
the Russian poet Mikhail Lermontov (1814-41) meant when
he wrote, “The love was without joy, the parting will be
without sorrow.”
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CHAPTER 8
NATO AND THE CAUCASUS:
THE CASPIAN AXIS
Glen E. Howard
Few regions of the former Soviet Union have been at the
center stage of world attention more than the Caucasus.
From the battlefields of Chechnya to the oil fields of Baku,
the Caucasus is once again becoming a pivotal arena of
world geopolitics as the rush to develop one of the world’s
largest untapped oil basins is transforming this region into
a major energy crossroads between Europe and Asia. The
eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the rush to gain a strategic
foothold in the oil-rich Caspian is dramatically altering the
strategic landscape between Eurasia’s petroleum heartland
and the world’s most powerful alliance. With NATO’s
expansion east a new Eurasian borderland is emerging
along NATO’s volatile eastern flank that is rapidly
narrowing the distance between the Atlantic Alliance and
the newly independent states of the Caucasus. No event
symbolized this development more than the 1997 visit to the
region by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana. His
mission to the newly independent states of Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia proved to be a major milestone in
NATO’s ties to the Caucasus as Solana became the highest
ranking representative of NATO to ever travel to the
region.1
Solana’s historic visit to the Caucasus officially
acknowledged the emergence of the Caucasus as a key
component in American and European security planning in
a pivotal energy crossroads of Eurasia. Since World War I,
oil in the Caucasus has been a major strategic objective of
European powers. Twice in this century strategic planners
in the German General Staff have plotted the capture of
Baku’s oilfields. In 1918, Germany and its ally, Ottoman
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Turkey, coordinated an attack that led to the successful
capture of Baku’s oilfields at the end of the First World War.
Twenty-five years later German strategic planners at the
request of Hitler plotted the seizure of Caspian oil in a bid to
gain control over the Soviet Union’s “petroleum heartland.” 2
Eyeing Baku, which produced over 80 percent of the Soviet
Union’s total oil production, Hitler directed two panzer
divisions south toward the Caucasus in 1942 to capture the
oil prize of the Caspian. This unsuccessful gambit proved to
be a devastating setback for Hitler’s war machine as oil
shortages plagued German military operations throughout
the remainder of the war and ultimately proved to be the
Achilles’ heel of the Wehrmacht.3
With the end of the Cold War, the Caucasus is once again
at the forefront of world geopolitics as Caspian oil
transforms NATO’s eastern flank. Throughout the Cold
War, NATO’s eastern flank received little attention from
NATO policymakers who frequently treated Eurasia as an
afterthought in strategic planning.4 Nearly a decade after
the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR), the new geopolitics of Caspian oil is dramatically
reshaping the strategic importance of the Caucasus in
Western energy security. Today the struggle over pipelines
and transportation of Caspian oil to Western markets is a
key security concern of the United States and its NATO
allies in the post-Cold War era. NATO Secretary General
Javier Solana is keenly aware of the strategic significance of
the Caucasus to Western energy security and underscored
this point when he traveled to Baku in February 1997.
During that visit Solana emphasized that:
The Caucasus is an important region for Europe which has
enormous social and economic potential. Europe will not be
completely secure if the countries of the Caucasus remain
outside European security.5

For over 2 centuries, the Caucasus has served as a major
linchpin in Imperial Russia’s zone of forward defense.
Acting as a strategic buffer, the Caucasus insulated the
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Russian Empire from threats to the south posed by the
encroaching Ottoman and Persian Empires.6 It served as a
strategic outpost for the Near East allowing Russia to
project its influence along several strategic axes: Turkey,
Iran, the Black Sea, and Central Asia. The strategic
importance of the Caucasus was significantly augmented by
the region’s enormous economic importance to Tsarist
Russia, which provided Moscow with two-thirds of its oil,
three-fourths of its manganese, one-fourth of its copper, and
much of its lead.7
At the turn of the century the discovery of oil in Baku by
the Nobel Brothers transformed the strategic importance of
the region as the Caucasus became a major source of oil for
the rapidly industrializing economies of the European
powers. Baku itself became the center of the world
petroleum industry as the Caucasus entered a key stage of
economic development. Nearly a century later a second oil
boom is in the making as the Caucasus once again becomes a
major center of world petroleum development. To date,
nearly a dozen NATO and NATO-aligned states are racing
ahead with plans to gain a strategic foothold in the Caspian.
The flags of numerous state-owned oil companies of many
NATO-member states now fly in Baku. This list includes
Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, the United States, and even
Japan.8
Two key members of NATO, the United States and
Turkey, attach deep strategic significance to the Caspian.
Their common interests in developing the oil resources of
the region and in safeguarding its transport across the
Caucasian Isthmus is rapidly escalating the geopolitical
importance of the region to NATO and its allies. The focus of
American interests in the Caspian is the 40 percent
American-owned Azerbaijan International Operating
Company (AIOC).9 Along with the United States, several
key NATO allies have developed vast economic stakes in the
flagship consortium. Moreover, U.S. concern over the
various obstacles arising from the transportation of
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Caspian oil from the region is playing a major role in
reshaping Western strategic interests in the region. The
cornerstone of Western energy security concerns in the
Caucasus is the strategic 1,650-kilometer Baku-Ceyhan
pipeline. This pipeline will play a key role in ending Russia’s
monopoly over energy routes from the Caspian and offer the
West an alternative means for transporting Caspian oil
outside of Russian control.
NATO’s interest in an alternative pipeline outside
Russian control has additional strategic significance to the
NATO-aligned states of Eastern Europe. Poland, Romania,
Bulgaria, and Ukraine, each attach a certain degree of
strategic significance to Caspian oil that enhances their
overall energy security. Each of these NATO-aligned states
share a commonality of interests in their desire to break the
Russian energy umbilical cord that has tied their economies
to Russia since their subjugation into the former Warsaw
Pact. The two anchors of NATO’s eastern flank, Ukraine
and Turkey, assign a high strategic priority in breaking this
connection that makes their economies almost 100 percent
dependent on Russian gas imports. By creating an
alternative energy transportation grid free of Russian
monopoly, these states can tremendously bolster their
energy security without relying on Moscow for most of their
energy needs.
The challenge of meeting these new strategic realities is
presenting NATO policymakers with a much different set of
concerns along its Eurasian borderland than was ever faced
during the days of the Cold War. For NATO, the Caucasus is
becoming a key geographic nexus between the newly
expanded NATO Alliance and the Eurasian petroleum
heartland. In turn the Caspian is rapidly becoming an
integral part of the calculus for Western energy security on
a scale approaching that of the Persian Gulf. What worsens
matters for Western policymakers is that the struggle for
Caspian oil is shifting beyond the competing interests of
European powers and now includes the competing interests
of regional powers in South Asia and even the Pacific. As a
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former policymaker on Caspian issues in the National
Security Council observed:
Increasingly, the Caspian region is emerging not only as a
critical component of Western energy security, but also as a
linchpin in the evolving balance of power in Eurasia, Asia and
the Middle East.10

While the United States and its NATO allies share a
profound interest in maintaining the balance of power in the
Caspian, the premier challenge awaiting NATO in the
Caucasus will be the delicate task of counterbalancing
Western energy security concerns with those of Russia. To
date, NATO’s blueprint for engagement in the Caucasus has
been the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative. Through the
PfP program, NATO planners hope to enhance regional
stability by offering military assistance and training in a
variety of areas that can bolster regional security. While
NATO successfully has filled the “gray zone of insecurity”
around the periphery of the former USSR by offering special
NATO charters with Ukraine and the Baltic states, no line
of security has been drawn by NATO in the Caucasus. The
Caucasus remains perhaps the most volatile region of the
former Soviet empire where a gray zone of insecurity
remains blanketed by a sea of oil. The regional security
environment in the Caucasus has grown more complicated
due to Moscow’s inability to relinquish its imperial interests
in the region and as other neighboring regional powers
slowly encroach upon Russia’s shrinking perimeter of
forward defense.
American policymakers insist that Washington’s major
aim is to avoid resurrecting imperial 19th century rivalries
in the Caucasus and neighboring Central Asia, a period
which historians record as the “Great Game.” 11 For
whatever reasons Washington refuses to acknowledge,
NATO has embarked upon its own version of the “Great
Game” by launching the PfP Program, which is creating
unprecedented military contacts between the Alliance and
the newly independent states of the Caucasus. Without a
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clear strategy of engagement in the Caucasus, the PfP
initiative is becoming one of the primary channels for
building closer military and security ties between the newly
independent states of the Caucasus and the West. With over
27 nations participating in NATO’s PfP Program, the
collective future of three of these countries, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia, will have a tremendous impact on
the future of Western energy security.
NATO and Caspian Oil.
As NATO enters its post-expansion phase the need to
safeguard access to world energy supplies will continue to
play a key role in NATO contingency planning and strategy.
Virtually all of the NATO-member states remain overly
dependent on oil imports from the Middle East. In coming
years Europe’s oil import dependence is projected to rise
from the current level of 55 percent dependence to over 60
percent by 2010, and 75 percent by 2015, the majority of
which will be coming directly from the volatile Middle
East.12
Energy diversification away from the Middle East has
extreme importance for the energy security needs of NATO
allies due to its ability to insulate Europe, as well as the
United States, from future oil shocks caused by instability
in the Persian Gulf region. The continued tension between
the West and Saddam Hussein over Iraq, which has
resulted in Iraqi oil remaining largely offline to Western
consumers since the 1991 Gulf War, has had a significant
impact on how NATO’s allies in Eastern Europe view the
Caspian. These states have begun to reexamine their
dependence on Middle Eastern oil and look to oil supplies
from Central Asia and the Caucasus as an alternative to
Arab crude. 13 The European Union, for example, is
conceptualizing a cohesive integrated approach to Europe’s
energy needs and is reportedly adopting a policy plan
towards the Caspian that incorporates this region into
European energy strategy.14
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For the United States and its NATO allies in Europe, the
interplay of oil and national security in the wake of the Arab
oil embargo and the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran remain
fresh in recent memory. Equally as important, many of
NATO’s newest alliance members in Eastern Europe share
similar strategic goals in their common aim of severing their
energy umbilical cords with Moscow, which together has
greatly fueled Europe’s embrace of the Caspian as an
alternative supply of oil and gas. Oil has and will continue to
play an important role in NATO’s national security
planning as both the United States and its NATO-aligned
allies seek to insulate themselves from supply disruptions
caused by over-dependence on one single regional source of
oil.15 Winston Churchill aptly noted the dire implications
that this causes for national security over a century ago
when he foresaw the problem that this issue created for
Great Britain and the Royal Navy. Churchill noted that:
On no one quality, on no one process, on no one country, on no
one route, and on no one field must we be dependent. Safety
and certainty in oil lie in variety, and variety alone.16

Indeed, in many ways the struggle for the Caspian basin
is strongly reminiscent of Great Britain’s rivalry with
Russia over Persian oil concessions at the turn of the
century. At that time the Royal Navy sought to develop
oilfields in south Persia as an alternative supply source for
oil. A similar fate awaits the Caspian as the United States
and its NATO allies struggle to create an alternative energy
supply that lies outside of the regional pipeline monopoly
that Russia maintains over the Caspian basin. To date,
nearly a dozen NATO-member countries are represented in
five major consortia involved in developing the oil wealth of
the Caspian basin. (See Table 6.) Western oil contracts with
Azerbaijan alone are worth $28 billion. Major European
companies, such as Italy’s Agip, Belgium’s Petrofina,
France’s Elf Aquitaine, and Britain’s British Petroleum
have strong governmental support for their activities in the
Caspian and these NATO allies are developing a greater
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Countries

Companies

Fields

United Kingdom

British Petroleum

Chirag, Shah Deniz

Norway

Statoil

Shah Deniz

Germany

Deminex

Karabakh

Belgium

Petrofina

Shah Deniz

France

Elf Aquitane, Total

Shah Deniz

Turkey

Turkish Petroleum

Azeri, Chirag (AIOC);
Shah Deniz

United States

Amoco, Exxon,
UNOCAL, Conoco,
Mobil, Pennzoil,
Chevron

Azeri, Chirag,
Guneshli

Italy

Agip

Karabakh

Table 6. NATO Member Countries Developing Oil
in the Caspian (Azerbaijan).
strategic stake in the region’s future. Italy’s ENI has
become the largest operator in the Caspian region and even
German oil companies have gained a foothold in the
Caspian as the quasi-state owned Deminex has won a major
oil concession from Azerbaijan.17
U.S. Interests in the Caucasus.
The United States has been at the forefront of NATO
allies in pronouncing its strategic ties to the Caucasus and
neighboring Caspian region. U.S. policymakers have been
instrumental in advocating greater NATO involvement in
the region through the PfP program. The United States has
also been active in conflict resolution efforts in the Caucasus
involving the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) and has played a pivotal role in the OSCE’s
Minsk group, which has been attempting to broker a
resolution to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh since
mid-1994.
Mindful of Russian sensitivities in the Caucasus, U.S.
policymakers have articulated a program of engagement in
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the region that espouses multiple solutions to the
geopolitical dilemma posed by transporting oil from the
Caspian. The core U.S. policy concerning the transit of oil
from the region revolves around the concern that no one
nation should monopolize the pipeline routes for exporting
Caspian oil. One of the chief problems confronting U.S.
policymakers has been the challenge of trying to arrange an
equal distribution of Caspian oil between two competing
spheres of influence in the Caucasus—that of Turkey and
that of Russia.18
Without question, the struggle for Caspian oil is
becoming one of the biggest strategic challenges to emerge
out of the former USSR for American policymakers.
Devising a strategy of engagement in this complicated
region slowly has evolved due to the absence of any U.S.
historical experience in dealing with Eurasia. Nevertheless,
the wisdom of the elder statesman of America’s policy of
containment during the Cold War, George Kennan, remains
as valid now as it did over 40 years ago. When asked to
devise a strategy for Eurasia in 1947, he reminded those
formulating America’s foreign policy that “any world
balance of power means first and foremost a balance on the
Eurasian land mass.”19
Creating a strategy to follow this objective remains one
of the most difficult challenges for American policymakers
in the post-Cold War era. The need to maintain the balance
of power on the Eurasia land mass has become a
tremendous challenge for the United States as the balance
of power shifts from the pursuit of the nuclear balance of
power in Eurasia to pipelines and energy security. The
cornerstones of U.S. policy in the Caucasus are multiple
pipelines and the export of early oil from the Caspian.
American strategic interests in the Caspian were formed
shortly after Azerbaijan signed the “contract of the century”
with the Azerbaijan International Operating Company
(AIOC) in September 1995. America’s predominance in the
AIOC is clearly evident due to the fact that the flagship
consortium is 40 percent American-owned. As a result of
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American stakes in the AIOC, U.S. policymakers in the
Clinton administration soon initiated a strategy of
engagement focusing on a multiple pipeline policy for the
export of “early oil” from Azerbaijan.
The multiple pipeline policy consists of U.S. support for
creating two major pipeline routes for exporting AIOC’s
“early oil” from the Caspian. The 1,346 kilometer
Baku-Novorossisk pipeline is the first of the two routes and
runs northward from Baku through war-torn Chechnya to
Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossisk. The second route is
the 926-kilometer Baku-Supsa pipeline that runs through
Georgia. Known as the “Western route,” this pipeline is
extremely costly to rebuild (over $2 billion) but remains the
only non-Russian route for transporting “early oil” from
Azerbaijan. The Western pipeline route ends at Georgia’s
Black Sea port of Supsa where a 1.6 million-barrel oil
terminal is being constructed. By early 1999 it will be
capable of handling the AIOC’s “early oil.”20
As the size of U.S. oil companies has grown in the
Caspian, so has the level of commitment and concern shared
by U.S. policymakers over the need for stability in the
region. The principal architect of U.S. policy toward the
Caspian region is Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott.
In early 1997, Talbott outlined the strategic importance of
the region to U.S. interests by noting that:
If economic and political reform in the countries of the Caucasus
and Central Asia does not succeed—if internal and cross-border
conflicts simmer and flare—the region could become a breeding
ground of terrorism, a hotbed of religious and political
extremism, and a battleground for outright war. It would
matter profoundly to the United States if that were to happen in
an area that sits on as much as 200 billion barrels of oil.21

The Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline.
Central to U.S. objectives in the Caucasus is the
promotion of the 1,650 kilometer Baku-Ceyhan pipeline as
the Main Export Pipeline (MEP). Known as “later oil,” this
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pipeline is the real strategic prize in the struggle for
Caspian oil. With a projected peak volume of more than one
million barrels per day (bpd), the pipeline will stretch from
Baku in Azerbaijan to Turkey’s deepwater Mediterranean
port of Ceyhan. The major strategic value of Ceyhan is its
ability to handle 300,000-ton supertankers, which would
alleviate oil traffic running through the congested
Bosporus.22 While no final decision over the selection of an
MEP route will be announced by the AIOC until sometime
in early 1999, the ultimate decision on the selection of the
MEP and the key question over its financing will be played
by the U.S. Government. The United States retains
significant leverage over the governments of Azerbaijan
and Turkey in the MEP decisionmaking process.
Due to Russian concerns, the United States has sought
to delay announcing the selection of an MEP route, although
officials in the Clinton administration repeatedly
emphasize that the Baku-Ceyhan route is preferred. (See
Table 7.) In early 1998, U.S. Secretary of Energy Frederico
Pena traveled to Turkey where he stated publicly that the
Baku-Ceyhan is the most suitable route for the MEP.

Option

Length
(km)

Diameter
(in.)

Capacity
(bpd)

Cost
($ billion)

BakuCeyhan

2,170

40

800,000

2.5

Baku-Poti

1,040

40

800,000

2.1

SamsunCeyhan

890

40

800,000

2.0

BakuNovorossisk

1,346

28/32/40

800,000

2.3

Source: Robert E. Ebel, Energy Choices in the Near Abroad,
Washington: CSIS, 1997.

Table 7. Pipeline Options for Later Oil.
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The strategic dimensions of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline,
however, go beyond oil. Currently there are plans underway in the U.S. Government to ease the $2.5 billion cost of
the pipeline by building a gas pipeline next to it which would
significantly lessen construction costs. If such a proposal
materializes, then the strategic stakes of the Baku-Ceyhan
pipeline project would double, thus augmenting the
strategic importance of the pipeline project for both Turkish
and U.S. national security interests. Nevertheless, the
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline itself will in all likelihood become the
centerpiece of U.S. energy security policy in the Caucasus
for the next century.
U.S. national security policymakers devote considerable
attention to all the complicated security elements
associated with the transportation of Caspian oil. At the
request of Congress, the U.S. Department of State has
prepared a detailed study on the Caspian in order to
familiarize U.S. policymakers with the region. The report
highlights every strategic aspect of the Caspian oil basin to
U.S. national interests and is intended to serve as a major
reference document for policymakers. To maintain even
closer watch over the energy security developments in the
region, the U.S. Government has established an interagency working group for Caspian energy that is chaired by
the National Security Council (NSC). This group meets
monthly, and sometimes weekly, to discuss U.S. policy
toward the Caspian Basin. In recent years no other
oil-producing region in the world has warranted such
high-level attention.23
Support for U.S. interests in the Caucasus has received
widespread support from within the U.S. Congress. Major
bipartisan legislation has been passed by the Congress that
calls for greater U.S. strategic commitment to the region. As
Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, U.S. Senator Sam
Brownback (R-Kansas) has introduced “The Silk Road
Strategy Act,” aimed at stabilizing the Caspian basin and
“helping fortify the area against future conflict.”
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Brownback’s Act calls for the United States to support its
strategic and commercial interests by providing urgently
needed economic, technical, and financial assistance for the
region, including assistance in the development of
telecommunications and transportation infrastructure in
Azerbaijan and other nations in the region.24
The Silk Road Strategy Act also calls for providing
security-related assistance in the form of military
education, counter-proliferation training and supplies of
surplus U.S. military equipment for the newly independent
states in the Caspian basin. This legislation also encourages
the development of democratic and free-market institutions
in the region. The core component of the strategy is to halt
Russian and Iranian efforts to destabilize the region
through a broad array of activities which are inimical to
U.S. and Western interests. 25 Facing an erosion of
international support to isolate Iran, the Clinton administration has begun to embrace Brownback’s strategy by
supporting the creation of an East-West corridor that would
involve a system of pipelines from Central Asia across the
Caucasus to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. U.S.
policymakers unveiled the proposal behind the “Eurasian
Transportation Corridor” at a series of conferences and
meetings in Caspian capitals in late 1997.26
Proliferation Concerns.
Aside from national security concerns over Caspian
pipelines, another important area for the United States and
its NATO allies in the Caucasus is the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. A substantial portion of the
former Soviet Union’s nuclear infrastructure is situated
throughout the Caspian region as an entire range of nuclear
research reactors, power reactors, nuclear fuel fabrication
plants and uranium mine processing plants extend from the
Caucasus to the steppes of Central Asia. Significant
quantities of enriched uranium have been identified in
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine. Facilities
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in these regions accounted for no less than 600 kilograms of
enriched uranium.27 Central to Western security concerns
is the close proximity of these facilities to the nuclear
aspirant states of Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan.
Allegations of shopping sprees by such states were
frequently reported in the Western media after the breakup
of the former Soviet Union. Since then, the Caucasus has
played a pivotal role in Western counter-proliferation
efforts as the United States and its Western allies have
successfully thwarted these states obtaining nuclear
materiel from the region. The smuggling of ballistic missile
parts and low-grade nuclear fuel has been frequently
reported in the Western media. In April 1998, for example,
the government of Azerbaijan halted a shipment of Russian
nuclear-capable ballistic parts bound for Iran. Twenty-two
tons of stainless plates used to build ballistic missiles were
seized by Azeri customs officials near the Iranian border in a
major operation to prevent the seizure of weapons of mass
destruction bound for Iran.28
The growing importance of Eurasia in NATO’s
counter-proliferation strategy was a key component of U.S.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s speech at the NATO
Foreign Ministers meeting in Brussels in December 1997.
Albright told an audience of NATO policymakers that the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction from the
Middle East and Eurasia are dangerous threats to Europe
and place the continent at considerable risk. The Secretary
of State strongly urged NATO policymakers to adopt a
wider strategy to deal with future challenges from these two
regions. 29 The degree of concern shown by Albright
highlights NATO’s growing interest in combating the
proliferation of these weapons. This issue was first added to
the Alliance’s agenda at the NATO Summit in January
1994. Shortly after this decision, the United States
launched a major counter-proliferation operation in
Eurasia in 1994 known as Operation SAPPHIRE. The
covert operation resulted in the highly successful transfer of
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half a ton of highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan to
the United States.30
Since then the United States has intensified its
counter-proliferation watch in Eurasia by devoting greater
attention to the Caucasus where the Republic of Georgia
has become the centerpiece of U.S. efforts in the Caucasus.
In mid-1998 American military personnel conducted a
highly secret operation to remove over 9 pounds of highly
enriched weapons-grade uranium from a facility near the
Georgian capital of Tbilisi. In cooperation with NATO ally
Great Britain, American experts loaded the nuclear
materiel on U.S. military aircraft for transport to the United
Kingdom. 31 The Tbilisi institute caused considerable
concern among American policymakers because it is the
only facility in the entire former USSR that is not monitored
by the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy
Agency.32 The United States has sought to bolster its
counter-proliferation efforts in Georgia by increasing the
level of assistance it extends to the Georgian government to
tighten security. In early 1998 the U.S. Department of
Defense signed an agreement with Georgia to provide more
than $1.3 million in materiel and equipment to combat
proliferation. The agreement calls for the United States to
assist Georgia in creating an export control system to
prevent the movement of weapons of mass destruction,
equip border forces, and train Georgian personnel in
counter-proliferation efforts.33
Aside from the facility in Georgia, other dangerous sites
are situated throughout the Caucasus; for example, one
unfinished nuclear power plant exists in Armenia, while
another nuclear facility similar to the institute in Tbilisi is
located in Georgia’s breakaway province of Abkhazia. The
Institute of Physics and Technology in Sukhumi may be one
of the most dangerous nuclear facilities in the former Soviet
Union. Located in Abkhazia, the institute previously
housed 2 kilograms of enriched uranium in 1992 and has
been impossible to inspect due to the unresolved conflict
between Abkhazia and Georgia.34
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The Caucasus in NATO Strategy.
The proximity of the Caucasus to Europe strongly
concerns NATO members due to the potential challenges
that this region might pose to European stability. Deputy
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, for example, highlighted
the importance of the Caucasus to European security when
he placed the Caspian region within the U.S. sphere of
interest as part of the larger Euro-Atlantic community.35
Talbott noted that while new threats arising from the south
or from the east might seem remote, “They are not
unthinkable,” adding that in Bosnia and NagornoKarabakh alone, “more Europeans have died violently in
the last 5 years than the previous 45.”36
The strategic necessity for determining where to place
the volatile Caucasus in NATO’s post-expansion grand
strategy is far from being resolved. With the first phase of
NATO expansion now complete, a new NATO borderland
has emerged to the east that forms a gray zone of insecurity.
Outside of NATO’s direct interests, NATO’s Eurasian
borderlands remain important enough to warrant high level
interest by NATO strategic planners. Solana’s 1997 visit to
the Caucasus certainly underscored this point. New
post-expansion missions are currently being examined by
NATO officials, which may result in more out of region
deployments to potential hot spots outside continental
Europe. To cope with this likelihood NATO is weighing the
adoption of a new strategic concept that may profoundly
affect NATO’s security interests in Eurasia. Since 1991 the
basis of NATO’s post-Cold War strategy has been the
Alliance Strategic Concept which viewed territorial defense
as the primary mission of the Atlantic Alliance. Now that
strategy is being reviewed as a result of the July 1997 NATO
Expansion Summit in Madrid. During that meeting, NATO
officials agreed to update the old 1991 NATO strategic
concept which has guided NATO since the end of the Cold
War. In its place a new NATO strategic concept will be
adopted at a conference honoring the 50th anniversary of
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NATO in Washington, DC, in April 1999. Once adopted, this
strategy will direct NATO into the 21st century and prepare
the Alliance for new threats to European security.37
Any new NATO strategy will have to incorporate many
of the new geographic realities introduced by NATO
expansion. While many NATO planners believe that the
Alliance should maintain its core function of collective
defense, others argue that NATO needs to adapt its political
and military structures to improve its ability to meet new
regional challenges. Former policymakers in the Clinton
administration argue that NATO must prepare for new
missions and revise its plans. These officials argue that the
Atlantic Alliance should take into consideration new
potential threats emerging outside the borders of Europe.
Both former Secretary of State Warren Christopher and
former Secretary of Defense William Perry argued that:
The alliance needs to adapt its military strategy to today’s
reality: the danger to the security of its members is not
primarily potential aggression to their collective security, but
threats to their collective interests beyond their territory.38

Faced with the new strategic realities fostered by the
end of the Cold War and NATO expansion, NATO officials
realize that the days are past when the Alliance will
consider collective defense as a primary focus of strategy.
NATO will increasingly be called upon to perform
peacekeeping missions, such as the U.S.-led NATO mission
in Bosnia. A growing number of NATO officials claim that
the notion that NATO is restricted to defending its own
members’ territory was interred for good in 1992 when
NATO officials agreed to make Alliance resources available
to peacekeeping missions under CSCE or U.N. authority.
Many NATO members agree that the Alliance should retain
the option, when considering jus ad bellum to act
autonomously when the U.N. or the OSCE fail to act—in
cooperation with any interested non-member state. These
members foresee an eventual geostrategic fusion between
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collective defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and
OSCE commitments.39
Until this occurs, NATO’s experience in Bosnia will most
likely serve as the basis for preparing NATO forces to meet
future threats to European stability. Echoing this view,
NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana has observed that
“new challenges, exemplified by Bosnia, have arisen—
challenges which require NATO to respond effectively and
rapidly.”40 In anticipation of these new regional threats,
NATO is developing a new military command structure that
is better adapted to the challenges for managing regional
crises and conflicts. Mobile forces and rapidly deployable
command and control structures are being developed which
would enable NATO to respond robustly and quickly to any
new mission of peace enforcement in and around the
periphery of Europe. 41 In preparation for potential
deployments to the Caucasus and Central Asia, U.S.
defense planners finally overcame bureaucratic infighting
among regional command authorities and divided the
region among U.S. regional commands in early 1998. The
decision marked a prolonged period of confusion in U.S.
strategic planning in Eurasia that left the region outside
any type of U.S. regional command authority. U.S.
European Command, which had overseen the PfP program,
assumed military responsibility for the Caucasus, while
U.S. Central Command, which is responsible for the Middle
East, received responsibility for Central Asia.42
Backed by the United States, two innovations in the
NATO command structure are being introduced that will
allow NATO to insert its units into hostile regions where
NATO can operate together with PfP trained forces. The
first is a streamlining of the command structure that will
allow NATO to have a smaller command structure. The
second is the introduction of the Combined Joint Task
Forces (CJTF) concept. This will provide the Alliance for the
first time with an expressly organized capability to deploy a
peacekeeping force into a crisis area. Most significantly,
from the outset, CJTFs are designed to operate with the
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participation of non-NATO countries. The first full-scale
demonstration of this new concept occurred in September
1997 when the United States dispatched eight C-17s from
the United States to Central Asia for joint peacekeeping
exercises in Kazakhstan that were the longest non-stop
military deployment ever conducted by the U.S. military.
The U.S.-led multinational peacekeeping exercise
involved over 1400 paratroopers, including a 540-member
C en tral A sia B attal i on, or CENTRAZBAT. The
CENTRAZBAT departed from the continental United
States along with members of the U.S. 82d Airborne, and
the units conducted an airborne drop over Central Asia. The
peacekeeping operations were carried out by the U.S.
Atlantic Command, which is responsible for the
American-led elements of NATO’s PfP program with the
newly independent states. Marine General John Sheehan,
the commander of U.S. Atlantic Command, participated in
the airborne jump and pronounced the exercises a success.
Moreover, upon finishing the exercise, General Sheehan
told The Washington Post that “that there is no nation on
the face of the earth that we cannot get to.”43
A major aim of the peacekeeping exercises was to bolster
the level of military cooperation between NATO and the
newly independent states of Central Asia. A wide range of
PfP countries and NATO personnel participated in the
peacekeeping operations. Military personnel from Georgia,
Russia, the United States, Turkey, Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan all participated in the airborne
jump. Officially, the Central Asian peacekeeping exercises
failed to receive the distinction of being a NATO-led PfP
exercise. Instead, Pentagon analysts preferred to
characterize the U.S.-led operations as being “in the spirit of
PfP.” Regardless of this portrayal, the CENTRAZBAT
deployment had all the hallmarks of a NATO PfP exercise,
as many of the Central Asian participants were equipped
with U.S.-made equipment. More importantly, it was the
first full–scale demonstration of the CJTF concept in
Eurasia and forebodes even greater military interaction
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between NATO and Eurasia. It is extremely likely that the
CENTRAZBAT will serve as a model for future NATOsponsored exercises in the Caucasus.44
Turkey’s Strategic Interests in the Caucasus.
The one member of NATO that stands to have the largest
inroads into the Caucasus is Turkey. No other member of
the Atlantic Alliance has the depth of strategic interest, nor
the historical attachment to the region. As the only NATO
member that shares a common border with all three of the
newly independent states in the Caucasus, Turkey shares a
profound interest in how NATO’s relations with the region
evolve. With the second largest army in NATO, Turkey can
carry considerable influence in helping NATO shape its
relations with the region.
The core of Turkish strategic interests in the Caucasus is
the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which will play a major role in
fueling Turkey’s strategic interests in the Caucasus. From
NATO’s perspective, the Baku-Ceyhan will have an
ancillary benefit for NATO in Turkey where the Alliance
runs and operates its own network of pipelines. Since the
end of the Cold War many of the existing NATO-run
pipelines in Turkey have become underutilized and Caspian
oil could solve some of the problems NATO planners have
experienced in keeping these pipelines operational. With
soaring energy needs that will rise by 400-500 percent over
the next decade, NATO planners could maximize the use of
these pipelines with Caspian oil that would in turn help
alleviate Turkey’s soaring energy needs.
Despite the end of the Cold War, Turkey remains as
important to the Atlantic Alliance as it ever has. One NATO
observer even noted that Turkey may very well be
“potentially the most important NATO ally for the next half
century.”45 Due to its unique geographical location Turkey
remains a valuable NATO ally capable of maintaining
stability along a variety of regional axes. Throughout the
Cold War, Turkey served as the eastern anchor of the
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Atlantic Alliance where it guarded the southeastern flank of
NATO. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, however,
Turkey has assumed an even more critical role for the
Alliance. It is a major frontline NATO state facing three
important strategic axes: the Middle East, the Caucasus,
and Central Asia. The need to maintain stability along
these axes remains pivotally important to NATO, especially
since the influx of Caspian oil along the eastern flank
creates another dimension of security that affects NATO
planning.
Safeguarding the flow of Caspian oil is already
strengthening Turkey’s importance to NATO due to
American and European energy security concerns in
Eurasia. For Turkey, the oil resources of the Caspian are
pivotally important to the country’s future energy needs as
its energy demand stands to rise by 400 percent by 2010.
Turkish oil companies have a major stake in the Caspian,
and Turkish Petroleum has a significant share of the
flagship Western consortium operating in the Caspian—the
AIOC. State-owned Turkish Petroleum continues to expand
its presence in the Caspian region in a bid to gain a greater
share of the oil resources. Currently, Turkish Petroleum
maintains a 6.75 percent stake in an $8-billion Caspian
oilfield development project led by British Petroleum (BP)
and Statoil. It also holds a 9 percent share in the nearby
Shah Deniz project, also led by BP and Statoil.46 The
Caspian axis has assumed even greater strategic
importance for Turkey due to the loss of Iraqi oil. Oil
sanctions imposed by the United Nations have taken a
damaging toll on the Turkish economy due to the closure of
the main Iraqi pipeline that carried Iraqi oil to Ceyhan. The
loss of transit fees from this pipeline has cost the economy
over $33 billion in revenue. The need to offset the loss of
these fees has significantly elevated the importance of the
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Consequently, the Baku-Ceyhan is
critically important to Turkey’s future energy security
needs.47 Once operational, the million barrels per day
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pipeline will go a long way toward meeting Turkey’s soaring
energy needs.48
Turkey’s Military Relations with the Caucasus.
Turkey’s proximity to the Caucasus and cultural and
linguistic ties to the region naturally have resulted in
Ankara’s special interest in forging closer military ties with
the Caspian region. Turkey has invested heavily in the
creation of bilateral military cooperation agreements with
all the newly independent Turkic states. With U.S. backing,
Turkey has taken a leading role in promoting NATO’s PfP
program in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Shortly after
the introduction of the program in mid-1994, many of the
responsibilities for carrying it out were delegated by NATO
to Turkey. Due to its already established military attaché
network in the Caspian region, Ankara has been well-suited
to set up and run the PfP exchange programs. Over time,
however, the United States increasingly has assumed a
much larger role in running the regional PfP program as the
number of American military attachés assigned to regional
posts have increased. Turkey’s role in the PfP program,
however, still remains significant and the bonds developed
between Turkish officers and regional military officers from
the Turkic states undoubtedly form the basis for long-term
defense cooperation with the region.49
By seizing the initiative early in the Caspian, Turkey’s
military ties to the Turkish-speaking states have yielded
positive results for Ankara. According to Turkey’s Deputy
Chief of the General Staff, significant numbers of mid to
high-level officials from the Caucasus and Central Asian
states are being educated in Turkey as a result of the PfP
program. Since the introduction of the program, over 4,000
military officers from the Caspian region have attended
Turkish military academies. Officers from Georgia and
Azerbaijan have joined hundreds of officers from the
Central Asian republics who are studying in Turkish
military schools, and the number promises to increase. In
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1998 the Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff told an
American audience at National Defense University that
approximately 2,300 students from the region have
graduated from Turkey’s military colleges, while another
1,700 students are continuing their training there.50
Turkey’s military initiatives in the Caucasus have given
Ankara an enormously impressive defense and security
relationship with the newly independent states of the
region. Nearly one-third of the officers studying in Turkish
military schools are from Azerbaijan, while Turkmenistan
reportedly has dispatched over a thousand military
personnel to Turkey to study in Turkish defense schools.
Georgia’s military ties are evolving as well. In 1997-98
Georgia continued to strengthen its defense ties with
Ankara. Several bilateral agreements between the two
countries have been signed. In 1997 Tbilisi sent the first
group of Georgian military officers to Turkish military
schools. NATO’s PfP program has proven to be a perfect
conduit for permitting Turkey to solicit the training of
Turkish-speaking military officers from the Caspian region.
Turkey, in turn, has sought an even larger regional role in
the PfP program by requesting that NATO institutionalize
Ankara’s defense links to the Caspian region by
establishing a NATO-sponsored regional PfP training
center in Turkey for training military officers from the
Caucasus and Central Asia.51
The depth of military ties between Turkey and
Azerbaijan is perhaps the most impressive of all the newly
independent states. Deep cultural and linguistic ties
already exist and serve as a logical basis for military and
security cooperation. In fact, military relations are so close
that Azerbaijan has even adopted the same national
military holiday as that of Turkey (October 9) in a sign of
military solidarity with its Turkish ally. Since Baku gained
its independence in 1991, Turkish military relations with
Azerbaijan have deeply evolved and certainly rank as one of
the most developed that Ankara has with any of the newly
independent states in the former Soviet Union. Several
173

military cooperation and exchange agreements have been
signed between the two nations since Azerbaijan gained
independence. According to President Aliyev, these
agreements are “creating a strong foundation for
Azerbaijan’s Armed Forces.”52
P residen t A liyev r outi nel y hol d s c l os ed - d oor
consultations with the Turkish General Staff when he visits
the Turkish capital. For Azerbaijan, the Turkish military
remains the best regional deterrent for Azerbaijan. The fear
of renewed fighting with the Armenian-backed forces of
Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as Russian support for further
territorial acquisitions, strongly concerns the Azeri
government. With the second largest armed forces in
NATO, Turkey is the only regional power, perhaps with the
exception of Ukraine, to which Azerbaijan could turn to
counter Russian support in the event of renewed fighting in
the Caucasus.
During President Aliyev’s April 1997 visit to Turkey, the
Azeri leader delivered a speech to several hundred Azeri
military students studying at the Turkish Land Forces
Military Academy. In mid-1997 the first batch of over 500
field-grade officers graduated from Turkish military
schools. These officers will likely serve as the nucleus for a
new generation of Azeri officers upon which Azerbaijan can
build its military, thus reducing the number of Russian
officers already serving in the Azeri army.53 In addition,
Turkey has provided Azerbaijan with valuable combat
experience by permitting Azeri special forces units to
participate in Turkish-led military operations against the
Partiya Karkere Kurdistan (PKK) in southeastern
Turkey.54
Turkey’s strategic interests in Caspian oil have elevated
Azerbaijan to a key position in Turkey’s regional interests in
the Caucasus. With its massive oil resources, regional
experts in Turkey anticipate that Ankara will one day reap
enormous profits in weapons sales to Azerbaijan and the
rest of the Turkish-speaking states in the Caspian. They
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argue that Central Asia is one of several major arms
markets in the world where Turkey could one day sell
arms.55 The Turkish military, in turn, has not hidden the
strategic importance that it places on Caspian oil. In 1996
Azerbaijan Defense Minister Sefer Abiyev traveled to
Ankara and met with Turkey Chief of the General Staff
General Ismail Hakki Karadayi. This meeting yielded a
military agreement on technical, scientific, and educational
cooperation between the two militaries. Commenting on the
meeting, General Karadayi stated “that in recent years
Azerbaijan has emerged as an important country due to its
strategic location, oil reserves and pipelines.”56
Other high-ranking members of the Turkish General
Staff have echoed those views as well. In early 1998 Deputy
Chief of Turkey General Staff General Cevik Bir outlined
the strategic importance that Caspian oil and gas play for
Turkey. Before an audience at National Defense University
in Washington, DC, General Bir stated that:
Its vast resources render the Caucasus even more important.
Taken together with those in the Middle East, oil reserves in
the region are calculated to be 200 billion barrels . . . this
represents 71 percent of the world’s oil reserves. One third of
the world’s total natural gas reserves are in the CaucasusCaspian basin alone. When rich natural resources such as
water and gold are also taken into account, in addition to oil
and gas, the region becomes a focal point where the vital
interests are expected to increase 35 to 40 percent by the year
2010, [and] the probability is that the region will eventually
become an oil and natural gas center.57

The need to forge a greater strategic military and
security commitment to this new epic center of the world oil
and gas trade is one of the new emerging challenges for
Turkey in the new world order. Concerns over the
emergence of a regional arms race in the Caucasus has
heightened Turkey’s regional sensitivities, and regional
states like Azerbaijan are turning to Ankara for support and
military assistance to counter what Baku perceives as
Russian efforts to tilt the military balance of power further
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against Azerbaijan. Ankara and Baku reached an even
higher level of defense cooperation in May 1997, shortly
after the revelation that Moscow had furnished Armenia
with over $1 billion in Russian arms from 1994-96.
Moreover, renewed fighting along the border with Armenia
near a key strategic crossroads of the Baku-Supsa pipeline
energized President Aliyev to develop an even deeper
defense dialogue with Turkey.58
Concerned by these events, President Aliyev traveled to
Ankara in May 1997 to hold consultations with the Turkish
civilian and military leadership to assess the strategic
balance in the Caucasus. Chief among Aliyev’s fears are
concerns that Russia might inspire an Armenian offensive
to sever the Western pipeline route from their mountain
positions in the Mughan Steppe. The pipeline is 22 miles
from Armenian positions and is within artillery range of the
planned Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Any Armenian effort from
this direction would cut Azerbaijan’s energy umbilical cord
to the West, leaving Baku dependent on Russian pipeline
routes for exporting its oil to the West.59
Strongly aware of Azerbaijan’s pipeline vulnerabilities,
President Aliyev held 3 days of intense discussions with
members of the Turkish General Staff in May 1997. Those
meetings included one-on-one discussions with Turkish
Chief of the General Staff General Ismail Karadayi. During
President Aliyev’s meetings with Karadayi and civilian
officials in the Turkish government, the Azeri leader
strongly urged the Turkish military to intensify its
cooperation with Azerbaijan by extending its defense
commitments to pipeline security. The Turkish media
further reported that Azerbaijan sought to use the
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline as a bargaining chip in negotiations
with the Turkish military, apparently in an effort secure
greater Turkish military commitments against the threat
posed by the Armenian-backed forces of NagornoKarabakh. Aliyev’s visit proved to be a major success. His
meetings yielded a host of agreements on economic and
technical cooperation between the two countries.60
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Aliyev gained a major strategic commitment from
Turkey by signing a declaration on “Deepened Strategic
Cooperation” with the Turkish government.61 The secretive
agreement appeared to extract a pledge from Turkey for a
deeper strategic commitment to Azerbaijan’s national
security. Both sides vowed that each would help the other in
the event that either side’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity was endangered. Although this agreement is open
to interpretation, the extent of Turkey’s defense
commitment to Azerbaijan’s security made by this
agreement still remains unclear. According to the Turkish
Daily News, the Declaration states that “the two sides will
help each other within the context of their strategic
partnership using methods foreseen by the United Nations
in the event that their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
the inviolability of their borders are endangered.”62
Azerbaijan and NATO.
Turkey’s military relations with Azerbaijan highlight
the depth of military ties being formed between a key NATO
ally and one of the Caspian region’s most pivotal oil states.
NATO’s PfP program has been instrumental in fostering the
climate for building stronger bonds with the region as
Turkey utilizes the PfP program as a conduit for building
closer military ties with Azerbaijan. With encouragement
from Ankara, the pace of Azerbaijan’s military ties to NATO
has gradually picked up and is rapidly evolving. After a
reluctant start in developing connections with NATO
through the PfP program, Azerbaijan made significant
headway after Solana’s 1997 visit to Baku.
Azerbaijan’s serious overtures toward NATO began in
April 1996 when President Aliyev became the first-ever
leader of Azerbaijan to visit NATO headquarters in
Brussels. During his visit, Aliyev toured NATO
headquarters and promised to forge closer bonds with
NATO’s planning structure. During that visit Aliyev made a
formal request to obtain specific types of military
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eq u ipmen t, partic ul ar l y N ATO c ommuni c ati ons
equipment. Azerbaijan also requested that NATO assist the
Azeri government in creating a modern civil defense
program, train an Azeri contingent for participation in
international peacekeeping operations, and deploy NATO
units for peacekeeping operations in Nagorno-Karabakh
upon the conclusion of a political agreement on settling the
conflict.63
Azerbaijan, in turn, is aware of Western concerns over
regional pipeline security and has carefully sought to
nurture NATO’s interests in safeguarding the oil resources
of the Caspian basin. In January 1997 Vice-President of the
State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) Ilham Aliyev,
who is also the son of President Aliyev, traveled to Brussels
to talk to NATO officials about sponsoring a NATO pipeline
security conference in the Azeri capital. Aware of NATO’s
underutilized pipelines in Turkey, Ilham Aliyev apparently
sought to cultivate NATO interest in Azeri oil by raising the
possibility for holding such a conference in Baku. Azeri
officials insist that Caspian oil could serve as a useful
alternative to NATO stockpiles based along the Atlantic
seaboard of the United States.64
Public support in Azerbaijan for NATO has been
extremely positive since the PfP program began. After
President Aliyev visited Brussels in April 1996, articles
appeared in the Azeri press that began seriously to examine
the implications of Azerbaijan joining NATO. These
discussions even debated what aspects of the country’s
constitution would have to be changed to allow such a
move.65 The Azeri constitution prohibits the permanent
stationing of any foreign troops within the country, with the
exception of the minor Russian military presence at the
radar facility at Gabala. 66 The newspaper Bakinskii
rabochii, for example, even went so far as to assert that
Azerbaijan should one-day become NATO’s anchor in the
Caucasus owing to the fact that it is the only independent
nation in the Caucasus that does not have any foreign
military bases located on its territory.67
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Azerbaijan’s political opposition movement has been a
major motivating force in internal Azeri politics advocating
closer military ties with NATO. Azerbaijan’s opposition
Musavat party, headed by Isa Gambar, has been very vocal
in criticizing the cautious pace being undertaken by
Azerbaijan in building ties with NATO. To heighten
pressure on President Aliyev, the opposition Musavat party
created an organization that would promote greater ties
between Azerbaijan and NATO on the eve of Solana’s visit to
Azerbaijan. The Musavat party secretary in charge of
political questions, Sulhaddin Akber, established a working
group known as the Azerbaijani Association for Atlantic
Cooperation (AAAC) in Baku. The founders of the group
support the expansion of NATO and the idea of closer ties
between Azerbaijan and NATO within the framework of
PfP. The other major opposition party, the Popular Front,
also formed a “NATO club” which meets regularly to discuss
avenues of security cooperation for Azerbaijan with the
Atlantic Alliance.68
In April 1997 Azerbaijan achieved a major milestone in
its modest efforts to participate in PfP. During a 2-day
meeting of NATO Chiefs-of-Staff, President Aliyev
dispatched Azerbaijan Chief of the General Staff N.
Sadikhov to Brussels to participate in the NATO-sponsored
discussions which included a joint session of PfP
representatives.69 Sadikhov’s visit proved to be a significant
boost for Azeri participation in NATO-sponsored PfP
activities. Shortly after Sadikhov’s trip to Brussels, Baku
deployed its first ever contingent of Azeri soldiers to NATO
military exercises in Norway. For nearly 2 weeks during
May-June 1997, these Azeri units participated in NATO
exercises in Norway. The 13-day exercise known as
“Cooperative Banners” involved other PfP units from the
former East bloc and the former Soviet Union and seriously
signaled Azerbaijan’s new found commitment to the PfP
program.70
Participation in PfP appears to have yielded some
tangible benefits for the Azeri military. Not surprisingly, it
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permits Azerbaijan to solicit greater assistance from NATO
members in training the Azeri military. Baku’s efforts to
solicit the German Bundeswehr were reportedly turned
down after the German Foreign Ministry learned of plans to
dispatch German military advisers to Azerbaijan to train
Azeri air force and infantry officers. Discussions with
Britain’s Ministry of Defense however, have proven more
successful. In late 1996 British military officers were
dispatched to Azerbaijan to discuss plans for sending
British Ministry of Defense specialists to Azerbaijan to
teach English in Azeri military academies.71
Over the past several years, little or no interaction has
occurred between the U.S. military and Azerbaijan due to
limitations imposed by section 907 of the Freedom Support
Act. Despite this congressional handicap, the Clinton
administration has struggled to overcome this restriction by
dispatching senior policymakers to Azerbaijan to reassure
President Aliyev that the United States retains a strong
geopolitical interest in his country and the whole region.
According to one former high ranking administration
official, the United States has begun a regular dialogue with
security policymakers in Azerbaijan as part of growing U.S.
strategic interest in the region. This official reported that
senior officials from the U.S. Department of Defense have
traveled to Baku to discuss a full range of security concerns.
The talks involved discussions on a wide range of matters
and demonstrate “that an open channel of communication
now exists between the United States and Azerbaijan on
defense and military matters.”72
In October 1997 U.S. Ambassador to NATO Robert
Hunter traveled to the Caucasus to map out further NATO
cooperation with the Presidents of Georgia and Azerbaijan.
During his meetings with President Aliyev, Hunter
discussed Azerbaijan’s participation in PfP and its future
relations with NATO. Discussing the outcome of those talks,
Azerbaijan’s former Foreign Minister Hasan Hasanov
stated that Azerbaijan welcomed NATO’s eastward
enlargement and stressed Baku’s close relations with
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NATO member Turkey.73 According to Hasanov, Aliyev’s
discussions with Hunter centered on expanding
Azerbaijan’s participation in PfP. In their joint statement,
however, both sides sought to emphasize the fact that
despite Baku’s improving relations with NATO, the
question of Azerbaijan joining the Alliance for the
foreseeable future is not on either sides’ agenda.74
Georgia and NATO.
Of all the newly independent states in the Caucasus, the
Republic of Georgia has been the centerpiece of NATO
activity in the Caucasus. It is the gateway to the Caucasus
and a key transit state in the transport of Caspian oil to
Western markets. With one of the most vibrant economies
in the Caucasus, Georgia boasts one of the strongest growth
rates among all of the former Soviet republics. In the realm
of security, Georgia has bolstered its external security by
building a wide array of defense and security links with its
neighbors. Through the PfP program, Georgia has carefully
cultivated close military relations with NATO that are the
strongest of any of the states in the Caucasus. Georgia’s
close ties to NATO are largely attributed to Georgian
President Eduard Shevardnadze, whose position as the
former Foreign Minister of the USSR played a pivotal role in
ending the Cold War by defusing ties between the USSR and
NATO. One of Shevardnadze’s biggest accomplishments
with NATO occurred on June 23, 1989, when he became the
first ever Soviet official to enter the headquarters of NATO
in Brussels.
Since the end of the Cold War, Shevardnadze has become
a major supporter of NATO expansion and has encouraged
the Alliance to develop closer ties to the Caucasus. The
Georgian leader has masterfully articulated the stabilizing
role that NATO can play in European security. Ironically,
according to Shevardnadze, his landmark visit to NATO
headquarters largely convinced the former Soviet Foreign
Minister that NATO’s role should not diminish in the
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aftermath of the Cold War. In his position as President of
Georgia, Shevardnadze has on several occasions stated in
speeches at NATO headquarters in Brussels that the
Alliance should become the principal military and political
g u aran tor of stabi l i ty and sec ur i ty i n Eur op e.
Shevardnadze in turn has appealed “to the other newly
independent states to maximize to the fullest the
opportunities that exist through NATO.”75
The Georgian President remains firmly convinced that
NATO can play a stabilizing role in helping Russia proceed
down the path toward democracy. Until that time passes,
however, Shevardnadze feels “that Russia’s imperial
tendencies will remain a potential danger to the world.” The
Georgian leader believes that the struggle unfolding in
Russia is “between those who support the imperial concept
and historical Messianism on the one hand,” and those who
advocate “democratic choice” on the other. Moreover,
Shevardnadze believes that “it would be an unpardonable
error to think that the democratic forces led by President
Yeltsin have finally and conclusively prevailed over the
‘party of imperialism’.”76
Shevardnadze has played a pivotal part in advocating a
wider peacekeeping role for NATO in Eastern Europe. Since
July 1993 the Georgian leader has been at the forefront of
international leaders who have given their public support to
the idea of giving NATO peacekeeping functions in Europe.
His outlook on NATO is shared by other ranking Georgian
officials, who have shown tremendous support for a growing
NATO role in the Caucasus. Speaker of the Georgian
parliament Zurab Zhvania stated during a meeting with his
Ukrainian counterpart that: “NATO is the only security
factor in Europe.”77
Shevardnadze, however, has been careful not to voice his
support for NATO too loud lest Moscow fear that he intends
to break Georgia’s ties to the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). The Georgian leader has
emphasized that NATO peacekeeping operations should
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only be conducted in cooperation with the United Nations
and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE). With an obvious eye toward Abkhazia,
Shevardnadze has called for NATO to place greater
emph a sis on devel op i ng mor e p ower f ul mobi l e
peacekeeping units in NATO. He argued that the need for
such units has increased dramatically, but cautioned that
such operations should be only under the aegis of the OSCE
and the United Nations. Shevardnadze has observed that
most states, with rare exceptions, would gladly invite
NATO to take part in settling their internal conflicts.
Moreover, he argues that if these conflicts go unsettled they
can evolve into “conflicts of international and regional
dimensions.”78
Since joining PfP, Georgia has been a favorite regional
destination for NATO officials and is the usual starting
point for NATO military visits to the Caucasus. The earliest
reported visit to Georgia occurred in 1995 when General
Jeremiah McKenzie, the Deputy Chief Commander of
NATO forces in Europe, visited Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Georgia with a five-member NATO delegation to inspect
regional progress in NATO’s PfP program.79 Shevardnadze
has facilitated NATO involvement in the region by placing
Georgia’s capital, Tbilisi, at the disposal of important NATO
conferences and meetings on regional security in the
Caucasus. NATO has sponsored several conferences on
conflict resolution there since Georgia joined PfP. In
October 1996 NATO sponsored a workshop on regional
secu rity in T bili si that br ought together key
representatives of the national security bodies from
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. High-ranking delegates
from NATO, the United States, the European Union,
Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan
convened there to discuss the geopolitical future of the
Caucasus, including the impact of PfP.80
Shevardnadze’s vision of NATO involvement in the
Caucasus goes much further than conferences. In late 1997
the Georgian statesman took a bold initiative toward NATO
183

assuming a greater presence in the region by proposing that
h is cou n try pa rt i c i p ate i n and host a ser i es of
NATO-sponsored PfP exercises. This proposal surfaced in
October 1997 when permanent U.S. representative to
NATO Ambassador Robert Hunter traveled to Tbilisi to
hold talks with the Georgian President.81
U.S. military assistance to Georgia has played a
significant role in getting modern equipment for the
Georgian military through the NATO PfP program. In
March 1998, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen
signed an agreement on military and security cooperation
with Georgian Defense Minister Vardiko Nadibaidze. As
part of that agreement, the United States also decided to
grant Georgia some $1.35 million to finance the purchase of
U.S. military radios for a Georgian infantry company that
will regularly participate in maneuvers under PfP. Cohen
also noted that the U.S. Department of Defense will provide
Georgia with two patrol boats to guard its Black Sea
borders.82
In February 1997, NATO Secretary-General Javier
Solana made Georgia the first stop on his landmark tour of
the Caucasus. When Solana landed in Tbilisi, he became the
highest-ranking non-Soviet military official to ever tour the
Caucasus. Solana visited Georgia on the first leg of the trip,
where he held discussions with President Shevardnadze on
both European and regional security issues. During his visit
Solana met with Defense Minister Nadibaidze and Foreign
Minister Irakly Menagarishvili and addressed the Georgian
parliament.83 After his meeting with Solana, Shevardnadze
appealed to the Secretary General to have NATO play a
greater role in the Caucasus when he noted that “small
nations must have stronger security guarantees.”84
Since joining the PfP program, Georgia has developed
military ties with many NATO allies, particularly Germany
and neighboring NATO-member Turkey. In June 1996 a
delegation of Turkish special services led by the service’s
deputy chairman, Ozden Peksavash, visited Tbilisi to
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exchange information and discuss security cooperation with
the Georgian Ministry of Security.85 In mid-July Turkish
General Cetin Dogan, the first deputy commander of
Turkey’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited Georgia, where the
two sides reportedly reached an agreement on the “training
of military cadres” and the holding of joint military
exercises. Turkey maintained the tempo of its military
dialogue with Georgia in September 1997, when President
Sultan Demirel visited Tbilisi and signed an agreement
with Georgian officials to train officers and cadets in its
military colleges and academies under yet another
agreement.86
Naval assistance from NATO has been pivotal for
Georgia in the formation of its coastal defense forces.
Assistance from Turkey, the United States, and Great
Britain, has greatly helped Georgia establish a modern
naval force. Tbilisi is seriously pursuing the creation of a
modern naval defense force that would be capable of
protecting Georgia’s maritime borders, since Georgia
inherited virtually no vessels from Russia that previously
belonged to the Soviet Black Sea fleet.87 Without a navy,
Georgia has had to face the embarrassment of relying upon
Russian naval forces for protecting its territorial waters.
Russia, in turn, has conveniently used Georgia’s naval
weakness to reinforce its control over Georgia’s maritime
borders and maintain tight access over which vessels come
and go from Georgian ports.
Russia has sought to capitalize on this advantage by
limiting the encroachment of Turkish fishing vessels in
Georgian territorial waters. In March 1996 Moscow used its
naval capabilities to send a powerful signal to Ankara when
Russian warships attacked Turkish fishing vessels in
Georgian waters. This incident nearly sparked a major
regional conflict with Turkey that greatly embarrassed
Georgian officials. To add insult to injury, Russian border
forces later seized a Ukrainian vessel and detained its crew
without informing the Georgian government. These
episodes greatly underscored Georgia’s inability to protect
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its own maritime border and prompted the United States,
Great Britain, Turkey, and Ukraine to accelerate and
expand their assistance program to the fledgling Georgian
navy.88 As a result of these incidents Georgia embarked on a
major effort to bolster its naval forces in an effort to ensure
its maritime security.89
Great Britain responded to Georgia’s naval concerns by
dispatching a group of naval officers to Georgia in late 1997
where the Royal Navy unveiled a program of naval
assistance. This program includes naval training for
Georgian officers in the United Kingdom and the transfer of
several small-scale naval vessels from the Royal Navy to
Georgia. During that visit British Assistant Defense
Secretary Roger Jackling announced in Tbilisi that Great
Britain would donate two coastal guard cutters to Georgia.
Jackling also announced that in early 1998 the Royal Navy
would accept the first group of Georgian naval officers for
training in the United Kingdom. The United States,
Ukraine, and Turkey have also responded to Georgia’s
naval concerns by donating several old coast guard vessels
to its fledgling navy.90 Ironically, after Jackling’s visit to
Tbilisi, Russian officials had a change of heart in their
refusal to assist Georgia. Colonel-General Sergei Mayev,
the head of the Russian Defense Ministry’s Main Armament
Directorate, traveled to Georgia to discuss the possibility of
turning over to Tbilisi several naval vessels from the former
Soviet Black Sea fleet. Prior to this announcement, Russian
Ministry of Defense officials consistently had refused to do
this.91
Georgia’s military ties to NATO also have an energy
security component as a result of Tbilisi’s key strategic role
as a major transit state for the export of Caspian oil to
Western markets. Georgia’s chief strategic role in the
geopolitics of Caspian oil is due to three strategic issues, two
of which relate to Caspian oil. The first is Georgia’s pivotal
position along the proposed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline route,
which is often referred to as a strong choice for the Main
Export Pipeline (MEP) route. Secondly, Georgia is the
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strategic hub for the widely discussed Eurasian Transport
Corridor, which has received over $5 billion in support from
the European Union via the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The third factor is
attributed to the Baku-Supsa pipeline, which is another
possible option for the MEP.
Georgia is well-positioned to play a central role in any
pipeline transporting Caspian oil to Western markets. U.S.
officials fully understand Georgia’s importance to Caspian
oil as a key transit country and former Secretary of State
James A. Baker assessed the importance of Georgia in U.S.
policy when he wrote in the New York Times that it is in “the
strategic interests of the United States to build the
strongest possible economic, cultural and political ties to
Georgia.” Baker emphasized that Georgia’s importance to
the United States is “derived from its location at the nexus
of Europe and Asia,” with ports on the Black Sea, which will
enable it to become the principal outlet for bringing Caspian
oil and gas to international markets. Baker added that
because of these factors, “Georgia’s future security is
therefore important to America’s security.”92
Georgia therefore is a key regional chokepoint for the
flow of Caspian oil to Western markets. Rail links between
Baku and the Georgian port of Batumi now serve as the
economic lifeline for the newly independent states of the
Caspian region. Free of Russian monopoly, this route is
witnessing a major increase in commercial traffic for
everything ranging from Uzbek cotton to Caspian oil. Over a
million barrels per month is transported to Western
markets along the Georgia route from Chevron’s oil fields in
Kazakhstan.93 This influx of trade through Georgia is
creating what some Western analysts describe as a new Silk
Road, the historical trade route that served as a Eurasian
highway between China and Central Asia to the rest of
Europe. Enders Wimbush, a leading American specialist on
the Eurasia Transport Corridor, has called this change “one
of the fundamental political shifts of our time, with
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important consequences for U.S. strategic interests from
Europe to China.”94
Armenia and NATO.
For over two centuries Armenia has been Russia’s chief
bulwark of defense in the Caucasus. Wedged between Iran,
Turkey, and Azerbaijan, this land-locked nation of 3.5
million has traditionally looked to Russia as its chief
guarantor for security. In the post-Soviet era Armenia
remains a pivotal Russian ally in the southern Caucasus,
just as it did in pre-Revolutionary days when Armenia was
the cornerstone of Russia’s forward defense in the
Caucasus.
Little has changed in how Russian policymakers view
Armenia since the Tsarist period. In fact, Boris Yeltsin’s
strategic perception of Armenia is hardly any different than
his Tsarist predecessors. As the Caucasus becomes engulfed
by the race for Caspian oil, Moscow remains fixated on
Armenia’s role as a strategic linchpin in its regional
security. Of particular concern is the belief that Christian
Armenia will drift away from Russia’s sphere of interest and
deprive Moscow of a key buffer state guarding the Muslim
borderlands of the southern Caucasus. Discussing Russia’s
dilemma, Russian President Boris Yeltsin emphasized in a
speech in early 1998 that:
Armenia is part of Russia’s field of strategic interests. It is an
Orthodox country, we must not lose Armenia and we shall not
lose her.95

Since the end of the Cold War, this basic geopolitical
assumption has guided Russian policymakers in their
calculus for security in the Caucasus. It is a policy that
Moscow will likely adhere to well into the next century
regardless of whether Caspian oil finds its way to Western
markets. This policy has guided Russia through two
centuries of conflict in the Caucasus and throughout the
breakup of the USSR when Nagorno-Karabakh’s won its bid
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for independence from Azerbaijan in 1992-93.96 Through a
combination of martial traits and strong Russian military
support, Armenia managed to win the decisive first round of
the post-Soviet wars in the Caucasus. By the time a
cease-fire was arranged in mid-1994, the military balance of
power in the region had decisively shifted to the
Armenian-backed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia’s
victory on the battlefield led to the seizure of more than 20
percent of Azerbaijan’s territory and resulted in more than a
million Azeri refugees fleeing from the region as a result of
the Armenian offensives.
Against this backdrop NATO launched its effort to
promote Armenian participation in NATO’s PfP Program.
Unlike Azerbaijan which is eager to distance itself from
Russia, Armenian policymakers view security ties to
Moscow as a strategic necessity and the key to national
survival. To overcome this tremendous disadvantage NATO
officials have had to steer clear of the historical animosity
shared by Armenia toward neighboring NATO-member
Turkey. With the second largest army in NATO, Turkey’s
geography and historical domination of land-locked
Armenia is a tremendous handicap for NATO in building
stronger ties to Armenia.
NATO’s road to Yerevan began in October 1995 when
Deputy Commander of NATO forces in Europe General
Jeremiah McKenzie visited Armenia with a five-member
NATO delegation. The purpose of his mission was to inspect
the progress of Armenia’s participation in PfP and
encourage Armenia to commit its scarce resources to
establishing military ties with NATO.97 During his 3-day
stay in Yerevan, General McKenzie made a public appeal
for the Armenian government to take a more active role in
the PfP program. Acting Armenian Foreign Minister Vahan
Papazian indicated that Armenia planned to play a more
active role in the program, but emphasized that Armenia
would proceed at its own cautious pace.98
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True to Papazian’s word, Armenia proceeded cautiously
in its efforts to participate in PfP exchanges during the first
several years of the program. Unknown to General
McKenzie, Armenian policymakers had more important
strategic concerns on their minds in 1995 than taking
advantage of NATO’s PfP program. From 1995-96 Armenia
embarked on a major rearmament program aimed at
replenishing equipment lost during the war with
Azerbaijan. Replenishing those stocks and building a
modern national army became a major priority. According
to NATO officials, Armenian military representatives
registered little official interest in the PfP program or
NATO-sponsored regional conferences on regional security
during this period. Even when NATO sponsored
conferences on regional security in the Caucasus in nearby
Tbilisi, Armenian government officials failed to extend any
type of federal assistance to private non-governmental
groups who were interested in establishing closer ties to
NATO.99
Raffi K. Hovannisian, a former foreign minister in
Armenia, underscored this problem when he retold how an
Armenian delegation wanted to travel to Tbilisi in October
1996 to attend a NATO-sponsored conference on
“Developing a Regional Security Concept for the Caucasus.”
The conference drew many high-level NATO officials,
including NATO Admiral Michael Gretton. Hovannisian
strongly criticized Armenia’s failure to provide logistical
support for Armenia officials attending the conference. The
former foreign minister also stated that the Armenian
government failed to provide any substantive or even
informational support for the Armenian group that
attended the conference.100
A rmen ia made a s tunni ng tur nar ound i n i ts
participation in the PfP program in 1997. Ties began to
improve after NATO Secretary General Javier Solana
visited Yerevan in February 1997.101 During Solana’s visit
Armenian Defense Minister Vazguen Sarkissian
announced that Armenian forces would participate in
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military training exercises with NATO in order to
familiarize themselves with how the Alliance operates.
Upon the conclusion of Solana’s visit Armenia dramatically
boosted the level of its participation in PfP by dispatching
Armenian units overseas for PfP exercises.102
The dramatic turnaround in Armenia’s participation in
PfP may be strongly attributed to Russia’s participation in
the NATO summit in Madrid in mid-1997 where the
Alliance created the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint
Council. Russia’s decision to participate in the Permanent
Joint Council apparently signaled Armenia that it would
have greater flexibility in pursuing its ties with NATO.
Following Moscow’s announcement, Armenia opted to send
its foreign minister to the NATO expansion summit in
Madrid. Although Armenian President Levon TerPetrosian failed to travel to the NATO summit, the presence
of the Armenian Foreign Minister and other high-level
officials from the Caucasus, including President
Shevardnadze of Georgia and President Heidar Aliyev of
Azerbaijan, strongly indicated NATO’s growing importance
there.103
The success of the NATO expansion summit in Madrid
provided an additional boost to Armenia’s participation in
the PfP program as Armenia significantly increased its level
of activity in the program shortly after the conclusion of the
historic summit. Evidence of a turnaround in support from
the Armenian government occurred when the Armenian
Foreign Ministry published a survey of the views of senior
Armenian policymakers on security issues in the Caucasus.
The study, Armenia’s Security Policy: The Vision of Senior
Policymakers, offered a positive assessment of NATO’s role
in the Caucasus, particularly from the Armenian Minister
of Defense.104 In the survey Armenian officials insisted that
their country has a strong European identity and
emphasized that the political spectrum of European
security has now become broader due to NATO
expansion.105
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Armenia’s participation in the program reached a major
milestone in late 1997 when Yerevan dispatched the
Armenian deputy foreign minister to NATO headquarters
to discuss expanding Armenia’s participation in the PfP
program.106 Shortly after those discussions the government
of Armenia participated in its first-ever PfP exercise.107 In
1998 the Armenian government sent Chief of General Staff
of the Armenian Armed Forces Major General Mikayel
Arutyunyan to Brussels to attend a meeting of NATO’s
Military Committee in one of the strongest displays of
interest in NATO ever made by the Armenian Ministry of
Defense.108
Armenia’s NATO Patron.
Perhaps no other ally in NATO is more ideally suited to
promote Armenia’s dialogue with NATO than Greece.
Greek ties to the Caucasus date back to the time of
Alexander the Great when the conqueror brought the region
under Greek rule. In fact, one of Alexander’s legendary
generals, General Atropates, governed a province in the
Caucasus that now bears his name—Azerbaijan. Remnants
of early Greek civilization remain scattered throughout the
Black Sea region, and Greece has actively pursued a policy
of reviving its military and security links with the region
since the collapse of the USSR. Greek military ties to
Armenia date back several centuries when both countries
shared a similar suffrage under Ottoman rule. According to
one Greek defense official, military ties between the
countries are at least 200 years old. These historical links
offer Greece a natural basis to facilitate closer links between
NATO and Armenia. The first public indication of bilateral
military ties between the two countries surfaced in 1996
when Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosian visited
Athens and signed an agreement on military cooperation
with Greece. During that visit, Armenian Defense Minister
Vazgen Sarkisyan observed that Armenia would become a
stable regional ally for Greece in the Caucasus. 109
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After signing the 1996 agreement, Armenia and Greece
significantly boosted the level of their military and security
cooperation. A year later the military cooperation
agreement was expanded to include an agreement on the
joint sharing of military intelligence as well as another
series of cooperation and exchange agreements. Those
meetings culminated in the signing of a major intelligence
and military-cooperation agreement in June 1997 when
Greece’s Chief of the General Staff, Athanasios Tzoganis,
traveled to Armenia to participate in the signing ceremony.
The two countries also agreed to expand the level of their
existing bilateral military training programs. The military
agreement evoked little concern from Russian officials in
Moscow and one Russian commentator simply referred to
the visit as “the logical continuation of bilateral relations
established by the agreement on friendship and
cooperation.”110
A mon th la ter Gr eek Def ens e M i ni s ter Aki s
Tsokhatzopoulos visited Yerevan in one of the highest level
military visits ever paid to Armenia by a Greek defense
official. The Greek Defense Minister announced that the
two sides planned to expand military cooperation between
the two countries, which he noted have “existed for over two
hundred years.” 111 The visit yielded several defense
agreements, including accords on defense cooperation and
an Armenian decision to dispatch military units to Greece to
participate in NATO PfP exercises.112
Although Greece’s initiatives in the Caucasus have
helped facilitate greater Armenian participation in NATO,
officials in Turkey share deep reservations over the scale of
Greek initiatives in the Caucasus. Turkish officials believe
that Greek military overtures are related to a larger
regional strategy aimed at the encirclement of Turkey. The
agreement on intelligence sharing signed between Greece
and Armenia created major concerns in the Turkish Foreign
Ministry. In a statement released during the Greek Defense
Minister’s visit, the Turkish foreign ministry stated that
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“Turkey is sensitive to this issue as it concerns the security
of Turkey.” 113
Greek initiatives in the Caucasus, however, have not
been solely limited to Armenia. Greek defense officials have
also visited Georgia and Azerbaijan where they have signed
military exchange agreements with the two countries. In
1998, for example, Greek officials visited Baku and signed
an exchange agreement with Azerbaijan. During this visit
Azerbaijan accepted an offer from the Greek Ministry of
Defense to pay for the training of a group of Azeri Air Force
pilots at a Greek Military Academy.114
Continuing to operate under the aegis of NATO’s PfP
program Greece reached a major milestone in its Caucasian
initiatives when it hosted a major PfP exercise that involved
elite military units from Armenia. In December 1997 an
Armenian Special Forces unit participated in a 10-day
NATO PfP exercise in Greece under the code name
Prometheus-97. The multinational peacekeeping exercise
consisted of Greek, Dutch, Armenian, Bulgarian, and
Albanian units that carried out military operations in a
zone affected by a natural disaster that required disaster
relief operations and convoy protection. In what may
forebode greater American military assistance to Yerevan,
Armenian units participating in the exercise were equipped
with American weaponry to conduct the exercises.115
Armenia’s Ties to Russia.
While NATO’s ties to Armenia have shown significant
progress over the past 18 months, officials in Yerevan
continue to downplay the recent warming of relations with
NATO. Armenian officials insist that their military
relations with Moscow remain a top priority. Since joining
PfP, Armenian officials have insisted that they intend to
maintain a delicate balance between East and West. For
example, the Armenian Foreign Ministry outlined this
approach by observing that Armenia’s participation in the
PfP program would only be “additional” to Armenia’s
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existing bilateral military cooperation with Russia and the
CIS. Armenian Defense Minister Vazgen Sarkissian
strongly echoed these views by noting that Armenia had
limitations in its defense cooperation with Greece and
NATO. The defense minister stated that Armenia does not
have any immediate plans to import arms from Greece due
to differences in armaments. Armenia’s military forces, he
noted, are equipped mostly with Russian weapons, while
the Greek military is primarily equipped with an array of
NATO and Western-designed equipment.116
The defense minister’s statement strongly underscores
the fundamental difference in views about NATO’s role in
the Caucasus in contrast to Armenia’s regional neighbors,
Azerbaijan and Georgia. Due to Moscow’s historical role as a
guarantor of security for Armenia, Yerevan refuses to
consider NATO as any sort of regional counterweight to
Russia in the Caucasus. One high-ranking Armenian
official echoed this view by claiming that NATO’s role in
Caucasus security “should not be seen as a counterweight to
Russia’s role . . . particularly since Russia and NATO have
signed a cooperation charter.” The official noted that
“counterpoising Russia and NATO’s respective roles is
unhealthy for the region,” and constitutes a “destructive
approach.” He also stated that that efforts by Azerbaijan to
pursue closer ties to NATO “can be destructive to regional
stability.”117
Despite the warming of ties with NATO, Armenia veered
away from its Western course in mid-1997 when it signed a
Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid with
Russia in August 1997. The new treaty further
strengthened already significant military relations
between the two nations by replacing the Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Security signed in
1991. The agreement also offered Moscow an exclusive
military basing agreement in Armenia for the next 25
years.118 Officials in Moscow proclaimed the new treaty to
be a step higher than the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation
and Mutual Security signed in 1991 and argued that neither
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Russia nor Armenia have signed any similar kind of treaty
with any other country in the world in recent years. The
Armenian parliament overwhelmingly approved the
Russian basing agreement that granted Russian forces
exclusive basing rights in Armenia whereby Yerevan would
pay for 30 percent of the costs to maintain the bases.119
Commenting on this agreement, Nikolai Ryzhkov, the
former Prime Minister of the USSR, stated that the military
basing agreement would enable Russia to offset NATO
forces based in Turkey. Ryzhkov also referred to Armenia’s
role as a buffer state for Moscow in the Caucasus.120
The dark side of Moscow’s efforts to destabilize the
regional balance of power in the Caucasus surfaced in
mid-1997 when the Duma defense committee revealed that
the Russian military had illegally transferred over a billion
dollars in arms to Armenia from 1994 to 1996. The scandal,
which became known in the West as “Yerevangate,”
involved the transfer of extensive stocks of Russian
weapons from military warehouses all over Russia,
including arms caches in Siberia. The massive transfer of
arms also included the gift of over 32 Scud ballistic missiles
and 8 associated launchers to the Armenian military.
Armenian military personnel even received extensive
training in the use of the missiles at the Russian testing
range of Kapustin Yar in mid-1996. With a 300-kilometer
range, Armenian Scuds are more than capable of wreaking
havoc on the oil fields in and around Azerbaijan’s capital
city of Baku. Moreover, the transfer of nearly 100
sophisticated T-72 tanks and 50 armored vehicles greatly
augmented the military muscle of the Armenian-backed
forces of Nagorno-Karabakh.121
The Demise of the Commonwealth.
At a time when Armenia refuses to abandon its
centuries-old relations with Moscow, Azerbaijan and
Georgia are increasingly distancing themselves from the
faltering CIS, as the Yeltsin government has proven
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incapable of forging an equal partnership among its
collective members. In contrast, ties between NATO and
Georgia and Azerbaijan via the PfP program have created
unique inroads for NATO in the Caucasus as a potential
guarantor of regional security.
Moscow’s disposition toward NATO’s growing ties to the
region has been unfavorably received in Kremlin
policymaking circles. Russian officials insist that the
Atlantic Alliance abandon any idea it has of integrating the
former Soviet republics into an enlarged NATO. NATO
Secretary General Javier Solana’s trip to the Caucasus in
early 1997 was fiercely criticized by Russian officials who
accused the NATO Secretary General of having a hidden
agenda aimed at undermining Russian influence in the
region. 122 Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai
Afanasyevsky echoed these views when he pointed to
NATO’s growing activity in the Caucasus, particularly its
efforts to develop closer military contacts and hold joint
military exercises. Afanasyevsky observed that “both the
Caucasus countries and NATO itself have been active in
initiating such contacts.”123
Russian concerns over NATO activity in the region
continue to place Azerbaijan and Georgia at odds with
Moscow. Azerbaijan has been strongly criticized for its
efforts to forge stronger ties to NATO. A major source for
Moscow’s irritation with Baku stems from the fact that
Azerbaijan remains the only independent state in the
Caucasus that refuses to allow Russian military bases on its
soil. Since joining the CIS, Azerbaijan has become
increasingly disillusioned with the organization. Russian
sponsored efforts to oust Aliyev from power have resulted in
no less than four to five coup attempts since 1993, the most
recent coming in February 1997 shortly after Solana’s visit
to Azerbaijan.124
Over the course of 1996 and 1997, President Aliyev has
been the most outspoken in his efforts to distance
Azerbaijan from the CIS. He has repeatedly resisted
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Russian efforts to regain access to former military bases in
Azerbaijan and repeatedly asked for Moscow to conclude its
investigation of the illegal $1 billion arms sale to Armenia
that transpired from 1994 to 1996. In March 1997 President
Aliyev stated that while the time for the funeral of the CIS is
not at hand, it is drawing quite near. Since joining the CIS in
September 1993, Azerbaijan has increasingly distanced
itself from Russian-led collective security efforts within the
organization. Azerbaijan’s Ambassador to Russia, Ramiz
Rizayev, told Nezavisimaia gazeta that his country had
expressed dissatisfaction with the Tashkent Treaty in
Collective Security noting that it is only oriented toward
defense against external aggression and demanded that it
be altered.125
Regional Conflicts.
With the growth in relations between NATO and the
Caucasus, there have been increasing calls from Georgia
and Azerbaijan for some sort of NATO-sponsored
peacekeeping mission under the aegis of the United
Nations. Both President Shevardnadze and President
Aliyev have suggested publicly that NATO play a wider role
in the Caucasus and their attendance at the NATO
expansion summit in Madrid marks another milestone for
NATO in its ties to the Caucasus. Although the possibility
for dispatching a NATO-sponsored peacekeeping force to
the Caucasus is quite remote, it is not implausible. The two
largest unresolved regional conflicts in the Caucasus,
Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, remain deadlocked with
Europe’s top security forum, the Organization for
Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), unable to
arrange a settlement. Frustrated over the absence of
progress by the European-led OSCE talks, both Azerbaijan
and Georgia have become increasingly vocal in their calls
for some level of NATO involvement in the region.
The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is one of the largest
and most volatile of the unresolved conflicts in the
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Caucasus. Entering its fourth year of negotiations, any
breakthrough in peace talks is largely tied to Armenian
hard-liners in Nagorno-Karabakh, who refuse to give up
any of the occupied territory that they seized from
Azerbaijan during the war. This refusal, combined with
instability in Armenia proper, has greatly dimmed Western
expectations for resolving the conflict. With approximately
20 percent of Azerbaijan’s territory under occupation by the
Armenian-backed force of Nagorno-Karabakh, the return of
the disputed territory ranks as one of Azerbaijan’s key
national priorities. Ironically the people of Azerbaijan view
the conflict through a European prism and consider it to be
analogous to the centuries-old European dispute over
Alsace-Lorraine.126 So far, efforts to resolve the dispute
have fallen on the shoulders of Europeans as the OSCE has
proven unable to broker an agreement. Since mid-1994 the
OSCE has tried to resolve the conflict acting as a mediator
in talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan.127
For Azeri officials, NATO has great appeal as a source
for resolving the conflict in the Caucasus due to its
successful peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. Azeri
policymakers view NATO’s record there to be quite
promising for Azerbaijan and remain hopeful that the
continued U.S. engagement in the region may eventually
result in some sort of NATO-led peacekeeping operation in
the disputed enclave. President Aliyev strongly
underscored this point when he visited NATO headquarters
in April 1996 where he expressed hope that upon the
OSCE’s resolution of the conflict NATO would be able to
assist in the deployment of an international peacekeeping
force to Nagorno-Karabakh.128
Against the $2 billion budget of NATO, the $100 million
budget of OSCE no where matches the resources of NATO.
The OSCE neither possesses the reputation established by
NATO in peacekeeping operations such as Bosnia, nor the
experience. To date, the OSCE has never fielded a military
force for peacekeeping operations. Instead it has primarily
limited itself to election monitoring and human rights
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missions in several ethnic conflict zones, such as
Tajikistan and Bosnia. With close to a million displaced
persons living in refugee camps, Azerbaijan has grown
weary of the OSCE’s inability to broker an agreement with
Armenia and the government of Nagorno-Karabakh.
NATO’s growing relations with the Caucasus have stirred
discussion inside Azerbaijan that NATO might become an
option if OSCE efforts fail. In 1997 Azerbaijan’s Foreign
Ministry conducted a study on the possible international
options that the government might have for a
peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh. The study
approvingly hailed NATO’s success in Bosnia, emphasizing that NATO holds significant promise for potential
peacekeeping operations in the Caucasus if the OSCE
eventually proves unable to bring about a resolution of the
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.129
Any likelihood for an OSCE-sponsored resolution
diminished in early 1998 when Armenian President
Ter-Petrosian resigned from office. The subsequent election
of Robert Kocharian as President of Armenia in April 1998
threatened to prolong the adoption of an OSCE-sponsored
formula by Armenia that had been favorably received by
outgoing President Ter-Petrosian. Petrosian was believed
to be on the verge of accepting an interim agreement in
which Nagorno-Karabakh would surrender buffer zones
around the enclave in an OSCE-sponsored stage-by-stage
agreement where Nagorno-Karabakh would receive the
highest autonomy within Azerbaijan. Kocharian, however,
has rejected any effort to return any of the territory occupied
by the Armenian-backed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh and
insisted on complete independence for the enclave, which is
not recognized by any other country in the world.130
Abkhazia.
The Abkhazian conundrum is the second largest
regional conflict in the Caucasus where there has been
increased reference to the potential for NATO intervention
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by regional leaders. President Eduard Shevardnadze
increasingly has advocated that a “Bosnia type” solution is
needed to resolve the conflict over Abkhazia. Since
mid-1993 Russia has kept 1,500 peacekeepers in a buffer
zone between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia. 131
Currently Russian forces operate there under the auspices
of the CIS. Kremlin policymakers have been extremely
reluctant to take on a more vigorous peacekeeping role in
Abkhazia that would include resettling refugees and
patrolling a wider area of the region. Peace talks remain
deadlocked with the Abkhaz separatists insisting upon
greater sovereignty than Georgia will tolerate. In 1997 CIS
leaders agreed that the Russian peacekeeping force would
assist in resettling refugees, but so far have failed to initiate
any decision.132
Distraught over the lack of movement in resolving the
conflict, Shevardnadze repeatedly has insisted that the
international community take on a bigger role. Georgian
officials are extremely dissatisfied with Russia’s failure to
prod Abkhazia into any kind of dialogue with Tbilisi,
particularly as Moscow plays the combined role of both
mediator and peacekeeper in Abkhazia. As Shevardnadze
has observed, “when we gave Russia a special role in
resolving the Abkhaz conflict, we had no other way out.
There were the Security Council resolutions, but they
(Russia) were really the only ones who could have helped
us.” Moreover, the Georgian President believes that “the
time has come in the world and especially in Europe for the
decisions of the high councils of the U.N. to be fulfilled.”133
The Georgian leader asserted that Russia has virtually
“exhausted its potential as political mediator and military
peacekeeper in the Caucasus,” and recently called for a
“Bosnia option,” using forces from outside countries, which
could be used to restore his country’s control over
Abkhazia.134
A NATO role in resolving the conflict, however remote,
increasingly has become a topic of discussion by Georgian
President Eduard Shevardnadze in his discussions on
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international peacekeeping options for Abkhazia. At the
“NATO Expansion Summit” in Madrid in May 1997,
Shevardnadze even broached the idea of introducing
Ukrainian peacekeepers in private talks with Ukrainian
President Leonid Kuchma. Shevardnadze reportedly asked
the Ukrainian leader to consider the possibility of
dispatching peacekeepers to Abkhazia as part of a
NATO-sponsored peacekeeping force.135
During his July 1997 visit to the United States,
Shevardnadze made the subject of U.N. or NATO
intervention a key part of his U.S. agenda. Shevardnadze
raised the issue of U.N. intervention in his discussions with
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. In his trip to
Washington, the Georgian leader raised the notion of NATO
intervention during his talks with U.S. policymakers.
American officials, however, reacted coldly to his NATO
proposal and expressed concern that such a force would
jeopardize Russian support for international efforts to
resolve the conflict. U.S. officials, in turn, urged
Shevardnadze to remain patient and insisted that he pin his
hopes on a U.N.-sponsored effort to resolve the conflict
through the “Friends of Georgia Group” at the United
Nations.136 The remarkable patience of the Georgian leader
has been rapidly approaching an end as Moscow’s
intransigence in prolonging the Abkhaz conflict and the
February 1998 assassination attempt in which Russia may
have had a hand stand to further distance Georgia from the
ailing CIS. Georgia is desperately seeking a way to
internationalize the conflict and gain greater diplomatic
support from the U.S. and Western allies for a Westernbacked effort to intervene in mediating an end to the
conflict.
Both Azerbaijan and Georgia share an common interest
in having NATO play a wider role in the Caucasus,
especially in implementing any sort of U.N.- or OSCEsponsored peacekeeping operation. Although a NATO-led
peacekeeping operation in the Caucasus may not be a
pressing concern for NATO policymakers, it certainly
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occupies a key place in the minds of President
Shevardnadze and President Aliyev. In Shevardnadze’s
1998 New Year’s address to his country, the Georgian leader
stated that “failing significant progress soon” toward a
political settlement of the Abkhaz conflict, he would call for
an international “peace enforcement operation in Abkhazia
on the Bosnian model.”137 The Georgian President then
indicated that he would raise this issue at the upcoming
summit of NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
(EAPC) as well as the “Friends of Georgia” group of Western
countries, the OSCE, and the U.N. in 1998. Shevardnadze
also outlined a timetable for the full restoration of Georgia’s
territorial integrity by the year 2000.138
Interestingly, NATO’s profile in brokering conflict
resolution in the Caucasus has risen steadily in popularity
among regional leaders since the PfP program began. The
frequency of use of NATO as an option by regional leaders in
the Caucasus is indeed an interesting phenomenon and
undoubtedly deepens as more and more officers embark on
military exchanges with key NATO states. NATO’s
credibility in the Caucasus has risen tremendously among
regional states in the Caucasus due to its record of success
in Bosnia. Still, NATO intervention in any scenario remains
possible only as an option if the United States and its NATO
allies decide to resort to it, which undoubtedly remains low
on the list of policy options for Western policymakers.139
Shifting Alliances in the Caucasus.
NATO’s growing ties to the Caucasus underscore one of
several regional trends that are emerging where new
regional alliances are being formed between the
independent states of the Caucasus and neighboring
regional powers. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the
oil rich Caucasus has continued to operate amid a regional
vacuum of security that officials in the Clinton
administration now refer to as “a second gray zone of
insecurity.”140 In the absence of any major guarantor of
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power in the region, the Caucasus is witnessing the creation
of a whole new series of loose regional alliances and security
alignments that are dramatically altering the strategic
complexion of the Caucasus. Neighboring regional powers,
such as Ukraine, Turkey, and Iran are leading these efforts
as old regional rivalries are resurrected in the absence of
any regional guarantor of power.
Ukrainian strategists in Kyiv have been the most active
in formulating a new strategic policy for the Caucasus that
seeks to create a regional grouping of states that opposes
Russian influence in the region. In October 1997 the
Presidents of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova
formalized their common regional interests into an informal
grouping known as GUAM. Founded at the Council of
Europe Summit in Strasbourg, Ukraine initiated the
formation of GUAM in order to counter Russia’s position in
the Caucasus. The four countries signed a communique
during that meeting establishing an informal alliance of the
four countries, whose chief objective appears to be the
establishment of a mechanism for coordinating the group’s
foreign and economic affairs.141
The addition of Moldova signified an expanded version of
a regional alignment formed the previous year that had
been referred to as the Baku-Kyiv-Tbilisi axis. GUAM
appears to be an extension of that axis which stands apart
from the Commonwealth of Independent States due to its
exclusion of Russia. Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Hasan
Hasanov observed that GUAM should make a major
contribution to the strengthening of security and
cooperation in Europe and would promote political and
military consultations with NATO on regional security
issues.142 The Azeri foreign minister stated that GUAM
would lead to the strengthening of contacts between the four
countries, which would go hand-in-hand with a process of
their integration into European and Euro-Atlantic
structures. Shortly after the Strasbourg meeting, GUAM
members held a consultative meeting at the deputy foreign
minister level in Baku to map out a common strategy.143
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During that meeting the Azeri foreign minister indicated
that contacts between NATO and the GUAM could evolve as
a sort of “16-plus-four principle, in order to raise political
and military cooperation to a qualitatively new level, not
only between NATO and its partners, but also among the
GUAM countries as well.”144
Members of GUAM have already created a military
contingent composed of units provided by regional
members. In December 1997 Ukrainian Defense Minister
Aleksandr Kuzmuk announced the creation of a joint
battalion by Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine that would
protect the Caucasus transport corridor. Referred to as the
“Eurasia battalion,” the Western media claimed that a
major aim of the military force would be to defend the oil
transport corridor that stretches from Baku to Supsa.
Kuzmuk and his Georgian counterpart, Vardiko
Nadibaidze, agreed to create a unit that would jointly
protect the railroad and oil pipelines that encompass the
corridor. In late 1997 the President Aliyev of Azerbaijan
stunned Western diplomats by fielding the Azeri contingent
for the battalion for review by visiting U.S. Ambassador to
NATO Robert Hunter. Moldova, for unknown reasons, has
failed to provide a military contingent for the battalion, and
appears to be limiting its involvement in GUAM to merely a
political and economic role. 145
Armenia has sought to counter this newly emerging
alignment by forging closer military and security ties with
Greece an d I ra n as a means of d eter r i ng the
Baku-Kyiv-Tbilisi–Kishinev axis. Greece’s willingness to
fill that void has led to discussion of a possible
Athens-Yerevan-Moscow-Tehran axis in the Caucasus to
counter GUAM. According to Greek Defense Minister
Apostolos-Athanasios Tsochatzopoulos, a key purpose of his
country’s efforts in the Caucasus is to counter Turkey’s
“destabilizing impact” in the region.146 To counter Turkey’s
growing influence, Greek officials also have advocated the
formation of a Greece-Armenia-Georgia-Iran axis. Armenia
represents the cornerstone of both Russian and Greek
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strategy in the Caucasus aimed at blocking Turkey’s
perceived intrusion into the oil corridor of the Caucasus.
Armenia, for example, has significantly improved its own
external military relations when it concluded an agreement
on military cooperation with Greece, Syria, and Bulgaria.
Yerevan also has initiated the sharing of military
intelligence with Greece in an effort to exert greater
pressure on Turkey’s eastern flank.147
Greece’s military ties with Armenia and Turkey’s
military relations with Azerbaijan highlight one of the
growing dangers posed by the emerging alliances in the
Caucasus as individual NATO-member states implement a
regional strategy aimed at creating new regional alliances.
PfP in some instances appears to have been the conduit for
building these alliances, as Turkey has overwhelmingly
been the greatest beneficiary of the PfP program in an effort
to pursue its regional aims in the Caucasus and Central
Asia. Both Ankara and Athens have successfully used the
PfP program as a conduit for forging closer military ties to
regional states in the Caspian region in order to build
greater strategic depth as well as establish the groundwork
for future arms sales to the region.148 Efforts to pursue these
regional agendas, however, may prove to be destabilizing to
regional stability if Turkey or Ukraine emerges as a
regional guarantor of security to these states. Unaware of
these dangers, policymakers in NATO should identify and
monitor these trends in order to prevent any outbreak of
regional hostilities between rival NATO member states. In
the event of tensions erupting between Turkey and Greece
in the Aegean, then it is extremely likely that the Caucasus
would become a secondary theater of military operations
between the two regional rivals.
The Gray Zone of Insecurity.
The expansion of regional alliances in the Caucasus
underscores the growing uncertainty that awaits this
region as it transitions from a little known hinterland of the
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Cold War to a key energy crossroads of Eurasia. The
Caucasus is vitally important to Western energy interests.
Its strategic location next to one of the largest untapped
petroleum basins in the world is unleashing new security
alignments oriented toward the defense of the region’s oil
supplies that may fall outside the ability of the West to
influence. In many ways the Caspian region is emerging as
a second Persian Gulf as the number of external powers
vying for control over the region’s oil resources extends
along several regional axes.
Regional security in the Caucasus is greatly complicated
by the emergence of an immense power vacuum that has
blanketed the region since the end of the Cold War. Russia’s
defeat on the battlefields of the North Caucasus has further
altered the regional balance of power as its capability to
project power into the southern Caucasus remains limited,
although Moscow still retains significant capacity to
interfere in the domestic affairs of neighboring states.
Meanwhile, Turkey and Greece continue to advance their
own regional security agendas in the Caucasus, which may
place these neighboring regional powers on a collision
course for conflict. The encroaching interests of Turkey,
however, raises a serious question for NATO policymakers
as they formulate a new regional strategy of engagement in
the Caucasus that takes into serious account the whirlwind
of competing interests there which is creating what
American policymakers refer to “as a second gray zone of
insecurity.”149
Nevertheless, NATO initiatives in the Caucasus
through PfP are a major step forward in alleviating the
regional vacuum in security as the PfP program becomes
the primary tool available for Western policymakers in their
efforts to promote regional stability in Eurasia. NATO
efforts to forge closer links to the region have been favorably
received by all the regional states, especially as Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia forge stronger ties with NATO
through the PfP program. Interest in the Caucasus among
senior NATO officials continues to grow as the region
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increasingly becomes a permanent part of the Alliance’s
agenda. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana strongly
underscored this point when he told Azerbaijan’s
parliament in February 1997, “that although it was his first
trip to Azerbaijan, it would not be his last.”150
Meanwhile, Western energy security concerns in the
Caspian stand to dramatically reshape NATO’s interests in
Eurasia. The construction of the strategic 1,730 kilometer
(1,081 miles) Baku-Ceyhan pipeline over the next decade
will play a central role in influencing NATO interests in the
region as transportation security becomes the centerpiece of
its concerns in the Caucasus. Both the United States and
Turkey share a deepening strategic commitment to the
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline as each side seeks to prevent Moscow
from developing a regional monopoly over pipeline routes
from the Caspian. Western policymakers have a vital
interest in safeguarding the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline as they
seek to promote the integration of the Caucasus into the
larger Euro-Atlantic community.
The receptiveness of regional leaders to NATO
initiatives in the Caucasus has undergone dramatic
changes since it first launched the PfP program. Unlike in
previous years, regional leaders in the Caucasus now openly
refer to the need for a wider NATO role in the region as some
states view the Alliance as a regional counterweight to a
resurgent Russia. Regional leaders in the southern
Caucasus recognize NATO’s capacity to project stability
into ethnically unstable areas of southeastern Europe and
the presidents of Azerbaijan and Georgia remain at the
forefront in advocating a wider NATO role for the region.
Both leaders seek to internationalize their respective
regional conflicts hoping that one-day, NATO can play a role
in assisting with a U.N.- or OSCE-sponsored peacekeeping
force in Nagorno-Karabakh or Abkhazia. Armenia, on the
other hand, remains wedded to Moscow, but even Yerevan’s
outlook toward NATO has shown considerable progress
since Russia joined the Joint Partnership Council and may
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eventually play a larger role in the program through
Greece’s NATO patronage.
While a NATO peacekeeping deployment in the
Caucasus is unlikely for the near future, the notion of a
NATO-led peacekeeping exercise in the region is definitely
on the horizon. Such an exercise, which would be patterned
after the American-led exercise in Kazakhstan in
September 1997, would prove to be a tremendous
psychological boost to NATO’s image in the region. It
additionally would demonstrate the American commitment
to promoting regional stability in the Caucasus. Georgian
President Eduard Shevardnadze has envisioned a similar
type exercise in the Caucasus and his aim moved one step
closer to reality in early 1998. During the visit of the
Georgian defense minister to the United States the two
countries reportedly signed an agreement to hold PfP
exercises in the Republic of Georgia sometime in the near
future.151
Conclusion.
NATO planners are strongly aware of the growing
strategic importance of the Caucasus to the Atlantic
Alliance. As NATO debates the adoption of a new NATO
strategy to guide the Alliance into the 21st century, the
entire Caspian is assuming a more prominent role in
NATO’s thinking about the future. In a round of NATO
“crystal ball” discussions in London in late 1997, a group of
NATO officials openly debated the strategic challenges that
might arise for the Alliance in the 21st century and the
Caspian figured prominently in those talks.152 Meanwhile,
regional support for a wider NATO role continues to surface
in the thoughts and views of senior officials in the Caucasus.
A major regional newspaper there has even gone so far as to
allege that U.S. reconnaissance aircraft based at Turkey’s
NATO air base at Incirlik would regularly monitor the
Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline once it became operational.
Moreover, the Prime Minister of Azerbaijan gave credence
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to this view by announcing in early 1998 that the
government of Azerbaijan is now holding regular
consultations with NATO on pipeline security.153 Whether
these allegations are true or not remains unclear; however,
there is growing evidence that the Caucasus is ascending in
importance in the strategic thinking of the Atlantic Alliance
as its approaches the 21st century.
Together the Persian Gulf and the Caucasus represent
two of the world’s most unstable regions, and it remains
unthinkable that NATO can ignore the potential impact
caused by future instability in a major oil basin such as the
Caspian. Russian military officials have begun their own
crystal ball discussions on the future of the region and are
deeply disturbed over the escalating interests by Western
powers in the Caspian. Their chief fear is that the intensity
of regional rivalries unfolding along the shores of the
Caspian will one day lead to a military deployment there in
order to protect Western oil interests just as they have in the
Persian Gulf. As one Russian general noted:
There is currently only one threat to Russia. It is not NATO,
China or Islam, but the threat of Desert Storm Two appearing
on the shores of the Caspian Sea.154

With over $28 billion in oil agreements with Azerbaijan
alone, it is clearly visible that Western powers share a
deepening strategic interest in Caspian energy security.
However, great uncertainties await the Caspian region as it
transitions from a backwater of the Cold War to one of the
most highly contested geopolitical arenas of world energy.
As an important energy corridor, the Caucasus deserves
close attention from NATO policymakers as the region
forms a new NATO borderland that will have extreme
importance for the energy security of not only NATO allies
in Western Europe, but those in Eastern Europe as well.
NATO’s PfP program is helping to pave the road to greater
regional stability in the Caucasus by fostering desperately
needed security cooperation between the West and the
independent states of the region. Of the 27 nations
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participating in NATO’s PfP Program, the collective future
of three of these countries, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Georgia, will have a tremendous impact on the future of
Western energy security.
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CHAPTER 9
NATO’S EXPANDING PRESENCE
IN THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA
Rachel Bronson
The convergence of two unrelated trends forecasts
trouble for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Alliance: a constant push for NATO expansion and
increased energy exploration in the Caucasus and Central
Asia. Although there is currently little connection between
these two trends, NATO’s expanding reach and the press for
alternative sources of energy could collide in an
unpredictable and potentially disastrous manner. The irony
is that an area that has not played a central role in strategic
thinking since “the Great Game” of the 19th century could
challenge the integrity of one of the most successful security
institutions in European history.
NATO’s responsibilities are increasing in one form or
another in all states of the former Soviet Union. After the
collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO members were quick to
protect the vulnerable newly independent states (NIS)
through the establishment of economic, political, and
military ties. The most significant development is the
possibility of full-fledged membership in the Alliance for
three new member states, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic. Other security arrangements have been extended
as well. Special agreements between NATO and Ukraine,
for instance, demonstrate an increased Western
commitment to Ukraine’s security. Partnership for Peace
(PfP) exercises have occurred throughout the former Soviet
Union for the dual purpose of preparing states for NATO
membership and establishing closer military ties. Several
arguments have been advanced in favor of expansion,
ranging from preventing domestic instability, which could
drag Europe inadvertently into war, to containment of a
potentially reassertive Russia. In most cases, the justi-
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fication for increasing NATO’s geographic responsibilities
has little to do with the countries themselves and more to do
with maintaining stability and independence on the
European continent, the central objective of the NATO
Alliance. NATO’s expanding presence is taking place for its
own internal logic, rather than for reasons specific to a
particular country or region.
A second and concurrent trend is the international
scramble to secure economic resources in the Caucasus and
Central Asia. This trend is specific to the region itself. A
1997 U.S. State Department report estimates there are 178
billion barrels of proven and possible energy reserves in the
Caspian Sea, second only to the Persian Gulf.1 The lure of
such reserves is pulling new actors into the region.
Uzbekistan alone is host to over 52 international joint
ventures, up from 12 in 1996.2 Kyrgyzstan opened its first
oil refinery in May with U.S. and Canadian assistance.3
Iran actively supported the construction of a TurkmenistanIranian pipeline which became operative in December 1997.
The United States and Britain, in particular, are
contracting for significant portions of the oil agreements.
Not far behind are Japan and China. India and Pakistan are
also expressing interest in the region as their growing
populations demand increasing energy resources.4
If not carefully managed, these two trends—NATO
expansion and increased energy exploitation—will
converge in southwest Asia with dangerous consequences.
Three scenarios for conflict are possible. First, local crises
threaten to draw the Alliance unexpectedly into regional
conflict. Second, actors such as Russia, Iran, and China
have established interests in the region which could lead
them to view NATO expansion in the Caucasus and Central
Asia as directly threatening. Third, competing economic
and political interests among NATO members could
reverberate back and affect Alliance cohesion. There is the
possibility that NATO will become embroiled in unwanted
military confrontations. As importantly, the economic and
political conflicts among NATO constituent states could
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erode the unity of the Alliance, affecting it far beyond the
borders of Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Logistically, the Caucasus and Central Asia could
become the true testing ground for NATO out-of-area
operations. The region poses problems which dwarf the
complications associated with operations in the former
Yugoslavia. Conflict in Eastern or Central Europe, while
problematic for NATO, would at least involve parties that
are familiar: ex-Warsaw Pact countries. In Central Asia and
the Caucasus this is not the case. The actors involved are as
likely to include China, Iran, and India, as they are Russia.
In addition, projecting power into Central Asia and the
Caucasus is also much trickier than in Europe or even the
Persian Gulf. In short, out-of-area in this region is truly
out-of-area.
This chapter is organized as follows. First, the extent of
NATO’s involvement in southwest Asia is discussed.
Because Central Asia and the Caucasus are usually
considered within the context of the “politics of pipelines,”
security developments there are often given short shrift.
But as the above paragraphs suggest, energy arrangements
are not the only important developments occurring in this
region. NATO, through Partnership for Peace (PfP), is
steadily expanding its previous commitments. In addition,
NATO already has assumed treaty commitments in the
region through the Flank Zone Agreement, a part of the
Treaty on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).
Once the extent of NATO’s presence in the region is
established, we turn to a consideration of other
international interests. The United States, Europe, China,
Russia, Iran, and Turkey all have interests in the region
outside the scope of NATO enlargement. This discussion
provides a brief overview of the international context in
which NATO is operating. The chapter concludes with a
discussion of the conflicts that are likely to plague the
NATO Alliance as it becomes more deeply entrenched in the
region.
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It is certainly possible that the mix of economic windfalls
and great power politics will compliment each other to allow
all parties involved to benefit equally and thus decrease the
likelihood of conflict. It is also possible that the region’s
conflicts will abate once economic resources flow into the
region, and governments are able to co-opt domestic
opposition. More likely, local conflict will escalate and
international interests will clash. Resource distribution
always raises the thorny question of who gains more, and
rarely is there a universally agreed upon answer. Arms
flows are increasing as cash becomes available and barter
arrangements are being concluded, while outside powers
are establishing defense agreements with regional actors
with alacrity. Such developments within the context of
NATO’s expanding commitments are a dangerous and
alarming mix.
NATO’s Role in the Region.
NATO is involved the Caucasus and Central Asia in two
central ways. The first is through the CFE Flank Zone
Agreement, and the second is through increasing PfP
activity.
The CFE Treaty.5 NATO’s formal involvement in the
Caucasus began somewhat unexpectedly with the 1990
Treaty on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The
CFE was negotiated between two “groups of states,” namely
the Warsaw Pact and NATO. It stipulated limits and
position of five categories of military equipment: tanks,
artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft, and
attack helicopters. The treaty’s jurisdiction extended from
the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural mountains.
Negotiated at the end of the Cold War, the treaty was
designed to increase confidence between NATO and
Warsaw Pact countries by reducing the likelihood of war in
Central Europe. Being that the states on Russia’s southern
flank were not yet independent, let alone important security
concerns, the area was included in the agreement only to
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bolster Central European security. This decision caused,
and will continue to cause, friction between NATO and
Russia, as Moscow reassesses its security agenda and
locates vital national interests in the Caucasus and Central
Asia.
While the CFE treaty stipulated a ceiling on the quantity
of military equipment that the blocs could maintain, it did
not specify national limits for individual states. That is,
limits were assigned to two groups of states, but not, for
example, to Russia or Germany. The blocs were then further
divided into zones constructed mostly around Central
Europe. One zone however—the Flank Zone—included
Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, and the Caucasus, along with
some states and areas in North Europe.
As the Soviet Union collapsed and strategic realities in
Europe changed, Russia became increasingly concerned
with developments in its “near abroad” and announced it
could not meet its promise of reduced forces in the Flank
Zone. Moscow requested that NATO remit Russian CFE
obligations owing to changed strategic realities. This
request directly challenged NATO to either accommodate
Russia in the Caucasus (and thereby ignore Turkish and
Caucasian concerns) or risk the collapse of an important
and successful European arms control agreement. In May
1996 in Vienna, NATO countries agreed to allow Russia an
increase in its permitted force levels in the Flank Zone. It
also granted Russia an extension of meeting those goals
until 1999. NATO therefore recognized Russia’s changing
security assessment and its need for time in managing
internal unrest, most notably in Chechnya.
This concession forced regional actors to contend with an
increased Russian presence in their own backyards. Also
problematic is the fact that Russia seems to be transferring
weapons to Armenia in contravention of the CFE
agreement, which calls for increased transparency through
regular data exchanges. Conflict in the Caucasus could
therefore push NATO countries into a dilemma. Should
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Russia continue covertly supporting Armenia, for example,
or keep troops in the Southern Zone past 1999, NATO
countries will have to consider whether to accept treaty
violations in the Caucasus in order to secure CFE benefits in
Central Europe, or protect the sovereignty and interests of
Caucasian states.6 Certain European countries may wish to
preserve the CFE in Central Europe, even if this means
sacrificing flank areas like the Caucasus. Turkey and others
more intimately involved in the region are likely to have
diverging interests in terms of how to weight the trade-offs.
Unfortunately, statements by then Russian Interior
Minister Anatoly Kulikov calling for “preventative” strikes
against renegade bases in Chechnya do not suggest that
Russia will be reducing its forces in the Flank Zone any time
soon.7
Should Russia fail to meet its new equipment limits and
continue violating transparency regulations in the Flank
Zone, NATO members with a strong interest in maintaining
Caucasian and Central Asian autonomy could demand a
reexamination of the CFE accord. While the West is
unlikely to overlook the many benefits that the CFE
agreement has brought to Central Europe, it may be forced
to take an increasingly tough line on Russia since any
violation in the Caucasus would support Western
hard-liners who view Russia as still geo-politically
ambitious with only temporarily reduced means to achieve
such ambitions. Turkey, still smarting from being frozen
out of the European Union, may also reevaluate its role in
NATO. The year 1999 will be pivotal for NATO-Russian
relations, not only because of the admission of three new
members to NATO. If Russia has not reduced its forces in
the Flank Zone by then, NATO may have to reevaluate the
success of the CFE agreement. One could also easily
envision a tacit trade-off whereby Russia begrudgingly
accepts the three new NATO members in return for the
West ignoring CFE violations in the Caucasus. This would
challenge Turkish strategic interests and would directly
weaken the independence of Caucasian states that the
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United States and Western Europe seem so eager to bolster.
However, a NATO decision to defend Caucasian interests as
part of its overall trend of expansion could risk many of the
benefits gained through the CFE.
Partnership for Peace Activity. NATO is tied to the
Caucasus and Central Asia even more explicitly through
the PfP program. PfP was introduced in Brussels in
January 1994 in order to expand and intensify political and
military cooperation between NATO and Partner countries.
All Central Asian and Caucasian states, except Tajikistan,
signed on. PfP was designed to promote civilian control of
military forces, enable joint operations with NATO
peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, and open
communications among PfP countries. As NATO documents
indicate, PfP “offers participating states the possibility of
strengthening their relations with NATO in accordance
with their own individual interests and capabilities.”8 PfP
exercises are “designed to improve practical military
cooperation and common capabilities in the areas on which
PfP focuses and help to develop interoperability between
the forces of NATO allies and partner countries.”9
Initially, PfP activities were seen by the NIS as a first
step to inclusion in NATO because NATO members made
overly ambitious statements and because regional leaders
held unrealistic expectations. As stated in NATO
documentation, active participation in the PfP will play “an
important role in the evolutionary process of including new
NATO members.”10 A more realistic understanding is
emerging in which PfP offers benefits of access to NATO
members, aid and military support. Its goal has been
modified to offering participating states the possibility of
strengthening their relations with NATO countries.
Nonetheless, it is important to note that PfP activity in
the Caucasus and Central Asia is increasing at a
remarkable rate. (See Figure 1.) In 1994, the first year of
PfP, no exercises took place in the region. A year later, there
were 6, which were followed by 11 and then 19 in each
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subsequent year. Each year, more countries in the region
participated, and by 1997 every country except Tajikistan
had participated in some way. More importantly, the
number of exercises involving local troops has increased,
suggesting a more important role for military training.
Local troops did not participate in any exercises in 1994, and
in 1995 and 1996, only one exercise took place that involved
troops from the region. In 1997, however, five exercises took
place, with most states in the region committing forces in
one exercise or another.11 There has also been a trend
toward a higher level of exercises. The commitment of local
forces has increased from platoon to brigade level
maneuvers.
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Figure 1. PfP Activity.
The most spectacular example of NATO involvement
was the September 15, 1997, exercise which included 500
U.S. paratroopers from the elite 82nd airborne jumping into
Central Asia. The jump, organized under PfP, included over
800 participants from the United States, Turkey, Russia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. U.S. troops flew
7,700 miles from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the longest
nonstop aerial deployment in U.S. history. The exercise
entailed an imaginary border dispute between two fictitious
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countries, with the goal of enforcing a U.N. brokered
agreement, enhancing regional cooperation, and increasing
interoperability. The fact that Russia was involved could
lead some to argue that the connection between the jump
and a NATO operation was quite loose. But the operation
was organized a year earlier, and, not surprisingly, agitated
Moscow which made clear that such an exercise was
unacceptable and would be deemed as an offensive
maneuver unless Russian troops were included. Their
inclusion was a political corrective. September’s exercise
with its striking pictures of American soldiers falling from
the sky under a PfP mandated exercise should serve as a
warning that economic developments are not occurring in a
military vacuum. Planning for another such exercise is
underway.
The point is that NATO is becoming increasingly
involved in the region. The discussion above does not
include the hundreds of workshops and day-to-day contacts
on-going in the region. The fear is real that it could
unwittingly be dragged into a conflict despite the
preferences of NATO to avoid such a situation. It has led one
Norwegian diplomat to state that “the last thing we want is
any hint of an implied responsibility . . . for guaranteeing a
PfP country’s security.”12 Presence in the region does not
guarantee involvement in local conflicts, but it certainly
increases the likelihood. Regional conflicts become all the
more perilous when the interests of other external states
are considered. The following section shows that not only
NATO is becoming involved. The United States and
European nations are pursuing independent policies in the
region to secure potentially lucrative oil and gas deals. In
addition, China, Russia, and others are establishing
economic and related defense relations. This is all
happening independent of NATO’s expanding reach.
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International Interest in Central Asia
and the Caucasus.
U.S. Involvement. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union,
the United States has become increasingly involved in
Central Asia and the Caucasus. To date, its involvement in
the oil and gas sector has garnered the most attention. More
than 80 oil and gas-related joint ventures are operating in
the region currently, with over 30 U.S. companies involved
in commercial activities.13 U.S. companies are awaiting
ratification of four product-sharing arrangements with
Azerbaijan which would involve the United States in seven
of nine product-sharing arrangements in Azerbaijan.
Chevron has already spent more than $1.3 billion in
Kazakhstan’s Tengiz project.14
Examining U.S. economic and military assistance to the
Caucasus and Central Asia reveals increasing U.S. interest
in the region.15 (See Figure 2.) States most involved in PfP
such as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Georgia continue to
receive a high percentage of the aid to the region. Notably,
assistance to Armenia is decreasing. As the United States
pushes for pipelines originating in and transmitting
through Azerbaijan to carry the region’s increasingly
important energy resources, assistance to Armenia will
necessarily decline as historic and domestic reasons for
assisting Armenia are overwhelmed. Aid to all countries,
with the exception of Armenia and Turkmenistan, is
increasing.
Assistance is also being given in less formal ways.
Taking $5 million from the U.S. Government’s Warsaw
Initiative Fund, Washington is setting up the PfP
Information Management System, a new computer network
designed to promote communication that will tie NATO’s 19
nations with all countries involved in PfP programs. The
new network is expected to increase military-to-military
ties with all PfP countries, since members will be expected
to place data ranging from peacekeeping doctrine to defense
budgets on-line.16
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Figure 2. U.S. Economic and Military
Assistance to the Caucasus and Central
Asia (1992 U.S. $ millions).
Sources: United States Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and
Assistance from International Organizations, Washington, DC: USAID, 1998; USAID, Congressional
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Militarily, officials from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and
Kyrgyzstan repeatedly emphasize the assistance they
received from U.S. forces in learning modern military
tactics including procedures for conducting combat
operations. This is achieved in many different ways
including trips to U.S. bases for training under PfP
exercises. Georgia has sought and achieved closer defense
relations with the United States. In 1997, Georgia had 23
military contacts with the United States, up from 9 in 1995.
In case U.S. commitment to the region was in doubt, after he
parachuted into Central Asia, Marine General Jack
Sheehan, Commander of the U.S. Atlantic Command and
NATO’s SACLANT, announced that, if the United Nations
ever decided to authorize a peace support operation
involving Central Asian military forces, “then the United
States is ready to stand beside them and participate.”17 His
remarks appeared to be the first such assertion of a U.S.
commitment to dispatch military forces to this remote
former Soviet Republic. Secretary of State Albright made
clear that “assistance to the strategically-located and
energy-rich democracies of Central Asia and the Caucasus
is strongly in our national interest.”18 President Clinton,
Vice President Gore, Secretary of Energy Pena, and Deputy
Secretary of State Talbott have all met with the region’s
leaders and made statements encouraging the developing
relationships.
European Involvement. Europe’s involvement in Central
Asia and the Caucasus is not as deep as the U.S.
commitment. Most of the ties result primarily from the oil
exploration. The United Kingdom, Italy, and France are
three of the most active states. British Petroleum, for
instance, maintains a 17 percent share in Azeri consortium.
British Gas has a production-sharing agreement for the
Kazakhstan Karachaganak oil and gas field. In addition,
Italy, through Agip, has production-sharing agreements for
the Kazakhstan Karachaganak oil and gas field. It also has
a 30 percent share of Azerbaijan’s Karabakh field in the
Caspian.
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England and Germany have established military
relations with Georgia, but have not been as active as the
United States, Russia, or China in securing border
arrangements throughout the region. The activity is
primarily confined to economic assistance and regular
diplomatic interaction. Europe’s involvement, though by no
means slight, is not as aggressive as other interested states.
This is likely to strain relations within the NATO Alliance
as the United States pushes for stronger NATO relations
there through PfP exercises, and European countries
consider alternative areas for involvement.
Russia. Russia’s role in the region oscillates between
benign neglect and intense involvement. In the early 1990s,
Moscow’s interest in the region was minimal as the “near
abroad” was taken for granted before the collapse of the
Soviet Union. After the break-up of the Soviet Union,
Russia adopted a much more direct strategy by becoming
financially and militarily involved in conflicts in Tajikistan,
Armenia/Azerbaijan, Georgia and Chechnya. Russia
worried that domestic conflict would spill into its own
territory. The Kremlin also recognized that domestic strife
provided an opportunity to extract concessions from
embattled leaders.
Potential economic windfalls in the area are also causing
Russia to assume a higher profile. Of the pipelines that run
through the region, 80 percent are in Russia proper.19 The
Galvtransneft System, a network of pipelines which
connects 14 different countries, was established by Soviet
engineering and financing. The Russians have taken a
direct interest in maintaining their monopoly in the region.
Its involvement is often coercive and takes the form of
sending troops and shutting off pipelines. A recent example
is Russian refusal to export Turkmen gas via Russian
pipelines because of a dispute over financing.
Russian involvement in the region has been documented
extensively elsewhere. It bears repeating, however, that
Moscow continues to view its former southern republics as
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important geo-political and economic assets and that
Russia’s weakened position in the region is not necessarily
permanent. The southern republics hold resources vital to
Russia’s future and the Kremlin will continue to eye
independent thinking with unease. For these reasons,
Russia will be a central player in the region for the
foreseeable future.
Iran. One of the most efficient routes for bringing gas
and oil to Asia, the area with the greatest potential growth
in energy demand, is through Iran. Armed with geographic
good fortune, Iran has been actively promoting its presence
in the region. Iran has been pursuing ties to the region
through the spread of Korans, by assisting the construction
of pipelines, and by trying to influence political behavior.20
On December 29, 1997, for instance, Turkmenistan and
Iran opened the first natural gas pipeline outside Russian
territory. The 200-kilometer pipeline extends from
southwest Turkmenistan to the village of Kord Kuy in Iran.
The $195 million pipeline will supply power stations in
northern Iran for 25 years, which will allow Iran to redirect
its own natural gas to centers of demand in the south,
including Tehran. At the same time, Shell Oil, Iran, Turkey,
and Turkmenistan have signed an agreement authorizing
Shell to draw up plans for extending the pipeline. The U.S.
State Department is currently investigating whether or not
this violates U.S. sanction laws.
It is doubtful that the U.S. isolation of Iran will continue
to the degree Washington desires. Even with the sanctions,
Iran is able to muster the technological strength to
construct its own pipeline. Tehran is pursuing other
projects such as the Mashad-Serakhs-Tedzen railway
which links Iranian and Central Asian rail networks. As
Iran becomes increasingly involved in the Caucasus and
Central Asia, it will likely bump against U.S., European and
NATO interests. There is no doubt that this will further
strain political relations within the Alliance, as differences
over policy toward Iran are exposed.
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China. China has three overlapping interests in Central
Asia: providing for its growing energy needs, promoting
stability on its western border, and increasing trade, which
all combine to ensure a growing geo-political interest in the
region. China’s need for energy will increase dramatically
over time. A one-time oil exporter of over three million
barrels per day in the mid 1980s, it became a net oil
importer in November 1993.21 Chinese demand for oil is
expected to increase from 18 million barrels per day in 1995
to 32 million barrels per day by 2010. This has driven
Chinese investment in Central Asian energy industries.
Preliminary discussions to construct a pipeline from
Central Asia to eastern China, South Korea and Japan are
underway. Such a project, running over 3,900 miles will be
inordinately expensive, costing in the range of $10 billion.
Chinese commitments to Kazakhstan’s energy industry
exceed $9.5 billion to date.22
China’s interest in the region stems not only from its
energy needs, but from its desire to minimize ethnic
problems on its western border as well. China has had
continuous problems with its western province of Xinjiang
which abuts the Kazakh border. China’s support of the
Kazakh government is, in part, an effort to dissuade Almaty
from supporting the autonomy movements of China’s
indigenous Turkish Muslims. To date, the Kazakh
government has honored its part of the bargain. Beijing’s
concern is that, should a different and more nationalistic
government come to power, Almaty may support rebellion
among its ethnic brethren in China. Therefore China has
supported, the best that it can, Kazakhstan’s oil and gas
industry, as well as other infrastructural projects. In 1992,
50 percent of Kazakh imports of consumer goods were from
China.23 Xinjiang is also home to 150,000 ethnic Kyrgyz
and, not surprising, trade between China and Kyrgyzstan is
also increasing.
Beijing believes that stability is best promoted through
economic growth, and is therefore actively pursuing trade
relations with Central Asian states. China is investing
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heavily in infrastructural development, which has taken its
leaders as far west as Armenia and Georgia in discussions
over joint ventures in rail, road, and ferry links. Its western
border is relatively open, and China views itself as the
natural exporter to the region. Since 1995, China has signed
multiple border treaties throughout the region. What the
region will be able to provide in terms of markets is still an
open question.
These three overlapping interests have made Central
Asia an area of increased Chinese attention. Analysts in
Beijing view the region not only as an opportunity, but as a
place where its interests could collide with other
international actors. Xu Xiaojie, a researcher at the
Petroleum Economic Research Center in Beijing, argues
that future Asian oil-and-gas security will be affected by the
new geopolitical game, ensuing among the West (the U.S.),
Russia and China, and some sensitive areas, like the Black Sea,
Iran-Afghanistan corridor and South China Sea. China
certainly has a great geopolitical advantage to expand its
economic and political will in Asia. Its involvement in the
region’s oil-and-gas affairs will be an important component of
this new geopolitical game . . . China’s future geopolitical
priority certainly will be to regenerate an aggressive geostrategy
that reestablishes a leading role in not just Asia, but the world
scene.24

Thus, as oil and gas export increases, China is positioning
itself to be an active regional player.
Turkey. Turkey has played on its ethnic ties to the
Caucasus and Central Asia. Soon after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, Ankara presented Turkey as a model for
economic and political development to the region. Turkey
has both economic and strategic reasons for considering
Caucasian and Central Asian developments as key to its
own planning.
Turkey is poised to become a major player in the region’s
energy exportation. To date it has invested $2 billion in
Turkmenistan alone. 25 U.S. policy toward Iran, and
244

international interest in promoting a diversification of
pipeline routes, means that the port of Ceyhan in Turkey is
one of the most attractive export transit points for regional
reserves.
But exporting gas and oil is not the only reason for
Turkey’s interest in the region. A historic rival of Russia,
Turkey worries about Russian activities in the region.
Russian military support of Armenia puts Russian weapons
too close for Ankara’s comfort. The fact that CFE limits on
troop deployments permitted in the Southern Flank have
been eased alters the balance of power in the region away
from Turkey. Turkey’s status as a NATO member thus
directly implicates the Alliance in regional developments.
The possibility of a Russo-Turkish collision means Ankara’s
activities are of direct consequence to NATO planners.
The above discussion suggests that, as NATO moves
east, it will run into a host of conflicting interests in the
Caucasus and Central Asia that do not exist on the
European continent. The problems in Europe are confined
primarily to NATO/Russian relations. The concern of
including new members is discussed in terms of what effect
it will have on Russian security and how best to deal with
the consequences. Extending security assistance to the
Caucasus and Central Asia, however, encounters not only
other potentially powerful international actors, but also
intrudes on important economic arrangements. The
likelihood for conflict increases as the two trends of NATO
expansion and energy exploration converge.
NATO’s Potential Conflicts.
The likelihood of NATO becoming involved militarily in
the area increases as international interests diverge. But
perhaps even more important than possible military
confrontations are the political tensions that are likely to
develop among NATO constituent members as new actors,
interests, and goals are confronted. Not only must NATO
planners now consider the logistical and operational
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problems confronting them in the ex-Soviet southern
republics, but a host of local political problems also
confronts NATO. The possibility of domestic crises pulling
NATO into unanticipated crises with regional actors is real.
A NATO presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia will not
only raise questions about how best to engage Russia and
provide for out-of-area operations, but also about the
regional role Turkey should assume and the appropriate
geo-political focus of NATO. NATO activity into the
Caucasus and Central Asia both reinstates familiar
problems and introduces new ones.
Domestic Crises. Local conflicts have the potential to
drag NATO into situations that it might otherwise choose to
avoid. Strife in Kazakhstan, Ngorno Karabakh, and
Georgia, for instance, historically has drawn Russian
participation. The most recent example of this tendency was
the assassination attempt on Georgian President Eduard
Shevardnadze in which Moscow has been implicated. As
NATO pushes eastward, such conflicts could inadvertently
dra w R u ssian a nd NATO f or c es i nto unwanted
confrontation. Georgian calls for a Bosnia-type operation in
Abkhazia suggest that regional actors foresee a role for
NATO security assistance in their own strategic
calculations. Similarly, Kazakhstan’s defense pact with
Ukraine and Ukraine’s special arrangements with NATO
link the Alliance to the regional conflicts in unexpected
ways. In fact, most Central Asian states are tying
themselves closer to Ukraine, viewing it as their link to
Europe. Domestic crises often draw in international allies.
NATO must be careful to avoid overextending its
commitment to the region as it trains and supports local
forces.
The prospect of continued fighting in Chechnya will also
certainly involve NATO, if only indirectly. As discussed
above, the CFE treaty has been altered to allow Russia until
1999 to reduce its Southern Flank forces. Because of the
current state of events, it is difficult to believe that Russia
will actually meet its obligations there. NATO must choose
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whether to support Turkey and the Caucasian states and
demand a reduction in Russian forces, or support gains in
Central Europe under the CFE flank and allow Russia to
remain in violation of the treaty.
Because domestic crises often involve outside powers,
NATO needs to be very careful about the commitments it
makes as it shifts east. For those who would argue that
NATO would never allow itself to overextend its
commitment to the Caucasus and Central Asia, consider the
statement made by Azerbaijan Prime Minister Artur
Rasi-Zade that his country’s leadership has had informal
consultations with NATO on safeguarding oil export
pipelines “should the need to do so arise.”26
Inter-State Conflicts. NATO also risks clashing with
other states with interests in the region. To date, NATO
officials have argued that no country should view PfP as
threatening. NATO repeatedly points out that PfP includes
operations such as humanitarian intervention and search
and rescue procedures. But few countries view the
operations in such light. Beijing, for instance, viewed the
recent parachute expedition as inimical to Chinese
interests. A senior policy planner at one of Beijing’s foreign
policy think tanks argued that “NATO’s move eastwards
was an example of Christian expansion which was
psychologically threatening to China and which could lead
eventually to the clash of civilisations.”27 Most states in the
region view such operations as threatening. The April 1996
Agreement on Mutual Military Confidence-Building
Measures, the first collective agreement among Russia,
China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, suggests
that China and Russia might, in some cases, view
geo-political threats similarly. Should Russia regain its
strength, or China improve its regional presence, it is
unlikely that opposition to PfP activity in the region would
be limited to verbal disagreement.
Diverging Interests among NATO Members. The most
likely way in which the Caucasus and Central Asia will
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affect NATO is through the political conflict it will cause
among NATO members themselves. The extent to which
member states are invested in the region is likely to dictate
how seriously NATO considers Russian moves into an area
previously thought of as Russia’s legitimate sphere of
influence. To date, there has been compromise, most
notably over the CFE agreement. But highly invested
states, such as the United States, are likely to view Russian
moves in the region with much greater apprehension than
other states not as commercially involved.
Different investments will dictate different regional
preferences. NATO members already worry that the
Alliance could be pulled into the region because of one
member’s interest. Denmark, the United States, and Italy
are key supporters of developing a regional focus for PfP
whereby one or more NATO countries form stronger ties
with certain PfP countries. Other allies, skeptical of such an
arrangement, worry that this could lead certain states to
secure a hegemonic position under the cover of PfP. As
Defense News reports, “what all the allies wish to avoid,
however, is a regionalization that leads to special
obligations by some NATO members or distinct spheres of
influence.”28 Should the United States, for instance, expand
ties to the region and continue using PfP as an international
cover, other NATO allies are likely to begin questioning
their support to such a program. What would happen if PfP
activities were pursued against the will of some NATO
members has yet to be answered. It could be, in the
Caucasus and Central Asia.
Differences among the allies also exist about how
prominent a role Turkey should play in the region. The
United States has actively supported a strong role for
Turkey, but European states are not as supportive. With
over a half a million Kurds now residing in Europe, and
notably disproportionately concentrated in Germany,
Germany in particular is hesitant to back a militarily strong
Turkey.29 European states worry that Turkey, in its role as
a NATO partner, will draw the Alliance unexpectedly into
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the region’s conflict. As Graham Fuller points out, “several
NATO states, especially Germany, are concerned about the
implication of potential ‘new’ NATO borders on such trouble
spots as Azerbaijan, Georgia and Iraqi Kurdestan.”30
Inter-Alliance interests will also diverge over which area
of the globe should preoccupy NATO if indeed it pursues an
out-of-area agenda. It is not clear that the Caucasus and
Central Asia are the most demanding of Western attention,
especially because they do not immediately affect the
security of Europe. Control over energy reserves is already
diversified; Central Asia and the Caucasus present yet
another route, not the only route. Despite the U.S. desire to
promote Turkish involvement, other areas of the globe are
perhaps more worthy of NATO attention. For instance, the
millions of North Africans living in Europe make North
African political stability a more pressing concern for
southern European politics and security. The possibility of a
massive influx of refugees from Morocco, Tunisia, or Egypt,
resulting from an Algerian-style crisis, is a very real concern
to southern Europeans because of the potential for
instability. Where to spend NATO’s scarce resources
becomes increasingly debatable as allies redefine their
geo-political priorities.
Conclusion.
Two trends are intersecting in the Caucasus and Central
Asia that have important ramifications for Western
security. As discussed above, the scramble for resources and
NATO expansion are converging in a way that will cause
new opportunities and problems for Western interests.
What is truly worrisome is the lack of attention being given
to such developments.
To date, the region has been discussed primarily within
the framework of “the politics of pipelines.” Analysts are
devoting considerable attention to where pipelines are
being laid, what the most likely routes will be, and the
political fall-out from all such decisions. But “energy
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politics” is not occurring within a strategic vacuum. As the
above discussion has pointed out, energy politics is
occurring simultaneously with an expanding NATO
presence in the region. PfP exercises are increasing in level
and scope on a yearly basis. Western interests are becoming
increasingly tied to the region not only because of the
significant wealth it offers, but because of the strategic
opportunities the region provides as well.
Also problematic is the uneven support among NATO
members for Alliance expansion. Clearly the United States
is taking a central role in this area. Washington is involved
disproportionately with the training of local troops, and
provides training facilities within the United States. The
United States is also actively supporting Turkey’s increased
presence in this area. It is not clear whether this interest in
the region is shared equally among NATO partners. This
might not be a problem, except for the ugly reality of
resource trade-offs. In addition, increased NATO
involvement by definition includes other European states,
which do not seem as enthusiastic about its involvement
there. What role Turkey should play, what kind of resources
should be invested, how the Alliance will manage
confronting international actors it never intended to face in
such a direct manner, and what should happen if NATO
were to become involved in a military conflict in the region
are all important questions to be addressed before increased
involvement continues.
As NATO continues to redefine its roles and missions,
the problems faced are as likely to be political as military.
The challenge of how best to engage Russia and provide for
out-of-area operations that are truly out-of-area will
continue to plague the Alliance, especially in this new and
demanding region. More immediately, the political
problems that NATO expansion is likely to cause will prove
cumbersome. Pushes into the Caucasus and Central Asia,
because of all the overlapping interests, are likely to result
in political quagmires. The Caucasus and Central Asia may
therefore inadvertently become the true test of NATO’s
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ability to respond and adapt to the changing security
environment of the post-Cold War era.
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